The statement expresses grave concern over Pakistan’s “Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan,” which was publicly announced on October 3, 2023. The plan has faced widespread criticism from local and international bodies, including the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the International Organization for Migration, which have called on Pakistan to uphold its international obligations and continue offering protection to at-risk Afghans.

The joint statement also appeals to the international community to provide safe and legal pathways for Afghan journalists, writers, artists, human rights defenders, and other vulnerable individuals seeking refuge from Taliban persecution due to their peaceful expression.

Read the full joint statement here.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by CPJ Staff.

“Sulaiman Rahil is the latest of many Afghan journalists to be swept up by the notorious General Directorate of Intelligence without explanation or charge,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The Taliban continue to show zero tolerance for independent journalists who report anything other than the group’s strictly censored narratives. The Taliban’s intelligence agency is attempting to control the media through fear and to prevent any honest reporting about the difficulties of life in Afghanistan today.”

Rahil, director of the local, independent Radio Khushal, was detained in Ghazni city after publishing a video on Facebook highlighting the plight of two impoverished women, according to the exiled Afghanistan Journalists Center watchdog group. CPJ was unable to locate the video.

Two days prior to his arrest, Rahil had also published a video on Facebook alleging that the provincial head of the Taliban-run National Radio and Television of Afghanistan had insulted him, according to the independent Afghanistan Women’s Voice website.

Rahil has a following of 49,000 on Facebook, where he regularly shares updates about daily events in the city.

Radio Khushal is an FM station that covers religious, cultural, and political issues across the province and regularly shares news on its Facebook page, with 72,000 followers.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid told CPJ via messaging app that he was not aware of Sulaiman Rahil’s detention.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

“We are critically concerned that the chaos in Haiti makes it nearly impossible for anyone — journalists included — to safely go about their daily lives,” said CPJ U.S., Canada, and Caribbean Program Coordinator Katherine Jacobsen. “Order must be restored, not least so that media outlets such as Radio Panic FM can provide news to Haitians and the world, rather than being hijacked to become mouthpieces for gangs.”

Privately owned Radio Panic FM’s director Joseph Allan Jr. told the Haiti-based SOS Journalists group, that the station in the central city of Mirebalais has been under the control of gang members since April 20.

“The gunmen have their own producer to operate the radio station and they played repeatedly a song recently released by their boss Jeff Larose,” the Haitian-Caribbean News Network reported.

Larose heads the Canaan faction of Viv Ansanm, or Living Together in Creole — an alliance of former rival gangs who joined forces in 2023 and took control of most of the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince.

Viv Ansanm attacked Mirebalais in March, forcing residents to flee. Journalist Roger Claudy Israël was taken hostage along with his brother. Both were later released; another journalist, Jean Christophe Collègue, was reported missing by his family.

Panic FM is the fourth Haitian broadcaster to be struck by gangs in the last month, following attacks on Radio Télévision Caraïbes (RTVC) and Mélodie FM, and TV Pluriel, in Port-au-Prince.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by CPJ Staff.

“Taliban intelligence must release journalist Sayed Rashed Kashefi immediately and unconditionally,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The continued detention of journalists like Kashefi is part of a ruthless campaign to silence independent reporting and intimidate the media into submission. This blatant assault on press freedom must end now.”

Taliban intelligence agents detained Kashefi after he was summoned to the GDI’s Directorate of Media and Public Affairs under the pretext of retrieving his mobile phone, video recording camera, and voice recorder, which had been confiscated in mid-March by agents who suspected him of working with Afghan exiled media, according to a journalist who spoke to CPJ on condition of anonymity, for fear of reprisal.

Kashefi, who was previously a journalist for the state-owned English-language newspaper, The Kabul Times, has been working as an independent reporter covering current affairs in Kabul.

He has been detained by the Taliban before. In December 2021, a senior official and his bodyguards held Kashefi for six hours during his reporting in Kabul and beat him.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not respond to CPJ’s request for comment sent via messaging app.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by CPJ Staff.

Respect for sovereignty? Are these well-intentioned but completely misguided folks incapable of remembering the not so distant past?

Did America respect Korea’s sovereignty when it canceled free and open elections there in 1950, instigating an unnecessary, brutal war? Over 2 million Koreans were killed.

Did America respect Vietnam’s sovereignty when it decided Vietnam could not have a Communist government there and slaughtered 3 million people? Vietnam is communist now. I’ve lived there. It does just fine.

Did America respect Serbia’s sovereignty when it bombed Belgrade for 79 days and finally carved out Kosovo so it could build what was for years the largest NATO base in Eastern Europe?

Did America respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty when it refused to work with the Taliban when they offered to hand over Osama bin Laden, but chose instead to invade and launch a 22-year war? We killed tens of thousands of Afghanis, lost the war. The Taliban is still in power.

Did America respect Iraq’s sovereignty when it lied about weapons of mass destruction and invaded, killing, and displacing hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens?

Did America respect Libya’s sovereignty when it and its NATO puppets destroyed the richest country in Africa and killed its revered leader, Muammar Gaddafi? Libya is a broken country now with a dysfunctional economy and open slave markets.

Did America respect Syria’s sovereignty when it funded terrorists to topple the government of Assad and eventually built bases in the country to choke off the food supply of the Syrian people and “steal their oil”?

Did America itself respect Ukraine’s sovereignty when it engineered the Maidan coup in 2014, toppled the democratically elected president, and installed a US puppet regime in power?

I could go on. But I’ll mention one last one, keeping in mind the Russiagate hoax where Russia was falsely accused of meddling in US elections …

Did America respect RUSSIA’S SOVEREIGNTY when it funded the re-election campaign of Boris Yeltsin in 1996, because we knew he would do our bidding?

Sovereignty, eh? If any of our leaders can even spell ‘sovereignty’, they sure as hell have no idea what it means.

This content originally appeared on Dissident Voice and was authored by John Rachel.

The Ministry of Information and Culture issued a verbal directive to media executives in the capital Kabul on February 13, stating that organizations may only address political and economic issues through the group’s spokespersons, two local journalists told CPJ on condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisal.

“The Taliban must allow Afghan media to operate independently,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “This latest move to censor discussion, reporting, and debate of political and economic issues is yet another repressive measure that indicates the extreme measures the Taliban are taking to totally dismantle Afghanistan’s independent media.”

In September, the Taliban banned live political shows and ordered journalists to obtain their approval before broadcasting pre-recorded shows, featuring pre-approved topics and participants. Journalists wishing to interview an expert outside of the Taliban’s list of 68 approved speakers had to seek the information ministry’s permission.

CPJ’s text messages requesting comment from Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not receive a response.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

The Taliban’s Ministry of Information and Culture accused the outlet of “non-compliance” with regulations and collaboration with an unnamed foreign-based television network. The ministry said it was investigating the broadcaster’s activities but did not specify a date to end the suspension.

The outlet refuted the accusations in a statement, according to a report by London-based broadcaster Afghanistan International.

“The Taliban must immediately rescind its suspension of Radio Begum’s operations and allow the station to resume its reporting without interference,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The forced closure of Radio Begum is part of a broader, systematic assault on women’s rights in Afghanistan, particularly targeting women-led and women-owned media organizations. This practice must end, and the international community must hold the Taliban accountable for these actions.”  

Founded in 2021, just months before the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, Radio Begum is a women-led media broadcaster in Kabul that also posts on social media, particularly Facebook. In November 2023, its sister channel, Begum TV, was launched in Paris with a grant from the Malala Fund, which advocates for girls’ education globally.

CPJ’s messages to Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid requesting comment did not receive a response.

In March 2023, the Taliban shut down women-run broadcaster Radio Sada e Banowan, citing the airing of music during the holy month of Ramadan. The station was permitted to resume operations on April 7 and continues to report on news about women in the city of Faizabad in northeastern Badakhshan Province.  

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

“Sayed Rahim Saeedi has been sentenced to three years in prison without access to a lawyer or due process in the Taliban’s courts, while also suffering from serious health complications,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “Taliban authorities must immediately release Saeedi and ensure that he receives necessary medical support and treatment.”

Saeedi has been transferred to Kabul’s central Pul-e-Charkhi prison. He is suffering from lumbar disc disease and prostate complications, the journalist source told CPJ.

The Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence detained Saeedi, his son, journalist Sayed Waris Saeedi, and their camera operator, Hasib, who goes only by one name, on July 14, 2024, in Kabul and transferred them to an undisclosed location. While the younger Saeedi and Hasib were released two days later, Saeedi remained in detention.

According to the exile-based watchdog group Afghanistan Journalists Center, Saeedi was arrested for his work criticizing the Taliban, including a screenplay he wrote about a girl denied an education by Taliban authorities.

According to the Afghanistan Journalists Center, restrictions on the country’s media are tightening.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not respond to CPJ’s request for comment via messaging app.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

“Mahdi Ansary’s unjust sentence is indicative of the Taliban’s continued brutality and suppression of press freedom in Afghanistan,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “Taliban authorities must immediately release Ansary and Sayed Rahim Saeedi, the other known detained journalist, as well as all anyother Afghan journalists imprisoned by the group without public knowledge.”

The start of Ansary’s prison term was set as October 5, 2024, when he was apprehended while returning home from his office in Kabul.

The General Directorate of Intelligence confirmed Ansary’s detention but withheld information regarding his whereabouts or the reasons for his arrest. Ansary, who is a member of Afghanistan’s persecuted Hazara ethnic minority, had been reporting on killings and atrocities against the community under Taliban rule.

On October 8, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid told CPJ via messaging app that the journalist was working with “banned [media] networks” and had engaged in “illegal activities.”

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by CPJ Staff.

More than three years later, the two journalists run the agency from exile in the United States. To get out the news, they rely on the reporting of 15 female journalists hired in 10 provinces to replace the staff who fled. As the Taliban has become increasingly hostile to women journalists and the exile press, the newsroom takes extreme security precautions. Zoom meetings take place with a strict “cameras off” policy so that the women won’t be compromised if they recognize each other on the street.

In June, CPJ interviewed Karimi and Siddiqi in Columbia, Missouri, where they were attending a safety training for journalists in exile at the University of Missouri’s School of Journalism. During the interview, both men checked their phones often, explaining the importance of remaining available at all times for their reporters.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Can you describe the atmosphere for the press immediately after the Taliban takeover?

Karimi: When the Taliban took over, our hope collapsed overnight. We were working journalists for eight years before the takeover and we used our journalism against extremist Taliban ideology. Our work aimed to promote democratic values and human rights in our country by creating a newsroom and outlet for female journalists. Eight years of such work was evidence enough for the Taliban to attack us. 

Siddiqi: Social norms in Afghanistan regarding women’s rights are very sensitive and this was the main reason we had to flee. When you are talking about women’s rights in Afghanistan, you are not only facing danger from the Taliban, but also from others in the country who adhere to such radical beliefs.

I remember when we were working in Herat, our office was in a very safe location, but even our neighbors would question why so many women were entering the building. They assumed there was some ethical wrongdoing. Since our work highlighted women’s issues, we were in danger from the Taliban and the pervasive misogyny in the society at large.

The Afghanistan Women’s News Agency is one of just a handful of women-focused outlets covering Afghanistan, like Rukshana Media and Zan Times. What led you to found it in 2016?

Karimi: Siddiqi and I both taught at Herat University. As a professor of journalism, I witnessed my female students struggle and face a lack of resources and opportunities every day. The disparity between them and my male students was blatantly obvious. Lack of access to media equipment, gender inequality in the newsroom, harassment and discrimination was a daily reality for these women.

In light of this, I decided to create a safe environment for my female students to publish their stories, [to] access media equipment and the internet eight years before the Taliban takeover. Although the Taliban was not yet in power, the extremist ideology had already begun to spread rapidly.

Families were understandably concerned when their daughters went to school or the newsroom, but when we established this newsroom solely for women, almost all female journalists across Herat came to work there. As a professor, I had the trust of these women’s families. That’s why I, as a man, was able to set up this space and reassure the families that it was safe.

Part of your staff is in exile, but you still have many female journalists based in Afghanistan. What’s their experience like?

Karimi: All of our female reporters on the ground have to remain anonymous for their safety as per our contract. Their names are never published with their stories. There are currently 15 female journalists working with us, spread across 10 provinces. Some of them are our former interns whom we hired permanently and some of them are currently interns who receive training through Zoom, so that they can be the next generation of female reporters. All of them are actively reporting, even interns, as they learn and are simultaneously paid for their work.

Siddiqi: It’s important to add that our reporters know each other by name only. Our reporters have never met or seen each other’s faces since we require them to turn their cameras off during virtual meetings. We are extremely strict about our security protocols in order to ensure that if one of our reporters faces Taliban retaliation, their colleagues will remain safe. Our reporters know that even a minor mistake can put our whole newsroom in danger.

It is obvious that these women are well aware of the danger that comes with being journalists. Why are they still in the country and choosing to report despite these risks?

Siddiqi: From my understanding and through my conversations with them, there are two main reasons. One, these women are wholly committed to their work. When I am talking with them, I learn that they work more than eight hours a day because they love their job. They all know the impact that they are making in the current environment. Two, financial security is also a huge part of their choice to report. It is rare for women to work and receive salaries in the country under the Taliban. AWNA pays its journalists and this provides them with some level of control and financial independence.

Karimi: These female journalists know that the stakes are very high. Many times I have told them that their security is our priority. We don’t want any report or story that puts their safety at risk, but they still don’t prioritize themselves. They prioritize their reporting. Nobody can stop them from making their voices heard even in the most repressive atmosphere.

What is it like for you when your reporters are so far away while you are in exile?

Karimi: To be honest, I am not comfortable. Sometimes I think something bad has happened to a colleague. Trying to minimize their risk is one of our strategies and biggest challenges. I am very concerned every single day.

Have any of the female journalists working for AWNA had dangerous encounters with the Taliban?

Siddiqi: Just a few days ago, one of our female reporters called me from Kabul while she was attempting to report on a business exhibition. Upon entering the venue, she was detained by the Taliban. In the commotion of a large crowd, she somehow managed to hide herself and escaped without facing arrest.

I called her after that and I reiterated that this cannot be the norm. I told her that we cannot lose her and that without her, there would be no reporting. My colleague replied that she tries her best and knows all the newsroom security protocols. But even for non-political events, this is the risk and the reality for female journalists in the country.

How has reporting from exile shaped your view of the future of the media in Afghanistan? 

Karimi: In my opinion, the lack of free and independent media in the country has created a need for reliable media in exile to combat Taliban propaganda and control. There is a lack of female-run media. We have bypassed the Taliban firewall by providing information from exile to empower people within the country, especially women.

Siddiqi: There are so many Afghan women who are students, photographers, activists, and writers, as well as journalists who can no longer publicize their work on their own channels due to safety concerns. Many of them have found a place in AWNA in order to share their work and add value to the media atmosphere. These are all citizens and female journalists. There are thousands of women who have something to share, journalists by training or not, who are acting as citizen journalists. They have something to show and we are dedicated to uplifting it.

Do you both hope to return to your country if things change?

Siddiqi: I chose to leave my parents, siblings, everything in order to escape the regime.

Life is not easy for me here. I left my memories and emotions in Afghanistan. Everyday these memories disturb me. I was educated and began my career in Afghanistan and I believe I owe my country.

Karimi: Of course I hope to go back to my country. Right now, I feel that I have three lives as an exiled journalist: The first is the life I left behind in Afghanistan, which includes most of my family. Half of my mind and heart remains there. My second life is this one in exile where I am forced to rebuild my personal and professional life from scratch. My third life revolves around how to keep my colleagues safe and to honor their mission as female journalists. I am constantly navigating these three lives and it is a devastating reality.

What is your hope for Afghan women journalists in the future?

Siddiqi: There is no hope bigger than Afghan women having their basic human rights and access to education. If there is no education for women, there is no understanding of their reality and rights. If there is no understanding in a society, there is no justice. If there is no justice, we are no longer in a human society, but in a jungle. The Taliban has shut off all the doors that were once available for Afghan women and together, we are trying to pry them open.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Ananya Bhasin.

“The raid on Arezo TV and expulsion of its women journalists shows the Taliban’s troubling commitment to cracking down on Afghan independent media, as it works to silence free voices and restrict the public’s access to information,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The Taliban must immediately and unconditionally release the seven detained journalists and media workers and permit the channel to resume broadcasting without further interference.”

The journalist told CPJ that the Taliban accused Arezo TV journalists during the raid of collaborating with and reporting for exiled media outlets operating outside Afghanistan. The current whereabouts of the detained journalists remain unknown.

Saif ul Islam Khyber, a spokesperson for the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, told media in an audio message that the group sealed Arezo TV’s offices to uphold “Islamic values, prevent misuse of media outlets, and strengthen social order.”

Khyber said Arezo TV was involved in dubbing foreign soap operas, purportedly with the backing of exiled media organizations.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by CPJ Staff.

“The Taliban’s latest ban on television and filming and photography in Takhar should trouble anyone who cares about media freedom worldwide” said CPJ’s program director, Carlos Martínez de la Serna, in New York. “The citizens of Afghanistan deserve fundamental rights, and the international community must cease its passive observation of the country’s rapid regression.” 

The ban was approved by senior officials from the Taliban’s provincial General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), directorates of Information and Culture, and the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, as well as the governor’s office of Takhar province.

Takhar is the second province in Afghanistan to institute such a ban. Previously, the Taliban implemented a similar ban in Kandahar province, its unofficial capital and the residence of the group’s leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, according to a Kandahar-based journalist who also spoke to CPJ under the condition of anonymity for fear of Taliban retaliation.

Saif ul Islam Khyber, a spokesman for the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, confirmed to the Associated Press that media outlets in the provinces of Takhar, Maidan Wardak, and Kandahar had been “advised not to broadcast or display images of anything possessing a soul—meaning humans and animals,” according to the AP. Khyber said the directive is part of the implementation of a recently ratified morality law. 

Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada signed the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice bill into law on July 31, though the news was not made public until August 21, when it was published on the Ministry of Justice’s website.

Article 17 of the law details the restrictions on the media, including a ban on publishing or broadcasting images of living people and animals, which the Taliban regards as un-Islamic. Other sections order women to cover their bodies and faces and travel with a male guardian, while men are not allowed to shave their beards. The punishment for breaking the law is up to three days in prison or a penalty “considered appropriate by the public prosecutor.”

On October 14, Qari Yousuf Ahmadi, the director of Taliban-controlled Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), informed senior management of Kabul’s national TV station that a phased strategy to implement the new law had already begun. TV stations across Afghanistan’s provinces will be gradually closed and converted to radio stations, with plans to eventually extend the ban to Kabul, where RTA and other major national broadcasters operate, according to two journalists familiar with the meeting and a report by the London-based independent outlet, Afghanistan International. 

On October 19, during a visit to Sheikh Zahid University in Khost province, Neda Mohammad Nadim, the Taliban’s Minister of Higher Education, barred the filming of the event, according to the London-based Afghanistan International.

On October 23, the Taliban’s Ministry of Defense launched the broadcast of Radio Sada-e-Khalid, which is managed by the ministry and operates from the 201st Corps of the Taliban army.

Since taking power in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, the Taliban has employed a gradual strategy to suppress media activity in the country, with the General Directorate of Intelligence forcing compliance with stringent regulations.  These include bans on music and soap operas, bans on women’s voices in the media, the imposition of mask-wearing for female presenters, a ban on live broadcasts of political shows, the closure of television stations, and the jamming or boycotting of independent international networks broadcasting to Afghanistan. To enforce these policies, the Taliban have detained, assaulted, and threatened journalists and media workers throughout the country.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by CPJ Staff.

“Taliban intelligence must release journalists Mahdi Ansary and Hekmat Aryan immediately and unconditionally,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “Afghan journalists face unprecedented pressure from the Taliban, who continue to get away with their ruthless crackdown without being held to account. The Taliban must end these crimes against journalists once for all.”

On September 29, Aryan, the director of the independent Khoshhal radio station, was detained by dozens of Taliban intelligence agents from his office in Ghazni city and transferred to an undisclosed location, according to a journalist who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. Aryan’s detention is reportedly linked to an alleged discussion on Khoshhal radio about the Taliban’s past suicide operations.

Separately, Ansary, a reporter for the Afghan News Agency, disappeared on the evening of October 5 while returning home from his office in Kabul, according to a journalist familiar with the situation, who also spoke on condition of anonymity. Local Taliban intelligence agents initially confirmed Ansary’s detention, but his current whereabouts remain unknown.

The reason behind Ansary’s detention remains unclear. However, the journalist has frequently reported on the killings and atrocities against the Hazara ethnic minority during the Taliban’s rule.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid told CPJ via messaging app that both the journalists were working with “banned [media] networks” and had engaged in “illegal activities.”

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by CPJ Staff.

On September 21, the Taliban’s Ministry of Information and Culture summoned media executives in the capital Kabul and issued an unprecedented list of restrictions on media freedom, two reporters in Kabul told CPJ on condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisal.

The ministry ordered domestic journalists producing daily political discussion shows to seek its approval each morning of proposed topics and participants. Shows must then be pre-recorded and approved by the Taliban prior to broadcasting. Content contrary to Taliban policies or critical of the group or its officials must be removed, it said.

The ministry later issued a one-page directive, reviewed by CPJ, detailing the new rules. It said that journalists wishing to interview an expert who is not on the Taliban’s list must seek the information ministry’s permission. If any of the rules are violated, the Taliban will hold the media manager, political show desk officer, editor-in-chief, and the guest accountable, and “they will be dealt accordingly,” the directive said.

“The Taliban must immediately reverse their draconian media restrictions and stop dragging Afghanistan back to the Stone Age,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “These new restrictions signal the end of fundamental media freedoms in Afghanistan and seek to transform the media into a Taliban propaganda tool. This must be stopped, once and for all.”

A third journalist in Afghanistan, also speaking on condition of anonymity, told CPJ that the Taliban had already begun preventing live broadcasts by verbally ordering media executives not to run them in the days prior to the September 21 meeting.

Earlier in September, the Taliban jammed broadcasts in Kabul of the popular London-based Afghanistan International television network.

CPJ’s text messages to Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid requesting comment went unanswered.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by CPJ Staff.

“The Taliban must immediately cease jamming Afghanistan International’s broadcasts, which marks a new low in their shameful campaign to silence an important source of independent news in Afghanistan,” said CPJ Program Director Carlos Martínez de la Serna. “The Taliban’s decision to use this sophisticated technology is highly alarming, demonstrating the lengths they are prepared to go to in order to prevent the free flow of information and news to the Afghan people.”

Harun Najafizada, executive editor of Afghanistan International, told CPJ that the television station had been using other satellites to ensure people in Kabul could watch its news after September 5, when the Taliban blocked its usual signal from a ground station in Afghanistan. Any independent media organization committed to providing accurate information faces threats and intimidation from the Taliban, he said.

Video clips reviewed by CPJ showed black screens and a “no signal” message on the TV station’s usual frequency. Kabul residents told CPJ that the signal was intermittent due to the jamming.

On September 4, the Taliban’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Stanekzai denounced Afghanistan International as an “enemy” for reporting that aid relief sent to the flooded northern province of Baghlan had been allegedly misused. In May, the Taliban ordered journalists and citizens to boycott Afghanistan International for falsifying information and producing broadcasts that aided the group’s opponents.

It is the country’s most popular international television channel, also available via social media and cable.

CPJ’s text messages to Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid requesting comment on the broadcast jamming went unanswered.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by CPJ Staff.

In his September 4 speech, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Stanekzai attacked the independent outlet as an “enemy” for reporting that aid relief sent to the flooded northern province of Baghlan had been allegedly misused. This latest criticism follows the Taliban’s ban in May on journalists and experts from cooperating with Afghanistan International and on people providing facilities for broadcasting the channel in public.

Separately, on September 4, Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice officials met with Afghan media executives in the capital Kabul and gave them verbal orders to replace Persian words — which they described as “Iranian” — with the Pashto equivalent in their reporting.

Persian, also known as Farsi, is the most widely spoken language in Afghanistan and in neighboring Iran. But the Taliban mainly speak Pashto and they have removed Persian words from signboards for public institutions and spoken out against the teaching of Persian in universities since their return to power in 2021.

The officials also ordered the journalists to respect Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada.

“The Taliban must immediately halt their campaign of intimidation against Afghanistan International and lift their restrictions on Persian-language reporting,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The Taliban’s recent vice and virtue law has already emboldened their notorious morality police to further restrict the media, threatening to annihilate press freedom gains made during the two previous decades of democratic rule in Afghanistan.”

CPJ’s text messages to Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid requesting comment went unanswered.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

The Taliban government in Afghanistan is drawing renewed outrage over a new law banning women’s voices in public, forcing them to completely cover their bodies and faces out of the home, and more. This comes after the Taliban banned women from working in most fields and ended girls’ education past primary school following their takeover of the country in 2021. We speak with Sima Samar, an Afghan human rights advocate and doctor who chaired the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission from 2002 until 2019; she also briefly served as minister of women’s affairs in the interim Afghan government in 2002, after a U.S.-led coalition toppled the first Taliban government for its support of al-Qaeda. “You cannot see such a law in any other regime on this planet,” she says. “This is a crime against humanity. It is gender apartheid.”

This content originally appeared on Democracy Now! and was authored by Democracy Now!.

Image by Diana Vargas.

Most Americans vilify the Taliban and are horrified at the draconian rules they impose on every resident and organization,and especially their oppression of Afghani women and girls. So why are millions of freedom-loving Americans rushing to vote for candidates who plan to impose white Christian nationalism (WCN) on our country? Yes, Christianity and Islam have different religious doctrines and rituals, but a theocracy is a theocracy. Do Americans really want to live in a nation where a particular religious doctrine dictates the beliefs, behaviors, and status of every individual and group?

The WCN movement is imbedded in the Trump-Vance candidacy and complements and animates the authoritarianism and white supremacy of Project 2025. It passionately supports the myth that the United States was founded as a white Christian nationand must be restored this “original” state, where only white native-born Christians are “true” Americans. In fact, however, the “founding fathers” were a collection of atheists, Unitarians, Deists, and liberal (not evangelical) Protestants, and nowhere does the Constitution refer to God, the Bible, or the Ten Commandments.

However, these erroneous beliefs appeal to people who resent the changing racial and religious demographics of our country, and they are a driving force in the 2024 election. States with a strong WCN presence give us a preview of what our lives will be like if the WCN movement prevails.

In places like Texas, we see the tragic effects of the elimination of women’s reproductive rights. To maintain the myth that we are a white nation, Florida and other states have passed laws forbidding any mention of race or specific racial groups in schools and any efforts to racially diversify workplaces or educational institutions. Recently a college professor was told that she would be fired if she didn’t remove a poster of Martin Luther King (who was a Baptist preacher) that hung in her office. In support of straight white male supremacy, The WCN loyalists that now run New College in Florida recently threw the books accumulated by the Gender and Diversity Center into a dumpster.

The separation between church and state, a foundational American principle, has been erased with public school teachers forced to teach the Bible in Oklahoma; the Ten Commandments must be posted in public buildings in Louisiana. Book banning in schools and libraries is occurring across the country wherever WCN proponents have gained control of school boards and town and city councils. And if the WCN movement takes over our country, those restrictions may expand to other media. Many popular entertainers, shows, movies, and TV series portray and celebrate racial, sexual, and lifestyle diversity. These images are an anathema to the WCN idealization of (white) families with a breadwinning father and a stay-at-home mother and (biological) kids as the only acceptable foundation of our society.

Fitting into these narrow definitions of legitimacy and following draconian WCN rules will profoundly affect all aspects of our lives, from how we make basic life choices to whether or not we get a particular job. Most frightening of all, is the prospect that over 340 million Americans who have a wide range of religious beliefs and affiliations, including 25 percent that have no religious connections, will have to adhere to WCN rules. What economic, social, and physical pressures will be used to force all of us to abide by this draconian form of Christianity? Given that WCN proponents embrace authoritarianism and believe that white Christian men are free to use threats and violence to gain and maintain power, we have a lot to fear.

So here we are in the 21^st century, a democratic country with a wide range of religious diversity and a long history of increasingly ensuring the rights of people of different races, creeds, genders, and abilities. Yet half of our fellow citizens are passionately supporting candidates who insist that all Americans be ruled by white Christian Nationalists who are only a small segment of people who identify as Christians. In contrast, many mainstream Protestant Christian churches (e.g., United Church of Christ, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Methodist) proudly fly Black Lives Matter and Gay Pride flags and view WCN as a dangerous mockery of the Bible and the teachings of Jesus. Check out Christian groups like Faithful America that are vigorously warning about the threats of a WCN takeover.

So, if you and your friends think that white Christian nationalists will “save America,” take a hard look at their specific plans and consider how they will affect your life, your community, and every American. On November 5, vote for Harris and Walz and Democrats at local, state and federal levels to preserve our “unalienable Rights…[to] Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

The post Taliban American Style? appeared first on CounterPunch.org.

This content originally appeared on CounterPunch.org and was authored by Patricia Ramsey.

“The Law for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice grants the Taliban’s notorious morality police extensive powers to further restrict Afghanistan’s already decimated media community,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “This law marks yet another appalling blow to press freedom in Afghanistan, where the morality police has worsened a crackdown on journalists and fundamental human rights for the past three years.” 

Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada signed the bill into law on July 31, although the news was not made public until August 21, when it was published on the Ministry of Justice’s website.

Article 17 details the restrictions on the media, including a ban on publishing or broadcasting images of living people and animals, which the Taliban regards as unIslamic. Other sections order women to cover their bodies and faces and travel with a male guardian, while men are not allowed to shave their beards. The punishment for breaking the law is up to three days in prison or a penalty “considered appropriate by the public prosecutor.”

In its annual report this month, Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice said, without providing details, that it had “successfully implemented 90% of reforms across audio, visual, and print media” and arrested 13,000 people for “immoral acts.” Several journalists were among those detained.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not respond to CPJ’s request for comment via messaging app.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

Except for revenging terrorist attacks by Iranian dissidents and Israeli intelligence and military services, the Islamic Republic has not harmed anybody in the Western nations. In the last 200 years, Iran has fought only one war ─ a defensive battle against aggressor Iraq. It has assisted friendly nations in their conflicts with other nations, similar to United States actions, but on a smaller scale. The demise of Ayatollah Khomeini established a refreshed Islamic Republic that promoted cordial relations with nations who were willing to return the cordiality. Iran has not sought hegemony, economic advantage, or extension of its influence to others than those who desire the influence.

Do a somersault and find the real Iran. The real Iran has tried to cooperate with the United States and other nations and bring peace and stability to the Middle East.

This does not excuse Iran’s semi-autocratic regime and human rights violations, no more than they can be excused in nations with whom the United States has friendly relations — Israel, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Mexico, Tajikistan, and others. For American diplomats, the concept of “cannot excuse” is an excuse for not engaging in diplomacy and resolving problems with Iran. The results have been disasters — harm to American society, harm to the American people, and an unending voyage to calamities.

Designating Iran as the greatest menace to peace assumes there is peace in the Middle East. Is there peace and has there been peace since the words Middle East entered the lexicon? The conflagrations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria would have existed without the presence of the Islamic Republic; the former two wars occurred due to United States’ invasions in those nations. Is the Islamic Republic responsible for Israel’s continuous wars with its neighbors and for Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the Emirates battles with their own citizens and quarrels they had with Yemen and Gaddafi’s Libya. The Islamic Republic and its well-educated and alert citizens have not initiated a war against another nation and their restraint holds the key to Middle East peace. The United States refusal to allow the key to unlock the cages that maintain the doves of peace is one of the great tragedies of the century. This was shown in the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Unlike America, Iran had special connections and interests in Afghanistan. After the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. officials responsible for preparing the war in Afghanistan, solicited help to unseat the Taliban and establish a stable government in Kabul. Iran had organized the resistance by the Northern Alliance and provided the Alliance arms and funding, which helped topple the Taliban regime.  In an interview with Iranian Press Service (IPS), Flynt Leverett, senior director for Middle East affairs in the National Security Council (NSC), said, “The Iranians had real contacts with important players in Afghanistan and were prepared to use their influence in constructive ways in coordination with the United States.”

Because the Northern Alliance played a significant role in driving the Taliban out of Kabul in November 2001, they demanded 60 percent of the portfolios in an interim government and blocked agreement with other opposition groups. According to the U.S. envoy to Afghanistan, Richard Dobbins, Iran played a “decisive role” in persuading the Northern Alliance delegation to compromise its demands.

Dobbins, J. (2009). “Negotiating with Iran: Reflections from Personal Experience,” The Washington Quarterly, 33(1), 149–162.

The Northern Alliance delegate, Younis Qanooni, on instructions from Kabul, was insisting that his faction not only retain the three most important ministries—defense, foreign affairs, and interior—but also hold three-fourths of the total. These demands were unacceptable to the other three Afghan factions represented in Bonn. Unless the Northern Alliance demand could be significantly reduced, there was no way the resultant government could be portrayed as broadly based and representative.

Finally Iranian representative, Javad Zarif, stood up, and signaled Qanooni to join him in the corner of the room. They spoke in whispers for no more than a minute. Qanooni then returned to the table and offered to give up two ministries. He also agreed to create three new ones that could be awarded to other factions. We had a deal. For the following six months, Afghanistan would be governed by an interim administration composed of 29 department heads plus a chairman. Sixteen of these posts would go to the Northern Alliance, just slightly more than half.

Dobbins worked with Iranian negotiators in Bonn and related that at a donors conference in Tokyo, in January, 2002, Iran pledged $540 million in assistance to Afghanistan.

Dobbins writes:

Emerging from a larger gathering in Tokyo, one of the Iranian representatives took me aside to reaffirm his government’s desire to continue to cooperate on Afghanistan. I agreed that this would be desirable, but warned that Iranian behavior in other areas represented an obstacle to cooperation. Furthermore, I cautioned him by saying that my brief only extends to Afghanistan. He replied by saying, “We know that. We would like to work on these other issues with the appropriate people in your government.”

On returning to Washington, O’Neill and I reported these conversations, to then-National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice and cabinet level colleagues, and to the Middle Eastern Bureau at the Department of State (DOS). No one evinced any interest. The Iranians received no private reply. Instead, they received a very public answer. One week later, in his State of the Union address, President George W. Bush named Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, an “axis of evil.” How arch-enemies Iran and Iraq could form any axis, evil or otherwise, was never explained.

How would the Afghanistan fiasco have played out if the American governments cooperated with the Iranian governments? No analysis can supply a definite and credible answer; clues are available.

The result of 20 years of U.S. occupation and battle in Afghanistan resulted in nearly 111,000 civilians killed or injured, more than 64,100 national military and police killed, about 2500 American soldiers killed and 20,660 injured in action, and $1 trillion spent by the U.S. in all phases of a conflict that ended with the Taliban return to power. The only accomplishment of the twenty years of strife had Osama bin Laden leave the isolated, uncomfortable, and rugged mountain caves in Tora Bora for a comfortable and well-equipped walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, a gift from Pakistan intelligence. Note that the al-Qaeda leader did not flee to U.S. adversary, Iran; he joined his family in U.S. friendly, Pakistan. The 20-year U.S. occupation of Afghanistan was a catastrophe and anything is better than a catastrophe.

More than any other nation Iran had justifiable reasons for wanting a stable, friendly, and economically secure government in Afghanistan.

• Iran had previous problems with the Taliban and did not want to repeat them.
• Terrorists enter Iran from Afghanistan and cause havoc to the Islamic Republic.
• Iran and the Afghan government created a free trading zone on their border and Iran wanted to continue to continue to exploit the arrangement.
• In 2017, Iran surpassed Pakistan as Afghanistan’s top trade partner and, in 2019, Iranian exports reached $1.24 billion.
• Iran had funded construction of the 90-mile (140 kilometer) line from Khaf in northeastern Iran to Ghoryan in western Afghanistan.
• Iran and Afghanistan had several mutual problems that needed, and still need, close contact to resolve. Among them are water distribution, poppy production in Afghanistan, export of opium to Iran, and refugee flow to Iran. “Between 1979 and 2014, Iran claims to have lost some 4,000 security forces fighting heavily armed drug traffickers along its eastern border. In 2019, Iran seized more heroin and illicit morphine than any other country, according to U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.”
• Iran shared ethnic, linguistic and religious links with millions of Afghan Shi’a and was interested in their protection.

More than any other nation, Iran had assets to assist in achieving a stable, friendly, peaceful, and economically secure government in Afghanistan.

• Iran was a large source of foreign direct investment, and provided millions of dollars for Afghanistan’s western provinces to build roads, electrical grids, schools, and health clinics.
• Afghanistan found Iran could assist Afghanistan in trade. “On April 2016, Iran, Afghanistan and India signed an agreement to develop the Chabahar port in southeastern Iran as a trading hub for all three nations.  Afghan goods would be transported to the Iranian port by rail, and then be shipped to India by sea. The first phase of the port was inaugurated in 2017.”
• Iran had knowledge of Taliban personnel, arrangements, and activities. It had contacts and informants who could provide intelligence.
• Not sure if they would acquiesce, but the Iranians could accommodate bases from which to attack the Taliban and to which fighters could retreat.

The U.S. State Department learned nothing from its disjointed and catastrophic actions in Afghanistan. It repeated the same worthless and aggressive policy in its invasion of Iraq.

After supporting Iraq against Iran in the 1980s Iraq-Iran war, the U.S. declared war in 1991 against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and performed a first in the history of foreign policy ─ helping a nation that wars against a nation that is not doing any harm to you, and then attacking the nation that it helped do the harm to the nation that was not harming you. The U.S. continued with sanctions against the nation it previously supported, Iraq, and then, in 2003, engaged it in another war, finally ending up with the nation it initially wanted to contain, Iran, essentially winning the war without firing another shot, and gaining influence in Iraq; another example of a U.S. policy toward Iran that backfired. Foreign policy at its finest.

While stumbling and fumbling its way into destroying Iraq, the U.S. managed to have al-Qaeda (remember them, the guys that America invaded Afghanistan to defeat) reconstitute itself in Iraq. This renewed al-Qaeda, “organized a wave of attacks, often suicide bombings, that targeted security forces, government institutions, and Iraqi civilians.” The American military was forced to use Iraq’s notorious militias, known as “Awakening Councils,” to expel the al-Qaeda organization; a short-lived victory that led to the formation of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS).

A statement by the ever-unaware President Trump, in a January 8, 2020 speech, argued the US had been responsible for defeating ISIS and the Islamic Republic should realize that it is in their benefit to work with the United States in making sure ISIS remained defeated. The US spent years and billions of dollars in training an Iraqi army that fled Mosul and left it to a small contingent of ISIS forces. Showing no will and expertise to fight, Iraq’s debilitated military permitted ISIS to rapidly expand and conquer Tikrit and other cities. Events energized Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, which, with cooperation from Iran and personal assistance from Major General Qasem Soleimani, was able to retake Tikrit and Ramadi, push ISIS out of Fallujah, and eventually play a leading role in ISIS’ defeat in Mosul. The U.S. honored Soleimani’s efforts by assassinating him ─ one of the most vicious crimes in history ─ and commended Iran by continually sanctioning it. No good deed goes unpunished.

As in Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic assisted in the re-building of Iraq. As far back as 2012, The Guardian reported that “Iran is one of Iraq’s most important regional economic partners, with an annual trade volume between the two sides standing at $8bn to $10b.” The U.S. confused competitive advantage with diabolical meddling and regarded Iran as a troubling factor in the Fertile Crescent, even though the inhabitants of Mesopotamia considered the United States as the troublemaker in the region. Iran had leverage in Iraq that could not be ignored nor easily combated.

Why is the Islamic Republic, sanctioned, vilified, and isolated? One clue is that almost all references to Iran in the U.S. media succeed with the phrase, “leading state sponsor of terrorism.” The phrase is stuck onto the word Iran as if by Velcro and all the words are one word. How does this coincidental commonality occur?

It occurs because the Zionist press distributes most reports on Iran to the American media. Israel has used U.S. support to subdue Israel’s adversaries — Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Iraq —and  has turned its national army to coerce Iran, the last man standing, into battle. It has turned its worldwide army of thought controllers to vilify Iran and entice Western powers to remove the Islamic member of the “axis of evil” from the map. Blind the world to reality.

Substitute the nation Israel for the nation Iran in each of the salient accusations made against Iran and the accusations become correct. Nowhere do the facts and historical narrative demonstrate that Iran has disrupted peace and stability by any of the combining factors. Israel is present in all the factors. During the 2016 presidential campaign, contender Donald Trump said, “Many nations, including allies, ripped off the US.” Doesn’t Donald Trump, in his support for apartheid Israel, know that he verified his statement? Bet on the wrong horse and you are sure to lose.

The following table summarizes the factors and clarifies the issues.

Iran ─ Key to World Peace

Resolving Iran’s oppression of its people and Israel’s genocide of the Palestinians are separate topics and cannot be resolved together. Permitting Israel to subdue Iran might dispatch the Ayatollahs, but enables the genocide of the Palestinian people, and allows Israel additional opportunities of expansion and continuous threats to other nations. The Zionist influence on Western governments and media will be enhanced.

Separating Iran’s internal oppression from its external policies allows using a challenging force to overcome an unchallenged destructive power. Which is more important and expedient — continually scolding and sanctioning Iran for its oppressive behavior or energizing an Iran that might repel the Israel juggernaut and push Israelis to realize they can no longer survive as a criminal enterprise and can become a “shining light on the Mediterranean,” a part of a truly democratic and bi-national state?

Analysis shows Iran has not displayed characteristics of a “major sponsor of international terrorism — creating turmoil, preventing peace, and wanting to dominate the Middle East.” The only international directives against Iran are sanctions and human rights violations. Israel displays all the characteristics falsely attributed to Iran plus recipient of tens of Resolutions and decisions by International agencies that accuse Israel and its leaders of aspects of genocide, war crimes, apartheid, illegal occupation, and crimes against humanity. The U.S. fought World War II to defeat Nazism, then allows its traits to arise again and gives support to its features ─ an enormous betrayal to the American public.

The defeated Nazi German state evolved into the German Democratic Republic. The defeated Israeli state will evolve into the Middle East Democratic Republic. The world will breathe easier and less concerned that events can spiral out of control and can usher in Armageddon. The multitude of arrogant Jewish organizations that served a foreign state will disappear. Jews will not display divided loyalty and will not arouse suspicion. They will no longer pose as victims who demand special attention but will express themselves as support for those who need attention. Washington DC will no longer be referenced as “occupied Zionist territory.”

Preventing Iran’s defeat does not strengthen Iran’s image or its government’s oppressive tactics. Just the opposite. With the threat of Israel removed, Hezbollah, Palestinians, and Assad’s Syria will have less need to be reliant on Tehran and will turn move favorably to the United States.

Counterfeit U.S. policies have led to continuous warfare in the Middle East, unnecessary sacrifice of U.S. lives, economic disturbances, and waste of taxpayer money. In the cauldron of corruption and autocracies, which pits Sunni against Shi’a, Gulf States and Saudi Arabia against Iran, religious extremists against moderates, and Israel against all, the United States makes its choice of allies. Whom does Washington support — those who are the most repressive, most corrupt, most militaristic, most prone to cause Middle East instability — Israel, cited by Osama bin Laden as a principal reason for Al Qaeda terrorism and Saudi Arabia, a principal supplier of al-Qaeda terrorists. A less resentful outlook on Iran yields a revised perspective of a violent, unstable, and disturbed Middle East. Israel would finally be recognized as the major cause of chaos to the region.

If Israel claims God permits it to ignore international law, murder whomever at will, and threaten all civilization, then even the devil should be approached to replace Israel with a law-abiding nation. Iran, similar to a multitude of nations, might be a problem; Israel is THE PROBLEM.

This content originally appeared on Dissident Voice and was authored by Dan Lieberman.

“Grave injustices are the hallmark of the Taliban’s rule,” CPJ’s Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi said on Wednesday. “The Taliban’s ruthless crackdown has pushed the few remaining media outlets in Afghanistan to the brink. The international community must stand with the Afghan people, and foreign governments should streamline resettlement processes and support journalists in exile so they can continue their work.”

Over the last year, the Taliban have detained at least 16 Afghan and foreign journalists, shut four radio and TV stations, banned a popular London-based broadcaster, and suspended the licenses of 14 media outlets. At least one of the detained journalists was severely beaten.

The Taliban have also banned the broadcast of women’s voices and announced a plan to restrict access to Facebook in Afghanistan.

The Taliban’s intelligence agency, the General Directorate of Intelligence, alongside the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice have been at the forefront of the ongoing media crackdown.

The hostile media environment has driven hundreds of Afghan journalists to flee to neighboring countries where many are stuck in legal limbo, without the right to work or clear prospects of resettlement. At least one Afghan journalist was injured in a shooting in Pakistan.

CPJ’s text messages to Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid requesting comment did not receive a response.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

“Taliban officials must immediately reverse their decision to suspend the broadcast licenses of 14 active media outlets in Nangarhar province that collectively reach millions of people,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ Asia program coordinator. “The Taliban continues to exert pressure on media outlets to control their programming and broadcasting operations in Afghanistan. They must cease these tactics and allow the independent media to operate freely.”

The order also stipulated that the outlets must renew their licenses and pay any outstanding fees or risk having all the outlet’s licenses revoked, according to CPJ’s review of the order, the exiled Afghanistan Journalists Center watchdog group, and a journalist who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity. 

ATRA is a regulatory body that operates as part of the Taliban’s Ministry of Communications and Information Technology.

Outlets with suspended radio and TV licenses: 

• Hamisha Bahar Radio and TV
• Sharq 
• Arzasht 

Radio networks affected: 

• The Nan
• Radio Safa
• Meena 
• Radio Dost
• Mazal
• Manar
• Muram
• Haqiqat 
• Hood 
• Spinghar
• Ulfat

CPJ’s text messages to Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment did not receive a reply.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

Mohtaj, a broadcast manager and presenter with the independent Millat Zhag radio station in the southern city of Kandahar, was transferred to an unknown location, according to a local journalist who spoke to CPJ on condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisals, the exiled Afghanistan Journalists Center watchdog group, and the London-based news broadcaster Afghanistan International.

“Taliban officials must immediately release Mohammad Ibrahim Mohtaj and stop arbitrary detentions of journalists and media workers,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “Afghanistan’s notorious morality police must not exacerbate a media crackdown that has been a hallmark of Taliban rule or heighten fears among Afghan journalists.”

Millat Zhag broadcasts news and cultural programming for Kandahar city and surrounding districts.

A report by the U.N. Mission in Afghanistan said this month that the ministry, which the Taliban set up after taking power in 2021, used threats, excessive force, and arbitrary arrests to enforce its rules around media monitoring, drugs, and female dress codes.

Separately, culture journalist Sayed Rahim Saeedi was detained by Taliban intelligence agents in the capital Kabul on July 14.   

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not respond to CPJ’s request for comment via messaging app, but The Associated Press reported that the ministry had called the findings of the U.N. report false and contradictory.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

Saeedi, an editor and producer with ANAR Media YouTube channel, was detained along with Sayed Waris Saeedi, a reporter at the outlet who is also his son, and cameraperson Hasib, who only goes by one name, according to the elder Saeedi’s former colleague Khushal Asefi who spoke with CPJ from exile.

Hasib and the younger Saeedi were released after two days but Saeedi remains in detention for unknown reasons in an unknown location. ANAR Media reports on culture, travel, religion, and social issues.

“Taliban intelligence officials must free Sayed Rahim Saeedi and cease their brutal crackdown on journalists in Afghanistan,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The media has been decimated since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, forcing journalists to work in a climate of fear and robbing the Afghan people of the right to access information. This harassment must stop.”

Restrictions on Afghan media are intensifying, according to the exiled Afghanistan Journalists Center watchdog group, which recorded 89 media freedom violations since the start of 2024.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not respond to CPJ’s request for comment via messaging app.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

On the evening of June 13, Taliban intelligence officers detained Danish, a news manager for the news website Revayat, while he was traveling from the capital Kabul to Bagrami district, according to news reports and a person familiar with the case, who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, due to fear of reprisal.

The source told CPJ that Danish was questioned over an April 3 report for the Khane Mawlana cultural center that was critical of the Taliban’s education policies and an April 21 Facebook post alleging the Taliban were using schools as military bases in Kapisa province.

Danish was held in an unknown location and severely beaten, sustaining a head injury, before being released on June 15 and going into hiding, the source said.

“The Taliban must immediately and impartially investigate the arbitrary detention and beating of journalist Abdullah Danish and hold those responsible to account,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “It is high time for the Taliban to take responsibility for the safety of the media and to allow reporters to critically cover issues of public interest without fear of reprisal.”

Danish previously worked as a broadcast director at Dunya Radio, a reporter and presenter at Mitra TV, and a program host and research manager at Maarif TV, the source told CPJ.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not respond to CPJ’s request for comment.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

On Thursday, the Taliban’s Ministry of Justice announced the closure of Tamadon TV, alleging that the broadcaster was affiliated with the Harakat-e-Islami political party, after the Taliban banned all such affiliations, and operating on “seized land,” according to Qari Baraktullah Rasuli, the spokesperson for the Taliban’s Ministry of Justice who posted the statement on X, formerly Twitter, and media reports. Tamadon TV denies the claims.

In a breaking news announcement earlier that day, Tamadon TV stated that a Taliban delegation was inside its station to shut down operations. However, later the TV station confirmed that the suspension of its operations was postponed until Saturday. The Taliban has not announced an exact date that it plans to close the station. 

“The Taliban must immediately and unconditionally reverse its decision to ban Tamadon TV and allow the channel to continue broadcasting,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The Taliban is expanding its relentless crackdown on Afghan media and suppressing any independent voices. This must end.”

On June 6, Mohammad Jawad Mohseni, director of Tamadon TV, rejected the Taliban’s claims about the broadcaster’s political affiliations, according to broadcaster Afghanistan International. Mohseni noted that the late founder of the TV station, Ayatullah Asif Mohseni, had resigned as the leader of Harakat-e-Islami in 2005, years before establishing Tamadon TV.

Mohseni said that “the land for Tamadon TV was purchased from a private owner and has a legitimate and legal title deed, and it is not and has never been government property.”

On February 18, 2023, about 10 armed Taliban members raided the headquarters of Tamadon TV in Kabul, beat several staff members, and held them for 30 minutes.

Tamadon TV is predominantly owned and operated by members of the Hazara-Shia ethnic minority and covers political and current affairs as well as Shiite religious programming. Hazara people have faced persecution and escalated violence since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021.

The closure order of Tamadon TV follows a series of other restrictions imposed on Afghan media in recent months. In May, the Taliban’s Media Complaints and Rights Violations Commission banned journalists, analysts, and experts from participating in discussions or cooperating with London-based Afghanistan International’s television and radio stations. The Commission called on citizens to boycott Afghanistan International and banned anyone from providing facilities for broadcasting the channel in public places.

Earlier, in April, the Taliban shut down Noor and Barya TV broadcasters, which were affiliated with other Islamist political parties, citing violations of “national and Islamic values.”

The Taliban has shut down other broadcasters since it took over the country in 2021,  including Radio Nasim. in central Daikundi Province, Hamisha Bahar Radio and TV in eastern Nangarhar province, and Radio Sada e Banowan in northeastern Badakhshan province. In 2022, the group also banned international broadcasters such as the U.S. Congress-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America.

CPJ’s requests for comment sent to Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not receive a response.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

In 1500, India and China were the world’s most advanced civilizations. Then came the Europeans. They eventually looted and wreaked havoc on both, just as they were to on the Americas and Africa. For India and China, Britain was the chief culprit, relying on state-sponsored drug-running backed by industrialized military power. The British Empire was the world’s largest producer and exporter of opium—the main product of global trade after the gradual decline of the slave trade from Africa. Their “civilization” brought the Century of Humiliation to China, which only ended with the popular revolution led by Mao Zedong. This historic trauma and the struggle to overcome it and re-establish their country is etched in the minds of the Chinese today.

Before the British brought their “culture,” 25% of the world trade originated in India. By the time they left it was less than 1%. British India’s opium dealing was for the large part of the 19th Century the second-most important source of revenue for colonial India. Their “opium industry was one of the largest enterprises on the subcontinent, producing a few thousand tons of the drug every year – a similar output to Afghanistan’s notorious opium industry [during the US occupation], which supplies the global market for heroin.” Opium accounted for about 17-20% of British India revenues.

In the early 1700s, China produced 35% of the world GDP. Until 1800 half the books in the world were printed in Chinese. The country considered itself self-sufficient, not seeking any products from other countries. Foreign countries bought Chinese tea, silk, and porcelain, having to pay in gold and silver. Consequently, the balance of trade was unfavorable to the British for almost two centuries, like the situation the US and Europe face with China today.

This trade slowly depleted Western reserves. Eventually, 30,865 tons of silver flowed into China, mostly from Britain. Britain turned to state sponsored drug smuggling as a solution, and by 1826 the smuggling from India had reversed the flow of silver. Thus began one of the longest and continuous international crimes of modern times, second to the African slave trade, under the supervision of the British crown.

(The just formed United States was already smuggling opium into China by 1784. The US first multi-millionaire John Jacob Astor grew rich dealing opium to China, as did FDR’s grandfather, Warren Delano, Jr.)

The British East India Company was key to this opium smuggling. Soon after Britain conquered Bengal in 1757, George III granted the East India Company a monopoly on producing and exporting Indian opium. Eventually its Opium Agency employed some 2500 clerks working in 100 offices around India.

Britain taxed away 50% of the value of Indian peasants’ food crops to push them out of agriculture into growing opium. This soon led to the Bengal famine of 1770, when ten million, a third of the Bengali population, starved to death. Britain took no action to aid them, as they did almost a century later with their orchestrated famine in Ireland. Another famine hit India in 1783, and again Britain did nothing as 11 million starved. Between 1760-1943, “As per British sources, more than 85 million Indians died in these famines which were in reality genocides done by the British Raj.”

At its peak in the mid-19th century, the British state-sponsored export of opium accounted for roughly 15% of total colonial revenue in India and 31% of India’s exports. The massive revenues from this drug money solidified India as a substantial financial base for England’s later world conquests.

In 1729, the Chinese emperor declared the import of opium illegal. At the time it amounted to 200 chests a year, each 135 pounds, a total of 14 tons. The emperor in 1799 reissued the prohibition in harsher terms, given imports had leaped to 4,500 chests (320 tons). Yet by 1830 it rose to 1100 tons, and by 1838, just before the British provoked the First Opium War (1839-1842), it climbed to 40,000 chests (2800 tons).

A chest of opium cost only £2 to produce in India but it sold for £10 [over $1,000 in today’s prices] in China, nearly an £8 profit per chest.

About 40,000 chests supplied 2.1 million addicts in a Chinese population of 350 million. China was losing over 4000 tons of silver annually. Addicts were mostly men, twenty to fifty-five years old, which should have been their most productive years. Smoking opium gradually spread to different groups of people: government officials, merchants, intelligentsia, women, servants, soldiers, and monks.

Just before the First Opium War the Chinese “drug czar,” Lin Zexu, wrote to Queen Victoria, “Where is your conscience? I have heard that the smoking of opium is very strictly forbidden by your country; this is because the harm caused by opium is clearly understood. Since it is not permitted to do harm to your own country, then even less should you let it be passed on to the harm of other countries.” In standard imperialist arrogance, Britain ignored the letter and challenged the very legality of China’s sovereign decision to prohibit opium imports.

Britain provoked this First Opium War in retaliation for China seizing and destroying 1300 tons of opium held by British drug dealers off Canton (now Guangzhou). This had a value equal to one-sixth of the British empire’s military budget. British Foreign Secretary Palmerston demanded an apology, compensation for the opium, a treaty to prevent Chinese action against British drug-running, and opening additional ports to “foreign trade,” their euphemism for drug dealing.

The British India Gazette reported on the sack of one Chinese city during the war:

A more complete pillage could not be conceived than took place. Every house was broken open, every drawer and box ransacked, the streets strewn with fragments of furniture, pictures, tables, chairs, grain of all sorts — the whole set off by the dead or the living bodies of those who had been unable to leave the city from the wounds received from our merciless guns… The plunder ceased only when there was nothing to take or destroy.

Once Britain defeated China, the Treaty of Nanking gave Hong Kong to the British, which quickly became the center of opium drug-dealing, soon providing the colony most of its revenue. The treaty also allowed the British to export unlimited amounts of opium.

In 1844, France and the US forced China to sign similar unequal and unjust treaties, with the same unrestricted trading rights.

In the wake of the First Opium War, a devastating famine hit southern China, causing mass starvation among millions of poor Chinese peasants. Soon the Taiping Rebellion against Chinese imperial rule broke out, claiming 20 million Chinese lives between 1850 and 1864. As with many later civil wars, as in Syria a decade ago, the European states financed the rebels to undermine the national government.

Karl Marx detailed how Britain provoked the Second Opium War (1856-1860). France joined in the looting. The Times of London, propagandists for their state-sponsored drug mafia, declared, “England, with France . . . shall teach such a lesson to these perfidious hordes that the name of Europe will hereafter be a passport of fear, if it cannot be of love, throughout their land.”

In October 1860 the British and French military attacked Beijing. Despite French protests, British commander Lord Elgin destroyed Yuanming Yuan, the emperor’s summer palace, in a show of contempt for the Chinese.

The Summer Palace was the quintessential treasure house of China. No such collection of wealth and beauty had ever existed anywhere on earth. Nor would it ever again.…in some 200 fabulously decorated buildings, thirty of them imperial residences, lay riches beyond all dreams of avarice. Jewels, jade, ceremonial robes, the court treasures, bales of silk, and countless priceless artifacts represented the years of accumulated tribute placed before the Chinese emperors. There were splendid galleries of paintings and irreplaceable libraries…For three days British and French troops rampaged through the palace’s marble corridors and glittering apartments, smashing with clubs and rifle butts what they were unable to carry away.

When the robbery and destruction was finished, they burned Yuanming Yuan to the ground. An estimated 1.5 million Chinese relics were taken away, many still filling museums and the homes of the wealthy in the West today.

Britain and France forced China to legalize the import of opium, which reached 5000 tons by 1858, an amount surpassing global opium production in 1995. China had to agree that no Westerner could be tried in Chinese courts for crimes committed in the country, and, ironically, to legalize Christian missionary work.

The 1881 pamphlet, Opium: England’s Coercive Policy and Its Disastrous Results in China and India, stated:

As a specimen of how both wars were carried on, we quote the following from an English writer on the bombardment of Canton: ‘Field pieces loaded with grape were planted at the end of long, narrow streets crowded with innocent men, women and children, to mow them down like grass till the gutters flowed with their blood.’ In one scene of carnage, the Times correspondent recorded that half an army of 10,000 men were in ten minutes destroyed by the sword, or forced into the broad river. The Morning Herald asserted that ‘a more horrible or revolting crime than this bombardment of Canton has never been committed in the worst ages of barbaric darkness.’

By the mid-1860s, Britain was in control of seven eighths of the vastly expanded opium trade into China. Opium imports from India skyrocketed to 150,000 chests (10,700 tons) in 1880. British opium earnings amounted to $2 billion a year in today’s money and accounted for nearly 15% of the British Exchequer’s tax revenue. The London Times (October 22, 1880) outrageously claimed that “the Chinese government admitted opium as a legal article of import, not under constraint, but of their own free will.” Lord Curzon, later Under Secretary for India, “denied that England had ever forced opium upon China; no historian of any repute, and no diplomatist who knew anything of the matter, would support the proposition that England coerced China in this respect.”

China began domestic production to curtail losing more silver to imported opium. After 1858, large tracts of land were given over to opium production, and provinces turned from growing food and other necessities to opium. Eventually the Chinese were producing 35,000 tons, about 85% of the world’s supply, with 15 million addicts consuming 43,000 tons annually.

China, now greatly weakened by the British narco state, surrendered territory to Russia equal to the combined size of France, Germany, and Spain. In 1885 France seized Chinese Southeast Asia. In 1895, Japan seized Taiwan and Chinese-controlled Korea.

The Eight-Nation Alliance (Japan, Russia, Britain, France, the United States, Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary) invaded again in 1900 to crush the nationalist Boxer Rebellion. An indemnity of 20,000 tons of silver was extracted, and China reduced to a neo-colony.

By 1906, besides British India, opium dealing also provided 16% of taxes for French Indochina, 16% for the Netherlands Indies, 20% for Siam, and 53% for British Malaya.

That year, the British, still exporting 3500 tons to China, finally agreed to end the dirty business within ten years. The British crown had the distinction of being the biggest opium smuggler in history – a central factor in their wrecking Chinese and Indian civilizations.

World opium production by 1995 was down to 4,200 metric tons (4,630 tons), mostly from Burma and Afghanistan. The Taliban banned it in 2000, and production fell from 3400 to only 204 tons. The 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan reversed this, and by 2008, US occupied Afghanistan was producing 90% of the world’s opium, reaching 10,000 tons in 2017. After the US was driven out in 2021, the Taliban quickly stopped opium production. The United States Institute of Peace, possibly revealing US support for narco-trafficking, pronounced, “the Taliban’s successful opium ban is bad for Afghans and the world” and “will have negative economic and humanitarian consequences.”

The blight of opium on China was not resolved until the revolutionary victory in 1949 – though it continued in British Hong Kong. Mao proclaimed “China has stood up,” ending its Century of Humiliation during which at least 100 million Chinese were killed in wars and famines, with up to 35 million during the Japanese invasion from 1931-1945.

By 1949, China had been reduced to one of the world’s poorest countries. Just 75 years ago four out of five Chinese could not read or write. But since 1981, China has lifted 853 million of its people out of poverty, has become an upper middle income country according to the World Bank, and regained its stature in the world. The West now views China as a renewed threat, again seeking to economically disable it and chop it into pieces. However, this time, the Chinese people are much better prepared to combat imperialist designs to impose a new era of humiliation on them.

This content originally appeared on Dissident Voice and was authored by Stansfield Smith.

On Monday, the provincial directorate of the Taliban-controlled Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in eastern Khost Province summoned and detained Saadat of Naz FM Radio, Masum of Iqra FM Radio, and Tasal of Wolas Ghag, according to the exiled Afghanistan Journalists Center watchdog group, the London-based news broadcaster Afghanistan International, and a person familiar with the case, who spoke with CPJ on condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisals.

The Taliban authorities questioned the journalists regarding their broadcasting of music and talking to female callers during the holiday of Eid al-Fitr earlier this month, those sources said.

The Taliban outlawed playing and listening to music when they retook control of Afghanistan in August 2021.

Last month, authorities in Khost Province banned women and girls from phoning broadcasters, the Afghan Journalists Center said, adding that female listeners sometimes called in to ask questions on educational programs. Afghanistan is the only country in the world where girls are banned from high school.

The person familiar with the case told CPJ that the three journalists were transferred to the provincial police command and were due to face trial soon.

“The detention of Afghan journalists Ismail Saadat, Wahidullah Masum, and Ehsanullah Tasal is only the latest example of the Taliban’s ruthless suppression of the press since the group returned to power in 2021,” said Carlos Martinez de la Serna, CPJ’s program director, in New York “The Taliban must immediately and unconditionally release all detained journalists and allow the media to operate without restrictive measures like bans on women callers.”  

Despite an initial promise to allow press freedom, repression has worsened with multiple cases of censorship, beatings, and arbitrary arrests of journalists, as well as restrictions on female reporters. 

Earlier this month, the Taliban banned two two national broadcasters for allegedly violating “national and Islamic values” and announced a plan to restrict access to Facebook in Afghanistan.

In 2023, the Taliban detained four journalists in Khost Province for allegedly violating the Islamic group’s media policies.

CPJ’s text messages to Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid requesting comment did not receive any response.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

On Tuesday, the Media Complaints and Rights Violations Commission banned the two broadcasters for violating “national and Islamic values,” without giving further details, according to media reports.

On Tuesday, Taliban intelligence forces stormed the headquarters of Noor TV in the capital, Kabul, disconnected the electricity, and sealed the premises, a former staffer told CPJ, on condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisal.

Barya TV also was taken off air, according to a journalist familiar with the situation who also spoke to CPJ on condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisal. Sources could not confirm whether its offices were also sealed.

“The Taliban must immediately and unconditionally reverse its ban on Noor TV and Barya TV and allow the two channels to resume broadcasting,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The Taliban are misusing the Media Complaints and Rights Violations Commission to stifle the press in Afghanistan, arbitrarily closing media houses, without regard for freedom of speech.”

Ministry of Information and Culture spokesman Khubaib Ghufran told Agence France-Presse news agency on Thursday that the channels had programs “creating confusion among the public” and their owners had “taken stands as opponents” of the Taliban government.

Hafizullah Barakzai, a member of the commission, told ABC News that a court would investigate files on the two stations, which could not operate until the court gave its verdict.

Pressure had been mounting on Barya TV from Taliban intelligence since late 2023, forcing the broadcaster to lay off most of its staff, CPJ’s journalist source said. The journalist source said that the Taliban’s pressure increased on Barya TV because of Hizbe Islami leader’s criticism of the group’s policies and the TV channel’s broadcast of these criticisms.  

Both of CPJ sources indicate that the specific violations and issues brought before the court have not been disclosed by the Taliban.

Noor TV was established in 2007 by former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was assassinated in 2011. It is currently owned by his son, Salahuddin Rabbani, an exiled former foreign minister and leader of the Jamiat-e-Islami party.

Barya TV was founded in 2019 by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former warlord and leader of the Hizb-e-Islami party. Its programming focuses on politics and news about Hekmatyar,

The founder’s son, Habiburrahman Hekmatyar, said on X, formerly Twitter that the channel was shut down because its religious values differed from those of the Taliban.

Barya TV editorial manager Qazi Shabir Ahmad rejected the commission’s claim that Barya TV violated Islamic and national interests and said that the April 16 ban was a “pretext” for stopping its operations. He told CPJ that the Taliban did not communicate any specific issues concerning their broadcasts, either in writing or verbally, prior to the ban, which he described as “politically motivated”.

Since the Taliban took over in 2021, they have shut down local broadcasters, including Radio Nasim in central Daikundi Province, Hamisha Bahar Radio and TV in eastern Nangarhar Province, and Radio Sada e Banowan in northeastern Badakhshan Province. In 2022, the group also banned international broadcasters such as the U.S. Congress-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America.

CPJ’s text messages to Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid requesting comment did not receive a response.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

We also ask you to urge members of Congress to sign the discharge petitions to overcome MAGA’s blockade of Ukraine aid in the House. Use this handy site made by a Gaslit Nation listener to contact your reps today: https://helpukrainewin.com/

In this week’s Gaslit Nation, Andrea and Terrell Star of the Black Diplomats Podcast & Substack get raptured! No, we’re still here, fighting fascism at home and abroad. And still with us, unfortunately, is Trump’s actual army of far-right Christian nationalists determined to destroy our democracy from within. What’s needed to fight a holy war? Another holy war, if your faith is in empathy and science. 

In this End Times-themed discussion (in honor of the 4.8 earthquake striking near Trump’s Bedminister golf course, opening up the gates of hell just in time for the election, and the solar eclipse that blinded the latest winners of the Darwin Awards), we discuss how to protect democracy against a transnational crime syndicate wielding Christian nationalism as its weapon. We also review the must-watch documentary "Bad Faith," based on the book by former Gaslit Nation guest and journalist Anne Nelson, titled Shadow Network: Media, Money, and the Secret Hub of the Radical Right. We also look at Bobby Kennedy Jr.’s campaign to help Trump come to power, Michael Flynn’s propaganda tour to energize authoritarian voters, the most dangerous men in the Biden administration who should have been replaced long ago, and why, in a time of genocide and other existential threats, straight white old guys are no longer a “safe bet.” But we’ll vote for Biden anyway, because we don’t have the time or resources to fight for survival and against a second, never-ending Trump regime. 

This week’s bonus episode, exclusively for our supporters at the Truth-teller level and higher, is a discussion of Evangelicals and Israel – staunch allies for opportunistic reasons. They also constitute a crucial element in Trump's potential Electoral College victory, where Biden barely squeaked by thanks to a mere 44,000 votes scattered across Georgia, Arizona, and Wisconsin. Yes, it was that close. So don't forget to pre-order the documentary Bad Faith, organize a watch party with friends and neighbors, and complete the recommended steps in the Gaslit Nation 2024 Survival Guide. What is your plan to help protect our democracy this year from Trump and his dreaded Project 2025, discussed in this week’s episode? 

To our supporters at the Democracy Defender level and higher, submit your questions for our upcoming Q&A! We always enjoy hearing from you! Thank you to everyone who supports the show – we could not make Gaslit Nation without you! 

Join the conversation with a community of listeners at Patreon.com/Gaslit and get bonus shows, all episodes ad free, submit questions to our regular Q&As, get exclusive invites to live events, and more! 

Check out our new merch! Get your “F*ck Putin” t-shirt or mug today! https://www.teepublic.com/t-shirt/57796740-f-ck-putin?store_id=3129329

SHOW NOTES:

Clip: Watch the trailer for Bad Faith https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6WYseVO29ZU

Clip: Bobby Kennedy Jr.’s New York State Campaign Manager Proudly Declares They’re Trying to Help Trump Win https://twitter.com/cwebbonline/status/1777021184737194221

Clip: Michael Flynn: From Government Insider to Holy Warrior | FRONTLINE + AP https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHqohI-ZNhY

Inside the Election Denial Groups Planning to Disrupt November https://www.wired.com/story/election-denial-groups-november-2024/

Inside the Terrifyingly Competent Trump 2024 Campaign With Donald Trump mostly focused on his own legal peril—leaving staffers free to run the campaign—the candidate’s third bid for the White House is as efficient as it is explicitly authoritarian. How worried should you be? Very. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/inside-trump-2024-campaign

Narrow Wins In These Key States Powered Biden To The Presidency https://www.npr.org/2020/12/02/940689086/narrow-wins-in-these-key-states-powered-biden-to-the-presidency

Obama Warned Trump Against Hiring Mike Flynn, Say Officials The warning came less than 48 hours after the November election when the two sat down for a conversation in the Oval Office. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/obama-warned-trump-against-hiring-mike-flynn-say-officials-n756316

Trump could face more FBI raids as witness suggests documents still hidden: ex-prosecutor https://www.rawstory.com/classified-documents-2667695220/

The latest in Republican Gaslighting: Democratic Oregon House candidate is big Republican donor Brian Maguire has given hundreds of thousands of dollars to state and federal Republican candidates and causes https://oregoncapitalchronicle.com/2024/04/04/democratic-oregon-house-candidate-is-big-republican-donor/

The Electoral College question looming over 2024 Whether the GOP has maintained its Electoral College advantage could determine how close the Biden vs. Trump contest really is — and who wins in the end. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/electoral-college-question-looming-2024-rcna145950

State Department sees unprecedented flood of internal dissent memos over Gaza war Exclusive: Eight internal dissent memos were sent by State Department staff during the first two months of the Gaza war, compared to just one sent during the first three years of the Iraq War https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/state-department-gaza-blinken-protest-b2525345.html

Trump pledges to expel immigrants who support Hamas, ban Muslims from the U.S. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-pledges-expel-immigrants-who-support-hamas-ban-muslims-us-2023-10-16/

Biden Shields Palestinians in the U.S. From Deportation The president, who is facing mounting criticism over U.S. support for Israel, used an authority that exempts people from deportation if their homeland is in crisis. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/14/us/politics/biden-palestinians-deportation.html

About Three-in-Ten U.S. Adults Are Now Religiously Unaffiliated Self-identified Christians make up 63% of U.S. population in 2021, down from 75% a decade ago https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/12/14/about-three-in-ten-u-s-adults-are-now-religiously-unaffiliated/

For American Evangelicals Who Back Israel, ‘Neutrality Isn’t an Option’ Conservative Christians’ strong connection to Israel forms the backbone of Republican support, and is tied to beliefs about biblical promises and prophecy. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/us/american-evangelicals-israel-hamas.html

What is an evangelical Christian? In America, evangelicalism has become as much a political as a religious identity https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/03/01/what-is-an-evangelical-christian

Investigators for the Justice Department wanted to search Donald Trump’s New Jersey golf club for top secret documents but lacked probable cause to secure a warrant, says a report. https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-classified-documents-bedminster-search-b2366013.html

Women and children are the main victims of the Israel-Hamas war with 16,000 killed, UN says https://apnews.com/article/women-children-gaza-war-victims-un-inequality-f0f89a724543b99c2c22439e7af09405

This content originally appeared on Gaslit Nation and was authored by Andrea Chalupa.

We also ask you to urge members of Congress to sign the discharge petitions to overcome MAGA’s blockade of Ukraine aid in the House. Use this handy site made by a Gaslit Nation listener to contact your reps today: https://helpukrainewin.com/

In this week’s Gaslit Nation, Andrea and Terrell Star of the Black Diplomats Podcast & Substack get raptured! No, we’re still here, fighting fascism at home and abroad. And still with us, unfortunately, is Trump’s actual army of far-right Christian nationalists determined to destroy our democracy from within. What’s needed to fight a holy war? Another holy war, if your faith is in empathy and science. 

In this End Times-themed discussion (in honor of the 4.8 earthquake striking near Trump’s Bedminister golf course, opening up the gates of hell just in time for the election, and the solar eclipse that blinded the latest winners of the Darwin Awards), we discuss how to protect democracy against a transnational crime syndicate wielding Christian nationalism as its weapon. We also review the must-watch documentary "Bad Faith," based on the book by former Gaslit Nation guest and journalist Anne Nelson, titled Shadow Network: Media, Money, and the Secret Hub of the Radical Right. We also look at Bobby Kennedy Jr.’s campaign to help Trump come to power, Michael Flynn’s propaganda tour to energize authoritarian voters, the most dangerous men in the Biden administration who should have been replaced long ago, and why, in a time of genocide and other existential threats, straight white old guys are no longer a “safe bet.” But we’ll vote for Biden anyway, because we don’t have the time or resources to fight for survival and against a second, never-ending Trump regime. 

This week’s bonus episode, exclusively for our supporters at the Truth-teller level and higher, is a discussion of Evangelicals and Israel – staunch allies for opportunistic reasons. They also constitute a crucial element in Trump's potential Electoral College victory, where Biden barely squeaked by thanks to a mere 44,000 votes scattered across Georgia, Arizona, and Wisconsin. Yes, it was that close. So don't forget to pre-order the documentary Bad Faith, organize a watch party with friends and neighbors, and complete the recommended steps in the Gaslit Nation 2024 Survival Guide. What is your plan to help protect our democracy this year from Trump and his dreaded Project 2025, discussed in this week’s episode? 

To our supporters at the Democracy Defender level and higher, submit your questions for our upcoming Q&A! We always enjoy hearing from you! Thank you to everyone who supports the show – we could not make Gaslit Nation without you! 

Join the conversation with a community of listeners at Patreon.com/Gaslit and get bonus shows, all episodes ad free, submit questions to our regular Q&As, get exclusive invites to live events, and more! 

Check out our new merch! Get your “F*ck Putin” t-shirt or mug today! https://www.teepublic.com/t-shirt/57796740-f-ck-putin?store_id=3129329

SHOW NOTES:

Clip: Watch the trailer for Bad Faith https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6WYseVO29ZU

Clip: Bobby Kennedy Jr.’s New York State Campaign Manager Proudly Declares They’re Trying to Help Trump Win https://twitter.com/cwebbonline/status/1777021184737194221

Clip: Michael Flynn: From Government Insider to Holy Warrior | FRONTLINE + AP https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHqohI-ZNhY

Inside the Election Denial Groups Planning to Disrupt November https://www.wired.com/story/election-denial-groups-november-2024/

Inside the Terrifyingly Competent Trump 2024 Campaign With Donald Trump mostly focused on his own legal peril—leaving staffers free to run the campaign—the candidate’s third bid for the White House is as efficient as it is explicitly authoritarian. How worried should you be? Very. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/inside-trump-2024-campaign

Narrow Wins In These Key States Powered Biden To The Presidency https://www.npr.org/2020/12/02/940689086/narrow-wins-in-these-key-states-powered-biden-to-the-presidency

Obama Warned Trump Against Hiring Mike Flynn, Say Officials The warning came less than 48 hours after the November election when the two sat down for a conversation in the Oval Office. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/obama-warned-trump-against-hiring-mike-flynn-say-officials-n756316

Trump could face more FBI raids as witness suggests documents still hidden: ex-prosecutor https://www.rawstory.com/classified-documents-2667695220/

The latest in Republican Gaslighting: Democratic Oregon House candidate is big Republican donor Brian Maguire has given hundreds of thousands of dollars to state and federal Republican candidates and causes https://oregoncapitalchronicle.com/2024/04/04/democratic-oregon-house-candidate-is-big-republican-donor/

The Electoral College question looming over 2024 Whether the GOP has maintained its Electoral College advantage could determine how close the Biden vs. Trump contest really is — and who wins in the end. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/electoral-college-question-looming-2024-rcna145950

State Department sees unprecedented flood of internal dissent memos over Gaza war Exclusive: Eight internal dissent memos were sent by State Department staff during the first two months of the Gaza war, compared to just one sent during the first three years of the Iraq War https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/state-department-gaza-blinken-protest-b2525345.html

Trump pledges to expel immigrants who support Hamas, ban Muslims from the U.S. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-pledges-expel-immigrants-who-support-hamas-ban-muslims-us-2023-10-16/

Biden Shields Palestinians in the U.S. From Deportation The president, who is facing mounting criticism over U.S. support for Israel, used an authority that exempts people from deportation if their homeland is in crisis. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/14/us/politics/biden-palestinians-deportation.html

About Three-in-Ten U.S. Adults Are Now Religiously Unaffiliated Self-identified Christians make up 63% of U.S. population in 2021, down from 75% a decade ago https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/12/14/about-three-in-ten-u-s-adults-are-now-religiously-unaffiliated/

For American Evangelicals Who Back Israel, ‘Neutrality Isn’t an Option’ Conservative Christians’ strong connection to Israel forms the backbone of Republican support, and is tied to beliefs about biblical promises and prophecy. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/us/american-evangelicals-israel-hamas.html

What is an evangelical Christian? In America, evangelicalism has become as much a political as a religious identity https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/03/01/what-is-an-evangelical-christian

Investigators for the Justice Department wanted to search Donald Trump’s New Jersey golf club for top secret documents but lacked probable cause to secure a warrant, says a report. https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-classified-documents-bedminster-search-b2366013.html

Women and children are the main victims of the Israel-Hamas war with 16,000 killed, UN says https://apnews.com/article/women-children-gaza-war-victims-un-inequality-f0f89a724543b99c2c22439e7af09405

This content originally appeared on Gaslit Nation and was authored by Andrea Chalupa.

On April 6, Najibullah Haqqani, the Taliban’s acting Minister of Telecommunications and Information Technology, announced in an interview with the independent, Kabul-based TOLOnews TV station that the group has finalized a plan to restrict or completely block access to Facebook in Afghanistan.

Since the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August 2021, the group has detained journalists, shut down Afghan news websites, and restricted access to foreign media outlets.

The Facebook pages for foreign news outlets that have been banned in Afghanistan—such as the U.S. Congress-funded broadcasters Voice of America and RFE/RL, the British public broadcaster the BBC, and the German public broadcaster Deutsche Welle—however, are still accessible to readers inside the country.

“The Taliban’s plan to restrict or block access to Facebook would be a further blow to freedom of information in Afghanistan,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “Social media platforms, including Facebook, have helped to fill a void left by the decline of the Afghan media industry since the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover and the ensuing crackdown on press freedom. The proposed ban highlights the worsening censorship by the Taliban.”

Facebook is one of the most popular social media platforms widely used by media outlets to disseminate news and information in Afghanistan, including TOLOnews, which has over 4.5 million followers on Facebook.

When contacted, Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid told CPJ via messaging app that “Facebook will not be banned but restrictions will be imposed on it.”

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

Hundreds of thousands of undocumented Afghans have been kicked out of neighboring countries and forcibly returned to Afghanistan in recent months. Millions more are slated to join them, complicating the already daunting humanitarian effort to stave off a famine.

Underscoring that Afghans are not welcome, neighboring states are rolling out the barbed wire in an attempt to keep them out.

Returnee Overload

Over the course of a year, a total of 1.5 million Afghans have been forcibly returned to Afghanistan by various countries, the Taliban said earlier this month.

Most, according to migration officials, were sent back by Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey -- for decades destinations for Afghan migrant workers as well as refugees looking to escape war and poverty. Others have been sent back from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

That number could more than double if Iran and Pakistan fully carry out their goals of deporting all undocumented Afghans, including asylum-seekers who face persecution under the Taliban and some who have not lived in their home country for decades or were born abroad.

Pakistan was initially accommodating to Afghans fleeing Taliban rule, serving as a temporary destination for many as they sought asylum in a third country.

But since October 2023, when Islamabad announced its plans to expel more than 1.7 million "undocumented foreigners," more than a half million Afghans have been forced to leave Pakistan, Abdulmatallab Haqqani, spokesman for the Taliban’s Refugees and Repatriations Ministry, said this week.

Some of the new arrivals are now trying to resettle in a homeland they have never stepped foot in, and most are being held in temporary tent camps set up along Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan, where aid groups are struggling to provide them with emergency relief.

More than half of Afghanistan's population of around 40 million faces a food security crisis that is approaching the level of a famine, according to aid and rights groups.

According to the UN's World Food Program, the situation is contributing to "a humanitarian crisis of incredible proportions" that has "grown even more complex and severe since the Taliban took control" in August 2021. The UN body warns that Afghanistan is on the brink of economic collapse, with the currency struggling and food prices on the rise.

The vast majority of the returnees aim to return to their provinces of origin, according to the International Organization for Migration Afghanistan, but many have no homes or livelihoods to return to.

The new arrivals have been welcomed in Afghanistan, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) senior public information officer Caroline Gluck told RFE/RL in written comments, but "there are limited capacities to offer them the support they need."

"The arrival of around a half million Afghans from Pakistan is putting a huge strain on already limited services -- from health to shelter, work opportunities, and schools," Gluck said.

"Many have arrived, having spent all their life in Pakistan and never having set foot in Afghanistan," Gluck added, noting that more than 23 million Afghans are in need of humanitarian aid.

Like many returnees, Abdul Basit, a migrant who recently left Pakistan and moved to Afghanistan's eastern Nangarhar Province, has experienced difficulties settling back in.

Basit told RFE/RL's Radio Azadi that there is no work and he and other deportees spend much of their time bouncing around from government office to government office.

The situation now promises to get even worse, with a second phase set to begin on April 15 to expel Afghan citizens from Pakistan, meaning more than 1 million Afghans could be potentially deported.

To the west, Iran is also engaged in a concerted effort to push out Afghans.

According to Iranian officials, more than 1 million undocumented Afghans have been deported in the past year. That number, too, could more than double, with Tehran saying it intends to expel half of the 5 million Afghans it estimates live in Iran.

In the meantime, Iran has taken steps to make Afghans' lives difficult on its territory, with migrants and refugees barred from living in, traveling to, or seeking employment in more than half of Iran's 31 provinces.

Amid rising resentment against Afghan migrant workers whom some Iranians accuse of stealing their jobs, parliamentary committees and officials have also discussed plans that would introduce strict punishments for renting homes or hiring undocumented foreigners.

Heydayatullah, an Afghan laborer who gave only his first name to Radio Azadi, said he was recently deported from Iran after spending only 20 days in the country.

He said that now that he is back in Afghanistan, he is unemployed and has no way of supporting his family of six.

Nasir Ahmad, a 30-year-old who was deported from Iran and has tried to settle in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif, said "there is no work in Afghanistan" and that he had depended on traveling to Iran to support his wife and children. Now, he says, he is ready to work for a pittance if only he could find employment.

Fenced Out

From all sides, Afghanistan's neighbors are taking steps to prevent Afghans from entering their territory, a situation that has led to tensions and occasional clashes.

The efforts are far-reaching, including Tajikistan calling on fellow members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to establish a "security belt" along the Afghan border to combat drug trafficking, and Turkey's construction of a 170-kilometer wall along its border with Iran that is widely seen as intended to keep Afghan migrants out.

But most of the work is being done along Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan and Iran.

In April 2023, Pakistan announced it was "98 percent" done installing fencing along its around 2,600-kilometer border with Afghanistan. Ahmed Sharif, the spokesman for the Pakistani military's media department, said the barrier was intended to prevent "terrorists" from crossing into Pakistani territory.

But the fence also reinforces Islamabad's anti-migrant position, observers suggest, and has posed difficulties for traders on both sides.

Running along the contentious Durand Line border that the Taliban does not recognize as legitimate, the fence has also left Taliban officials bristling. Having previously boasted about destroying the barbed wire fencing, the Taliban has said it will not allow the fence to be completed.

Tensions along the border have risen considerably in recent days, with Islamabad this week launching retaliatory air strikes on armed groups it says have carried out militant attacks in Pakistan and are hiding out in Afghanistan.

The Taliban, in turn, said its forces had fired at Pakistani positions in retaliation on March 17.

Iran, meanwhile, has launched its own initiative to block the paths of Afghans across its 920-kilometer border with Afghanistan.

Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi said in January that the project was a "complete plan" that went beyond the erection of a wall along a porous 74-kilometer stretch of the border, stressing it is a top priority to seal gaps in the border that are being "misused."

Observers note the initiative comes after Iran accused extremist groups in Afghanistan of attacks on Iranian territory as well as following clashes between Iranian and Taliban border forces that reportedly led the Taliban to reinforce the border.

Aziz Maaraj, a former Afghan diplomat in Iran, told Radio Azadi that "Iran is installing cameras and barbed wire" to prevent smuggling and the entrance of illegal migrants, as well as to protect itself against future clashes and possible militant attacks.

Fereshta Abbasi, a researcher in the Asia division at Human Rights Watch, told RFE/RL that "definitely, Iran and Pakistan are trying to send the message to Afghans that they are not welcome."

Contributing to the problem is that the international community has been slow in living up to commitments to resettle Afghan asylum seekers and refugees who fled after the Taliban seized power. That has left thousands of Afghans who did find temporary refuge in neighboring countries as they awaited processing at the risk of having to return to the persecution and insecurity they fled.

"Some of these people who are now being forced to leave Pakistan and Iran are the ones whose lives are not safe inside Afghanistan," Abbasi said.

"The Taliban have arbitrarily detained journalists, human rights activists, former government employees, and former security officers. These people have been tortured. In some cases, they have been forced to disappear and killed," she added.

Outside countries have also been slow to deliver money, leaving the coffers of the UN's 2024 humanitarian response plan at just 3 percent of expected levels, coming after the 2023 plan was only funded by half, according to Abbasi.

"These governments are not living up to their commitments," Abassi said, adding that Afghans who worked with the previous Western-backed government or alongside Western forces are at particular risk. "They need to be reminded of the fact that they are leaving those Afghans behind who have stood by them."

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

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The United Nations has delivered more than $2.9 billion in cash to Afghanistan since the Taliban seized control, resulting in the flow of U.S. funds to the extremist group, according to a recent government report.

The U.N. deposits the cash into a private Afghan bank and disburses funds to the agency’s aid organizations and nonprofit humanitarian groups. But the money does not stop there, the report found. Some winds up at the central bank of Afghanistan, which is under the control of the Taliban. The group took over the country after the withdrawal of U.S. forces in August 2021.

The report, from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, provides the first detailed account of how U.S. cash falls under the control of the Taliban and adds to a growing body of evidence that contributions to the U.N. are not always reaching Afghans in need. It did not specify how much U.S. funding has been channeled to the central bank.

“Most of the money that’s going in cash through the U.N. is ultimately coming from U.S. taxpayers,” John Sopko, the inspector general, said in an interview. “It’s going to a terrorist group. The Taliban are a bunch of terrorists.”

U.N. officials do not deny that the cash delivered to Afghanistan makes its way to the central bank. But they say there is no avoiding it since the Taliban control the country.

In a briefing to the U.N. Security Council on March 6, Roza Otunbayeva, the U.N.’s special representative for Afghanistan, did not mention the Afghan central bank. The cash shipments, she said, have helped stabilize the economy and deliver desperately needed medical care and food to Afghans. The shipments have “injected liquidity to the local economy that has in large part allowed the private sector to continue to function and averted a fiscal crisis,” Otunbayeva told council members.

In a letter provided in response to the inspector general’s report, the State Department said the U.N. was responsible for managing the cash transfer program.

“We remain committed to providing critical, life-saving humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. We will continue to monitor assistance programs and seek to mitigate the risk that U.S. assistance could indirectly benefit the Taliban or could be diverted to unintended recipients,” the letter said.

Lawmakers say the U.S. must do more to prevent the flow of money to the group.

“This is unacceptable,” said Rep. Michael McCaul, the Texas Republican who chairs the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in a statement. “The U.S. government must work harder to prevent the Taliban from benefiting from humanitarian aid.”

A spokesperson for the Afghan central bank did not return requests for comment.

Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has suffered numerous humanitarian crises, with half its 40 million people in need of food, water and other basic necessities. Earthquakes last year killed more than 1,200 people and left thousands displaced. Women’s rights have been severely curtailed.

The U.S. remains the largest donor of aid to Afghanistan, providing a total of about $2.6 billion since the collapse of the previous Afghan government. But fears over money ending up in the wrong hands have complicated aid delivery. For instance, U.S. officials have blocked the central bank from receiving money from a trust fund holding Afghan funds that could be used to benefit the country.

“We could not be more clear on this: The United States does not provide funding to the Taliban,” said Matthew Miller, a State Department spokesperson, at a briefing last year.

The inspector general report calls that assertion into question. The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development have continued to provide money to the U.N. to assist ongoing humanitarian efforts. The U.N., in turn, has said it must send cash to Afghanistan because of the lack of an infrastructure to wire money.

After getting the money from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the U.N. flies shrink-wrapped $100 bills to the Kabul International Airport. The money arrives on a regular basis, as much as $40 million at a time, according to posts from the Afghan central bank on X, formerly known as Twitter.

Once aid organizations receive the U.S. dollars, they must convert the money into afghanis, the country’s currency, to pay for workers and other expenses. They often use private money exchanges, which use the dollars to purchase afghanis from the central bank, known as the Da Afghanistan Bank.

Senior leaders of the Taliban control the central bank, which has no systems in place to prevent terrorism financing or money laundering, according to the inspector general’s report, which cites an analysis paid for by USAID. Officials at the development agency declined to release the study, describing it as a “confidential internal document.”

When money leaves the central bank, there’s yet another concern. Humanitarian organizations are sometimes forced to pay cash directly to the Taliban. Local Taliban leaders have demanded that the U.N. and aid groups hire its members and their relatives or prioritize treatment of widows and wounded militants, according to the inspector general.

“Aid diversion does happen, and when it does, humanitarian work has to halt and solutions need to be found,” said one U.N. official who was not authorized to make public comment. “There are cases where the Taliban seek to take control of distribution according to their priorities, or other cases where aid work is stopped altogether. In other areas we see very positive support and openness.”

The risk of the diversion of foreign aid in wartorn countries has long bedeviled the U.S. and other countries. The only way to stop it would be to halt the flow of money — which humanitarian groups have said could lead to disastrous consequences such as starvation or the collapse of local economies.

In many ways, the U.S. is responsible for the problems it now faces. The distribution of funds to help the vulnerable was a repeated issue during two decades of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. American officials flew more than $12 billion in cash — that’s 363 tons — to Iraq in the early days of the war, according to congressional investigators, making it nearly impossible to determine the final beneficiaries.

But the U.S. and its international allies failed to ever fully implement systems to improve transparency, such as wire transfers or electronic payments, in Afghanistan, despite repeated pleas for such technology by watchdog organizations.

Sopko, the inspector general, said the U.S., the U.N. and multilateral agencies could install better controls over the delivery of cash in Afghanistan, but he acknowledged the inherent difficulty of the task.

“If nobody’s paying attention, then you’re going to have waste, fraud and abuse, big time,” he said.

Mohammad Jawad Alizada, the managing editor for Alive in Afghanistan, a former ProPublica partner, assisted with translation.

This content originally appeared on Articles and Investigations - ProPublica and was authored by by T. Christian Miller.

The Iranian government "bears responsibility" for the physical violence that led to the death of Mahsa Amini, the 22-year-old Iranian-Kurdish woman who died in police custody in 2022, and for the brutal crackdown on largely peaceful street protests that followed, a report by a United Nations fact-finding mission says.

The report, issued on March 8 by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, said the mission “has established the existence of evidence of trauma to Ms. Amini’s body, inflicted while in the custody of the morality police."

It said the mission found the "physical violence in custody led to Ms. Amini’s unlawful death.... On that basis, the state bears responsibility for her unlawful death.”

Amini was arrested in Tehran on September 13, 2022, while visiting the Iranian capital with her family. She was detained by Iran's so-called "morality police" for allegedly improperly wearing her hijab, or hair-covering head scarf. Within hours of her detention, she was hospitalized in a coma and died on September 16.

Her family has denied that Amini suffered from a preexisting health condition that may have contributed to her death, as claimed by the Iranian authorities, and her father has cited eyewitnesses as saying she was beaten while en route to a detention facility.

The fact-finding report said the action “emphasizes the arbitrary character of Ms. Amini’s arrest and detention, which were based on laws and policies governing the mandatory hijab, which fundamentally discriminate against women and girls and are not permissible under international human rights law."

"Those laws and policies violate the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of religion or belief, and the autonomy of women and girls. Ms. Amini’s arrest and detention, preceding her death in custody, constituted a violation of her right to liberty of person,” it said.

The New York-based Center for Human Rights in Iran hailed the findings and said they represented clear signs of "crimes against humanity."

“The Islamic republic’s violent repression of peaceful dissent and severe discrimination against women and girls in Iran has been confirmed as constituting nothing short of crimes against humanity,” said Hadi Ghaemi, executive director of the center.

“The government’s brutal crackdown on the Women, Life, Freedom protests has seen a litany of atrocities that include extrajudicial killings, torture, and rape. These violations disproportionately affect the most vulnerable in society, women, children, and minority groups,” he added.

The report also said the Iranian government failed to “comply with its duty” to investigate the woman’s death promptly.

“Most notably, judicial harassment and intimidation were aimed at her family in order to silence them and preempt them from seeking legal redress. Some family members faced arbitrary arrest, while the family’s lawyer, Saleh Nikbaht, and three journalists, Niloofar Hamedi, Elahe Mohammadi, and Nazila Maroufian, who reported on Ms. Amini’s death were arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced to imprisonment,” it added.

Amini's death sparked mass protests, beginning in her home town of Saghez, then spreading around the country, and ultimately posed one of the biggest threats to Iran's clerical establishment since the foundation of the Islamic republic in 1979. At least 500 people were reported killed in the government’s crackdown on demonstrators.

The UN report said "violations and crimes" under international law committed in the context of the Women, Life, Freedom protests include "extrajudicial and unlawful killings and murder, unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, torture, rape, enforced disappearances, and gender persecution.

“The violent repression of peaceful protests and pervasive institutional discrimination against women and girls has led to serious human rights violations by the government of Iran, many amounting to crimes against humanity," the report said.

The UN mission acknowledged that some state security forces were killed and injured during the demonstrations, but said it found that the majority of protests were peaceful.

The mission stems from the UN Human Rights Council's mandate to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran on November 24, 2022, to investigate alleged human rights violations in Iran related to the protests that followed Amini's death.

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

But women who are unmarried or do not have a "mahram," or male guardian, face even tougher restrictions and have been cut off from access to health care, banned from traveling long distances, and pressured to quit their jobs.

The Taliban's mahram rules prohibit women from leaving their home without a male chaperone, often a husband or a close relative such as a father, brother, or uncle.

Single and unaccompanied women, including an estimated 2 million widows, say they are essentially prisoners in their homes and unable to carry out the even the most basic of tasks.

Among them is Nadia, a divorced woman from the northern province of Kunduz. The mother of four has no surviving male relatives.

"These restrictions are stifling for women who now cannot do the simple things independently," Nadia told RFE/RL's Radio Azadi.

The 35-year-old said women also need to have a male escort to visit a doctor, go to government offices, or even rent a house.

She said she had to pay a man to be her chaperone in order to meet a realtor and sign a rental agreement.

Nadia also paid a man in her neighborhood around 1,000 afghanis, or $15, to accompany her to the local passport office. But the Taliban refused her passport application and ordered her to return with her father, who died years ago.

"Even visiting the doctor is becoming impossible," she said. "We can only plead [with the Taliban] or pray. All doors are closed to us."

Mahram Crackdown

Women who violate the Taliban's mahram requirements have been detained or arrested and are often released only after signing a pledge that they will not break the rules again in the future.

In its latest report, the UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) said the Taliban's notorious religious police was enforcing the rules by carrying out inspections in public spaces, offices, and education facilities as well as setting up checkpoints in cities.

Released on January 22, the report said three female health-care workers were detained in October because they were traveling to work without a mahram.

In December, women without male chaperones were stopped from accessing health-care facilities in the southeastern province of Paktia, the report said.

And in the southern province of Kandahar, the Taliban visited a bus terminal and checked if women were traveling with a male relative, the report said.

In late 2021, the Taliban said women seeking to travel more than 72 kilometers should not be offered transport unless they were accompanied by a close male relative.

In another incident, the Taliban advised a woman to get married if she wanted to keep her job at a health-care facility, saying it was inappropriate for a single woman to work, the report said.

In a report issued on January 18, the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) said the Taliban's restrictions on single and unaccompanied women has ensured that female-led households receive less income and food.

"Their share of employment has nearly halved, decreasing from 11 percent in 2022 to 6 percent" in 2023, the report said.

The report noted that female-headed households typically care for more children and get paid less for their work and consume lower quantities of food.

"Female-headed households have greater needs for humanitarian assistance and yet report more restrictions to accessing such assistance," the report said.

"Unaccompanied access by women to public places such as health facilities, water points, and markets has declined in the past two years," the report added.

'Deeply Insulting'

Parisa, an unmarried woman, takes care of her elderly parents in the northeastern province of Takhar.

With her father bedridden and her two brothers working in neighboring Iran, she has been forced to take care of the family's needs.

But she said she has been repeatedly harassed by the Taliban while trying to buy groceries in the local market, located some 10 kilometers away from her house.

"What can women do when men in their families are forced to leave the country for work?" she told Radio Azadi, giving only her first name for security reasons.

"I have no choice but to look after my family's basic needs. The Taliban's attitude is deeply insulting and extremely aggressive."

Parisa said she has pleaded with local Taliban leaders to relax the mahram requirements. But she said her efforts have been in vain.

"They start abusing and threatening us whenever we try to tell them that we have to leave our houses to meet our basic needs," she said.

Parasto, a resident of Kabul, said the Taliban's restrictions are preventing single women from seeking the limited health care that is available.

"The doctors in the hospitals and clinics are reluctant to see unaccompanied women," she told Radio Azadi.

Parasto said the Taliban's mounting restrictions on women, especially those who are unmarried or do not have a male guardian, have made life unbearable.

"Single women are trying to survive without rights and opportunities," she said.

Written by Abubakar Siddique in Prague based on reporting by Naqiba Barakzai, Abida Spozhmai, and Khujasta Kabiri of RFE/RL's Radio Azadi

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

Listen to the Talking China In Eurasia podcast

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Welcome back to the China In Eurasia Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

As Huthi rebels continue their assault on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the deepening crisis is posing a fresh test for China’s ambitions of becoming a power broker in the Middle East – and raising questions about whether Beijing can help bring the group to bay.

Finding Perspective: U.S. officials have been asking China to urge Tehran to rein in Iran-backed Huthis, but according to the Financial Times, American officials say that they have seen no signs of help.

Still, Washington keeps raising the issue. In weekend meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan again asked Beijing to use its “substantial leverage with Iran” to play a “constructive role” in stopping the attacks.

Reuters, citing Iranian officials, reported on January 26 that Beijing urged Tehran at recent meetings to pressure the Huthis or risk jeopardizing business cooperation with China in the future.

There are plenty of reasons to believe that China would want to bring the attacks to an end. The Huthis have disrupted global shipping, stoking fears of global inflation and even more instability in the Middle East.

This also hurts China’s bottom line. The attacks are raising transport costs and jeopardizing the tens of billions of dollars that China has invested in nearby Egyptian ports.

Why It Matters: The current crisis raises some complex questions for China’s ambitions in the Middle East.

If China decides to pressure Iran, it’s unknown how much influence Tehran actually has over Yemen’s Huthis. Iran backs the group and supplies them with weapons, but it’s unclear if they can actually control and rein them in, as U.S. officials are calling for.

But the bigger question might be whether this calculation looks the same from Beijing.

China might be reluctant to get too involved and squander its political capital with Iran on trying to get the Huthis to stop their attacks, especially after the group has announced that it won’t attack Chinese ships transiting the Red Sea.

Beijing is also unlikely to want to bring an end to something that’s hurting America’s interests arguably more than its own at the moment.

U.S. officials say they’ll continue to talk with China about helping restore trade in the Red Sea, but Beijing might decide that it has more to gain by simply stepping back.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. ‘New Historical Heights’ For China And Uzbekistan

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev made a landmark three-day visit to Beijing, where he met with Xi, engaged with Chinese business leaders, and left with an officially upgraded relationship as the Central Asian leader increasingly looks to China for his economic future.

The Details: As I reported here, Mirziyoev left Uzbekistan looking to usher in a new era and returned with upgraded diplomatic ties as an “all-weather” partner with China.

The move to elevate to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” from a “comprehensive strategic partnership” doesn’t come with any formal benefits, but it’s a clear sign from Mirziyoev and Xi on where they want to take the relationship between their two countries.

Before going to China for the January 23-25 trip, Mirziyoev signed a letter praising China’s progress in fighting poverty and saying he wanted to develop a “new long-term agenda” with Beijing that will last for “decades.”

Beyond the diplomatic upgrade, China said it was ready to expand cooperation with Uzbekistan across the new energy vehicle industry chain, as well as in major projects such as photovoltaics, wind power, and hydropower.

Xi and Mirzoyoev also spoke about the long-discussed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with the Chinese leader saying that work should begin as soon as possible, athough no specifics were offered and there are reportedly still key disputes over how the megaproject will be financed.

2. The Taliban’s New Man In Beijing

In a move that could lay the groundwork for more diplomatic engagement with China, Xi received diplomatic credentials from the Taliban’s new ambassador in Beijing on January 25.

What You Need To Know: Mawlawi Asadullah Bilal Karimi was accepted as part of a ceremony that also received the credential letters of 42 new envoys. Karimi was named as the new ambassador to Beijing on November 24 but has now formally been received by Xi, which is another installment in the slow boil toward recognition that’s under way.

No country formally recognizes the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, but China – along with other countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – have appointed their own envoys to Kabul and have maintained steady diplomatic engagement with the group since it returned to power in August 2021.

Formal diplomatic recognition for the Taliban still looks to be far off, but this move highlights China’s strategy of de-facto recognition that could see other countries following its lead, paving the way for formal ties down the line.

3. China’s Tightrope With Iran and Pakistan

Air strikes and diplomatic sparring between Iran and Pakistan raised difficult questions for China and its influence in the region, as I reported here.

Both Islamabad and Tehran have since moved to mend fences, with their foreign ministers holding talks on January 29. But the incident put the spotlight on what China would do if two of its closest partners entered into conflict against one another.

What It Means: The tit-for-tat strikes hit militant groups operating in each other’s territory. After a tough exchange, both countries quickly cooled their rhetoric – culminating in the recent talks held in Islamabad.

And while Beijing has lots to lose in the event of a wider conflict between two of its allies, it appeared to remain quiet, with only a formal offer to mediate if needed.

Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told me this approach reflects how China “shies away from situations like this,” in part to protect its reputation in case it intervenes and then fails.

Michael Kugelman, the director of the Wilson Center's South Asia Institute, added that, despite Beijing’s cautious approach, China has shown a willingness to mediate when opportunity strikes, pointing to the deal it helped broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March.

“It looks like the Pakistanis and the Iranians had enough in their relationship to ease tensions themselves,” he told me. “So [Beijing] might be relieved now, but that doesn't mean they won't step up if needed.”

Across The Supercontinent

China’s Odd Moment: What do the fall of the Soviet Union and China's slowing economy have in common? The answer is more than you might think.

Listen to the latest episode of the Talking China In Eurasia podcast, where we explore how China's complicated relationship with the Soviet Union is shaping the country today.

Invite Sent. Now What? Ukraine has invited Xi to participate in a planned “peace summit” of world leaders in Switzerland, Reuters reported, in a gathering tied to the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion.

Blocked, But Why? China has suspended issuing visas to Lithuanian citizens. Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis confirmed the news and told Lithuanian journalists that “we have been informed about this. No further information has been provided.”

More Hydro Plans: Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy and the China National Electric Engineering Company signed a memorandum of cooperation on January 24 to build a cascade of power plants and a new thermal power plant.

One Thing To Watch

There’s no official word, but it’s looking like veteran diplomat Liu Jianchao is the leading contender to become China’s next foreign minister.

Wang Yi was reassigned to his old post after Qin Gang was abruptly removed as foreign minister last summer, and Wang is currently holding roles as both foreign minister and the more senior position of director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office.

Liu has limited experience engaging with the West but served stints at the Communist Party’s anti-corruption watchdog and currently heads a party agency traditionally tasked with building ties with other communist states.

It also looks like he’s being groomed for the role. He recently completed a U.S. tour, where he met with top officials and business leaders, and has also made visits to the Middle East.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

Listen to the Talking China In Eurasia podcast

Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Google | YouTube

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

As Huthi rebels continue their assault on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the deepening crisis is posing a fresh test for China’s ambitions of becoming a power broker in the Middle East – and raising questions about whether Beijing can help bring the group to bay.

Finding Perspective: U.S. officials have been asking China to urge Tehran to rein in Iran-backed Huthis, but according to the Financial Times, American officials say that they have seen no signs of help.

Still, Washington keeps raising the issue. In weekend meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan again asked Beijing to use its “substantial leverage with Iran” to play a “constructive role” in stopping the attacks.

Reuters, citing Iranian officials, reported on January 26 that Beijing urged Tehran at recent meetings to pressure the Huthis or risk jeopardizing business cooperation with China in the future.

There are plenty of reasons to believe that China would want to bring the attacks to an end. The Huthis have disrupted global shipping, stoking fears of global inflation and even more instability in the Middle East.

This also hurts China’s bottom line. The attacks are raising transport costs and jeopardizing the tens of billions of dollars that China has invested in nearby Egyptian ports.

Why It Matters: The current crisis raises some complex questions for China’s ambitions in the Middle East.

If China decides to pressure Iran, it’s unknown how much influence Tehran actually has over Yemen’s Huthis. Iran backs the group and supplies them with weapons, but it’s unclear if they can actually control and rein them in, as U.S. officials are calling for.

But the bigger question might be whether this calculation looks the same from Beijing.

China might be reluctant to get too involved and squander its political capital with Iran on trying to get the Huthis to stop their attacks, especially after the group has announced that it won’t attack Chinese ships transiting the Red Sea.

Beijing is also unlikely to want to bring an end to something that’s hurting America’s interests arguably more than its own at the moment.

U.S. officials say they’ll continue to talk with China about helping restore trade in the Red Sea, but Beijing might decide that it has more to gain by simply stepping back.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. ‘New Historical Heights’ For China And Uzbekistan

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev made a landmark three-day visit to Beijing, where he met with Xi, engaged with Chinese business leaders, and left with an officially upgraded relationship as the Central Asian leader increasingly looks to China for his economic future.

The Details: As I reported here, Mirziyoev left Uzbekistan looking to usher in a new era and returned with upgraded diplomatic ties as an “all-weather” partner with China.

The move to elevate to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” from a “comprehensive strategic partnership” doesn’t come with any formal benefits, but it’s a clear sign from Mirziyoev and Xi on where they want to take the relationship between their two countries.

Before going to China for the January 23-25 trip, Mirziyoev signed a letter praising China’s progress in fighting poverty and saying he wanted to develop a “new long-term agenda” with Beijing that will last for “decades.”

Beyond the diplomatic upgrade, China said it was ready to expand cooperation with Uzbekistan across the new energy vehicle industry chain, as well as in major projects such as photovoltaics, wind power, and hydropower.

Xi and Mirzoyoev also spoke about the long-discussed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with the Chinese leader saying that work should begin as soon as possible, athough no specifics were offered and there are reportedly still key disputes over how the megaproject will be financed.

2. The Taliban’s New Man In Beijing

In a move that could lay the groundwork for more diplomatic engagement with China, Xi received diplomatic credentials from the Taliban’s new ambassador in Beijing on January 25.

What You Need To Know: Mawlawi Asadullah Bilal Karimi was accepted as part of a ceremony that also received the credential letters of 42 new envoys. Karimi was named as the new ambassador to Beijing on November 24 but has now formally been received by Xi, which is another installment in the slow boil toward recognition that’s under way.

No country formally recognizes the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, but China – along with other countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – have appointed their own envoys to Kabul and have maintained steady diplomatic engagement with the group since it returned to power in August 2021.

Formal diplomatic recognition for the Taliban still looks to be far off, but this move highlights China’s strategy of de-facto recognition that could see other countries following its lead, paving the way for formal ties down the line.

3. China’s Tightrope With Iran and Pakistan

Air strikes and diplomatic sparring between Iran and Pakistan raised difficult questions for China and its influence in the region, as I reported here.

Both Islamabad and Tehran have since moved to mend fences, with their foreign ministers holding talks on January 29. But the incident put the spotlight on what China would do if two of its closest partners entered into conflict against one another.

What It Means: The tit-for-tat strikes hit militant groups operating in each other’s territory. After a tough exchange, both countries quickly cooled their rhetoric – culminating in the recent talks held in Islamabad.

And while Beijing has lots to lose in the event of a wider conflict between two of its allies, it appeared to remain quiet, with only a formal offer to mediate if needed.

Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told me this approach reflects how China “shies away from situations like this,” in part to protect its reputation in case it intervenes and then fails.

Michael Kugelman, the director of the Wilson Center's South Asia Institute, added that, despite Beijing’s cautious approach, China has shown a willingness to mediate when opportunity strikes, pointing to the deal it helped broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March.

“It looks like the Pakistanis and the Iranians had enough in their relationship to ease tensions themselves,” he told me. “So [Beijing] might be relieved now, but that doesn't mean they won't step up if needed.”

Across The Supercontinent

China’s Odd Moment: What do the fall of the Soviet Union and China's slowing economy have in common? The answer is more than you might think.

Listen to the latest episode of the Talking China In Eurasia podcast, where we explore how China's complicated relationship with the Soviet Union is shaping the country today.

Invite Sent. Now What? Ukraine has invited Xi to participate in a planned “peace summit” of world leaders in Switzerland, Reuters reported, in a gathering tied to the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion.

Blocked, But Why? China has suspended issuing visas to Lithuanian citizens. Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis confirmed the news and told Lithuanian journalists that “we have been informed about this. No further information has been provided.”

More Hydro Plans: Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy and the China National Electric Engineering Company signed a memorandum of cooperation on January 24 to build a cascade of power plants and a new thermal power plant.

One Thing To Watch

There’s no official word, but it’s looking like veteran diplomat Liu Jianchao is the leading contender to become China’s next foreign minister.

Wang Yi was reassigned to his old post after Qin Gang was abruptly removed as foreign minister last summer, and Wang is currently holding roles as both foreign minister and the more senior position of director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office.

Liu has limited experience engaging with the West but served stints at the Communist Party’s anti-corruption watchdog and currently heads a party agency traditionally tasked with building ties with other communist states.

It also looks like he’s being groomed for the role. He recently completed a U.S. tour, where he met with top officials and business leaders, and has also made visits to the Middle East.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

Listen to the Talking China In Eurasia podcast

Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Google | YouTube

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

As Huthi rebels continue their assault on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the deepening crisis is posing a fresh test for China’s ambitions of becoming a power broker in the Middle East – and raising questions about whether Beijing can help bring the group to bay.

Finding Perspective: U.S. officials have been asking China to urge Tehran to rein in Iran-backed Huthis, but according to the Financial Times, American officials say that they have seen no signs of help.

Still, Washington keeps raising the issue. In weekend meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan again asked Beijing to use its “substantial leverage with Iran” to play a “constructive role” in stopping the attacks.

Reuters, citing Iranian officials, reported on January 26 that Beijing urged Tehran at recent meetings to pressure the Huthis or risk jeopardizing business cooperation with China in the future.

There are plenty of reasons to believe that China would want to bring the attacks to an end. The Huthis have disrupted global shipping, stoking fears of global inflation and even more instability in the Middle East.

This also hurts China’s bottom line. The attacks are raising transport costs and jeopardizing the tens of billions of dollars that China has invested in nearby Egyptian ports.

Why It Matters: The current crisis raises some complex questions for China’s ambitions in the Middle East.

If China decides to pressure Iran, it’s unknown how much influence Tehran actually has over Yemen’s Huthis. Iran backs the group and supplies them with weapons, but it’s unclear if they can actually control and rein them in, as U.S. officials are calling for.

But the bigger question might be whether this calculation looks the same from Beijing.

China might be reluctant to get too involved and squander its political capital with Iran on trying to get the Huthis to stop their attacks, especially after the group has announced that it won’t attack Chinese ships transiting the Red Sea.

Beijing is also unlikely to want to bring an end to something that’s hurting America’s interests arguably more than its own at the moment.

U.S. officials say they’ll continue to talk with China about helping restore trade in the Red Sea, but Beijing might decide that it has more to gain by simply stepping back.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. ‘New Historical Heights’ For China And Uzbekistan

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev made a landmark three-day visit to Beijing, where he met with Xi, engaged with Chinese business leaders, and left with an officially upgraded relationship as the Central Asian leader increasingly looks to China for his economic future.

The Details: As I reported here, Mirziyoev left Uzbekistan looking to usher in a new era and returned with upgraded diplomatic ties as an “all-weather” partner with China.

The move to elevate to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” from a “comprehensive strategic partnership” doesn’t come with any formal benefits, but it’s a clear sign from Mirziyoev and Xi on where they want to take the relationship between their two countries.

Before going to China for the January 23-25 trip, Mirziyoev signed a letter praising China’s progress in fighting poverty and saying he wanted to develop a “new long-term agenda” with Beijing that will last for “decades.”

Beyond the diplomatic upgrade, China said it was ready to expand cooperation with Uzbekistan across the new energy vehicle industry chain, as well as in major projects such as photovoltaics, wind power, and hydropower.

Xi and Mirzoyoev also spoke about the long-discussed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with the Chinese leader saying that work should begin as soon as possible, athough no specifics were offered and there are reportedly still key disputes over how the megaproject will be financed.

2. The Taliban’s New Man In Beijing

In a move that could lay the groundwork for more diplomatic engagement with China, Xi received diplomatic credentials from the Taliban’s new ambassador in Beijing on January 25.

What You Need To Know: Mawlawi Asadullah Bilal Karimi was accepted as part of a ceremony that also received the credential letters of 42 new envoys. Karimi was named as the new ambassador to Beijing on November 24 but has now formally been received by Xi, which is another installment in the slow boil toward recognition that’s under way.

No country formally recognizes the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, but China – along with other countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – have appointed their own envoys to Kabul and have maintained steady diplomatic engagement with the group since it returned to power in August 2021.

Formal diplomatic recognition for the Taliban still looks to be far off, but this move highlights China’s strategy of de-facto recognition that could see other countries following its lead, paving the way for formal ties down the line.

3. China’s Tightrope With Iran and Pakistan

Air strikes and diplomatic sparring between Iran and Pakistan raised difficult questions for China and its influence in the region, as I reported here.

Both Islamabad and Tehran have since moved to mend fences, with their foreign ministers holding talks on January 29. But the incident put the spotlight on what China would do if two of its closest partners entered into conflict against one another.

What It Means: The tit-for-tat strikes hit militant groups operating in each other’s territory. After a tough exchange, both countries quickly cooled their rhetoric – culminating in the recent talks held in Islamabad.

And while Beijing has lots to lose in the event of a wider conflict between two of its allies, it appeared to remain quiet, with only a formal offer to mediate if needed.

Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told me this approach reflects how China “shies away from situations like this,” in part to protect its reputation in case it intervenes and then fails.

Michael Kugelman, the director of the Wilson Center's South Asia Institute, added that, despite Beijing’s cautious approach, China has shown a willingness to mediate when opportunity strikes, pointing to the deal it helped broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March.

“It looks like the Pakistanis and the Iranians had enough in their relationship to ease tensions themselves,” he told me. “So [Beijing] might be relieved now, but that doesn't mean they won't step up if needed.”

Across The Supercontinent

China’s Odd Moment: What do the fall of the Soviet Union and China's slowing economy have in common? The answer is more than you might think.

Listen to the latest episode of the Talking China In Eurasia podcast, where we explore how China's complicated relationship with the Soviet Union is shaping the country today.

Invite Sent. Now What? Ukraine has invited Xi to participate in a planned “peace summit” of world leaders in Switzerland, Reuters reported, in a gathering tied to the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion.

Blocked, But Why? China has suspended issuing visas to Lithuanian citizens. Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis confirmed the news and told Lithuanian journalists that “we have been informed about this. No further information has been provided.”

More Hydro Plans: Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy and the China National Electric Engineering Company signed a memorandum of cooperation on January 24 to build a cascade of power plants and a new thermal power plant.

One Thing To Watch

There’s no official word, but it’s looking like veteran diplomat Liu Jianchao is the leading contender to become China’s next foreign minister.

Wang Yi was reassigned to his old post after Qin Gang was abruptly removed as foreign minister last summer, and Wang is currently holding roles as both foreign minister and the more senior position of director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office.

Liu has limited experience engaging with the West but served stints at the Communist Party’s anti-corruption watchdog and currently heads a party agency traditionally tasked with building ties with other communist states.

It also looks like he’s being groomed for the role. He recently completed a U.S. tour, where he met with top officials and business leaders, and has also made visits to the Middle East.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

Listen to the Talking China In Eurasia podcast

Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Google | YouTube

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

As Huthi rebels continue their assault on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the deepening crisis is posing a fresh test for China’s ambitions of becoming a power broker in the Middle East – and raising questions about whether Beijing can help bring the group to bay.

Finding Perspective: U.S. officials have been asking China to urge Tehran to rein in Iran-backed Huthis, but according to the Financial Times, American officials say that they have seen no signs of help.

Still, Washington keeps raising the issue. In weekend meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan again asked Beijing to use its “substantial leverage with Iran” to play a “constructive role” in stopping the attacks.

Reuters, citing Iranian officials, reported on January 26 that Beijing urged Tehran at recent meetings to pressure the Huthis or risk jeopardizing business cooperation with China in the future.

There are plenty of reasons to believe that China would want to bring the attacks to an end. The Huthis have disrupted global shipping, stoking fears of global inflation and even more instability in the Middle East.

This also hurts China’s bottom line. The attacks are raising transport costs and jeopardizing the tens of billions of dollars that China has invested in nearby Egyptian ports.

Why It Matters: The current crisis raises some complex questions for China’s ambitions in the Middle East.

If China decides to pressure Iran, it’s unknown how much influence Tehran actually has over Yemen’s Huthis. Iran backs the group and supplies them with weapons, but it’s unclear if they can actually control and rein them in, as U.S. officials are calling for.

But the bigger question might be whether this calculation looks the same from Beijing.

China might be reluctant to get too involved and squander its political capital with Iran on trying to get the Huthis to stop their attacks, especially after the group has announced that it won’t attack Chinese ships transiting the Red Sea.

Beijing is also unlikely to want to bring an end to something that’s hurting America’s interests arguably more than its own at the moment.

U.S. officials say they’ll continue to talk with China about helping restore trade in the Red Sea, but Beijing might decide that it has more to gain by simply stepping back.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. ‘New Historical Heights’ For China And Uzbekistan

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev made a landmark three-day visit to Beijing, where he met with Xi, engaged with Chinese business leaders, and left with an officially upgraded relationship as the Central Asian leader increasingly looks to China for his economic future.

The Details: As I reported here, Mirziyoev left Uzbekistan looking to usher in a new era and returned with upgraded diplomatic ties as an “all-weather” partner with China.

The move to elevate to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” from a “comprehensive strategic partnership” doesn’t come with any formal benefits, but it’s a clear sign from Mirziyoev and Xi on where they want to take the relationship between their two countries.

Before going to China for the January 23-25 trip, Mirziyoev signed a letter praising China’s progress in fighting poverty and saying he wanted to develop a “new long-term agenda” with Beijing that will last for “decades.”

Beyond the diplomatic upgrade, China said it was ready to expand cooperation with Uzbekistan across the new energy vehicle industry chain, as well as in major projects such as photovoltaics, wind power, and hydropower.

Xi and Mirzoyoev also spoke about the long-discussed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with the Chinese leader saying that work should begin as soon as possible, athough no specifics were offered and there are reportedly still key disputes over how the megaproject will be financed.

2. The Taliban’s New Man In Beijing

In a move that could lay the groundwork for more diplomatic engagement with China, Xi received diplomatic credentials from the Taliban’s new ambassador in Beijing on January 25.

What You Need To Know: Mawlawi Asadullah Bilal Karimi was accepted as part of a ceremony that also received the credential letters of 42 new envoys. Karimi was named as the new ambassador to Beijing on November 24 but has now formally been received by Xi, which is another installment in the slow boil toward recognition that’s under way.

No country formally recognizes the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, but China – along with other countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – have appointed their own envoys to Kabul and have maintained steady diplomatic engagement with the group since it returned to power in August 2021.

Formal diplomatic recognition for the Taliban still looks to be far off, but this move highlights China’s strategy of de-facto recognition that could see other countries following its lead, paving the way for formal ties down the line.

3. China’s Tightrope With Iran and Pakistan

Air strikes and diplomatic sparring between Iran and Pakistan raised difficult questions for China and its influence in the region, as I reported here.

Both Islamabad and Tehran have since moved to mend fences, with their foreign ministers holding talks on January 29. But the incident put the spotlight on what China would do if two of its closest partners entered into conflict against one another.

What It Means: The tit-for-tat strikes hit militant groups operating in each other’s territory. After a tough exchange, both countries quickly cooled their rhetoric – culminating in the recent talks held in Islamabad.

And while Beijing has lots to lose in the event of a wider conflict between two of its allies, it appeared to remain quiet, with only a formal offer to mediate if needed.

Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told me this approach reflects how China “shies away from situations like this,” in part to protect its reputation in case it intervenes and then fails.

Michael Kugelman, the director of the Wilson Center's South Asia Institute, added that, despite Beijing’s cautious approach, China has shown a willingness to mediate when opportunity strikes, pointing to the deal it helped broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March.

“It looks like the Pakistanis and the Iranians had enough in their relationship to ease tensions themselves,” he told me. “So [Beijing] might be relieved now, but that doesn't mean they won't step up if needed.”

Across The Supercontinent

China’s Odd Moment: What do the fall of the Soviet Union and China's slowing economy have in common? The answer is more than you might think.

Listen to the latest episode of the Talking China In Eurasia podcast, where we explore how China's complicated relationship with the Soviet Union is shaping the country today.

Invite Sent. Now What? Ukraine has invited Xi to participate in a planned “peace summit” of world leaders in Switzerland, Reuters reported, in a gathering tied to the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion.

Blocked, But Why? China has suspended issuing visas to Lithuanian citizens. Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis confirmed the news and told Lithuanian journalists that “we have been informed about this. No further information has been provided.”

More Hydro Plans: Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy and the China National Electric Engineering Company signed a memorandum of cooperation on January 24 to build a cascade of power plants and a new thermal power plant.

One Thing To Watch

There’s no official word, but it’s looking like veteran diplomat Liu Jianchao is the leading contender to become China’s next foreign minister.

Wang Yi was reassigned to his old post after Qin Gang was abruptly removed as foreign minister last summer, and Wang is currently holding roles as both foreign minister and the more senior position of director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office.

Liu has limited experience engaging with the West but served stints at the Communist Party’s anti-corruption watchdog and currently heads a party agency traditionally tasked with building ties with other communist states.

It also looks like he’s being groomed for the role. He recently completed a U.S. tour, where he met with top officials and business leaders, and has also made visits to the Middle East.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

Listen to the Talking China In Eurasia podcast

Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Google | YouTube

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

As Huthi rebels continue their assault on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the deepening crisis is posing a fresh test for China’s ambitions of becoming a power broker in the Middle East – and raising questions about whether Beijing can help bring the group to bay.

Finding Perspective: U.S. officials have been asking China to urge Tehran to rein in Iran-backed Huthis, but according to the Financial Times, American officials say that they have seen no signs of help.

Still, Washington keeps raising the issue. In weekend meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan again asked Beijing to use its “substantial leverage with Iran” to play a “constructive role” in stopping the attacks.

Reuters, citing Iranian officials, reported on January 26 that Beijing urged Tehran at recent meetings to pressure the Huthis or risk jeopardizing business cooperation with China in the future.

There are plenty of reasons to believe that China would want to bring the attacks to an end. The Huthis have disrupted global shipping, stoking fears of global inflation and even more instability in the Middle East.

This also hurts China’s bottom line. The attacks are raising transport costs and jeopardizing the tens of billions of dollars that China has invested in nearby Egyptian ports.

Why It Matters: The current crisis raises some complex questions for China’s ambitions in the Middle East.

If China decides to pressure Iran, it’s unknown how much influence Tehran actually has over Yemen’s Huthis. Iran backs the group and supplies them with weapons, but it’s unclear if they can actually control and rein them in, as U.S. officials are calling for.

But the bigger question might be whether this calculation looks the same from Beijing.

China might be reluctant to get too involved and squander its political capital with Iran on trying to get the Huthis to stop their attacks, especially after the group has announced that it won’t attack Chinese ships transiting the Red Sea.

Beijing is also unlikely to want to bring an end to something that’s hurting America’s interests arguably more than its own at the moment.

U.S. officials say they’ll continue to talk with China about helping restore trade in the Red Sea, but Beijing might decide that it has more to gain by simply stepping back.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. ‘New Historical Heights’ For China And Uzbekistan

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev made a landmark three-day visit to Beijing, where he met with Xi, engaged with Chinese business leaders, and left with an officially upgraded relationship as the Central Asian leader increasingly looks to China for his economic future.

The Details: As I reported here, Mirziyoev left Uzbekistan looking to usher in a new era and returned with upgraded diplomatic ties as an “all-weather” partner with China.

The move to elevate to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” from a “comprehensive strategic partnership” doesn’t come with any formal benefits, but it’s a clear sign from Mirziyoev and Xi on where they want to take the relationship between their two countries.

Before going to China for the January 23-25 trip, Mirziyoev signed a letter praising China’s progress in fighting poverty and saying he wanted to develop a “new long-term agenda” with Beijing that will last for “decades.”

Beyond the diplomatic upgrade, China said it was ready to expand cooperation with Uzbekistan across the new energy vehicle industry chain, as well as in major projects such as photovoltaics, wind power, and hydropower.

Xi and Mirzoyoev also spoke about the long-discussed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with the Chinese leader saying that work should begin as soon as possible, athough no specifics were offered and there are reportedly still key disputes over how the megaproject will be financed.

2. The Taliban’s New Man In Beijing

In a move that could lay the groundwork for more diplomatic engagement with China, Xi received diplomatic credentials from the Taliban’s new ambassador in Beijing on January 25.

What You Need To Know: Mawlawi Asadullah Bilal Karimi was accepted as part of a ceremony that also received the credential letters of 42 new envoys. Karimi was named as the new ambassador to Beijing on November 24 but has now formally been received by Xi, which is another installment in the slow boil toward recognition that’s under way.

No country formally recognizes the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, but China – along with other countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – have appointed their own envoys to Kabul and have maintained steady diplomatic engagement with the group since it returned to power in August 2021.

Formal diplomatic recognition for the Taliban still looks to be far off, but this move highlights China’s strategy of de-facto recognition that could see other countries following its lead, paving the way for formal ties down the line.

3. China’s Tightrope With Iran and Pakistan

Air strikes and diplomatic sparring between Iran and Pakistan raised difficult questions for China and its influence in the region, as I reported here.

Both Islamabad and Tehran have since moved to mend fences, with their foreign ministers holding talks on January 29. But the incident put the spotlight on what China would do if two of its closest partners entered into conflict against one another.

What It Means: The tit-for-tat strikes hit militant groups operating in each other’s territory. After a tough exchange, both countries quickly cooled their rhetoric – culminating in the recent talks held in Islamabad.

And while Beijing has lots to lose in the event of a wider conflict between two of its allies, it appeared to remain quiet, with only a formal offer to mediate if needed.

Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told me this approach reflects how China “shies away from situations like this,” in part to protect its reputation in case it intervenes and then fails.

Michael Kugelman, the director of the Wilson Center's South Asia Institute, added that, despite Beijing’s cautious approach, China has shown a willingness to mediate when opportunity strikes, pointing to the deal it helped broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March.

“It looks like the Pakistanis and the Iranians had enough in their relationship to ease tensions themselves,” he told me. “So [Beijing] might be relieved now, but that doesn't mean they won't step up if needed.”

Across The Supercontinent

China’s Odd Moment: What do the fall of the Soviet Union and China's slowing economy have in common? The answer is more than you might think.

Listen to the latest episode of the Talking China In Eurasia podcast, where we explore how China's complicated relationship with the Soviet Union is shaping the country today.

Invite Sent. Now What? Ukraine has invited Xi to participate in a planned “peace summit” of world leaders in Switzerland, Reuters reported, in a gathering tied to the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion.

Blocked, But Why? China has suspended issuing visas to Lithuanian citizens. Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis confirmed the news and told Lithuanian journalists that “we have been informed about this. No further information has been provided.”

More Hydro Plans: Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy and the China National Electric Engineering Company signed a memorandum of cooperation on January 24 to build a cascade of power plants and a new thermal power plant.

One Thing To Watch

There’s no official word, but it’s looking like veteran diplomat Liu Jianchao is the leading contender to become China’s next foreign minister.

Wang Yi was reassigned to his old post after Qin Gang was abruptly removed as foreign minister last summer, and Wang is currently holding roles as both foreign minister and the more senior position of director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office.

Liu has limited experience engaging with the West but served stints at the Communist Party’s anti-corruption watchdog and currently heads a party agency traditionally tasked with building ties with other communist states.

It also looks like he’s being groomed for the role. He recently completed a U.S. tour, where he met with top officials and business leaders, and has also made visits to the Middle East.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

On January 17, the Taliban’s Government Media Information Center (GMIC) summoned Akbari, the assistant bureau chief of Japanese media outlet Kyodo News, to their office in the capital, Kabul, and officials from the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) agency detained the journalist and took him to an undisclosed location, according to news reports and a Kyodo News representative who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, as they did not have permission to speak publicly.

The following day, Taliban intelligence officials forced Akbari to call his family, instructing them to hand over his mobile phone to agents waiting at the family residence, according to those sources. Members of the Taliban intelligence unit raided the Kyodo office in Kabul on the same day, seizing security and video recording cameras, laptops, a satellite phone, and documents.

“Taliban authorities must immediately and unconditionally release Kyodo News journalist Ehsan Akbari and stop detaining Afghan journalists in retaliation for their work,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “Akbari’s detention and the raid on the Kyodo office in Kabul are excessive and highlight the systematic media crackdown in Afghanistan led by the GDI intelligence agency. The Taliban must abide by its promise to allow journalists to report freely.”

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed Akbari’s detention and the seizure of his work equipment. He told CPJ via messaging app that the journalist was detained because he had been “in contact with anti-government [Taliban] circles and transferred information to them.”

Since the Taliban retook control of the country on August 15, 2021, the Taliban’s repression of the Afghan media has worsened. Last year, it detained several Afghan journalists on charges of reporting for exiled media.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

• The war in Ukraine will persist until the West realizes that a return to the previous world order is unattainable.
• In Iran, with parliamentary elections scheduled for March, the government is likely to face yet another challenge to its legitimacy.
• In Belarus, setbacks for Russia in Ukraine could prompt the Lukashenka regime to attempt to normalize relations with the West.
• While 2024 will see a rightward shift in the EU, it is unlikely to bring the deluge of populist victories that some are predicting.
• The vicious spiral for women in Afghanistan will only worsen.
• Peace between Armenia and its neighbors could set the stage for a Russian exit from the region.
• Hungary's upcoming leadership of the European Council could prove a stumbling block to the start of EU accession talks with Ukraine.
• Kyrgyzstan is on course to feel the pain of secondary sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine if the West's patience runs out.

Here, then, are our correspondents' predictions for 2024. To find out more about the authors themselves, click on their bylines.

The Ukraine War: A Prolonged Stalemate

By Vitaliy Portnikov

In September 2022, Ukrainian generals Valeriy Zaluzhniy and Mykhaylo Zabrodskiy presciently warned that Russia's aggression against Ukraine would unfold into a protracted conflict. Fast forward 15 months, and the front line is effectively frozen, with neither Ukrainian nor Russian offensives yielding substantial changes.

As 2023 comes to a close, observers find themselves revisiting themes familiar from the previous year: the potential for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive, the extent of Western aid to Kyiv, the possibility of a "frozen conflict,” security assurances for Ukraine, and the prospects for its Euro-Atlantic integration ahead of a NATO summit.

It is conceivable that, by the close of 2024, we will still be grappling with these same issues. A political resolution seems elusive, given the Kremlin's steadfast refusal to entertain discussions on vacating the parts of Ukraine its forces occupy. Conversely, Ukraine’s definition of victory is the full restoration of its territorial integrity.

Even if, in 2024, one side achieves a military victory -- whether through the liberation of part of Ukraine or Russia seizing control of additional regions -- it won't necessarily bring us closer to a political resolution. Acknowledging this impasse is crucial, as Russian President Vladimir Putin's assault on Ukraine is part of a broader agenda: a push to reestablish, if not the Soviet Empire, at least its sphere of influence.

For Ukraine, resistance to Russian aggression is about not just reclaiming occupied territories but also safeguarding statehood, political identity, and national integrity. Western support is crucial for Ukraine's survival and the restoration of its territorial integrity. However, this backing aims to avoid escalation into a direct conflict between Russia and the West on Russia's sovereign territory.

The war's conclusion seems contingent on the depletion of resources on one of the two sides, with Ukraine relying on continued Western support and Russia on oil and gas revenues. Hence, 2024 might echo the patterns of 2023. Even if external factors shift significantly -- such as in the U.S. presidential election in November -- we might not witness tangible changes until 2025.

Another potential variable is the emergence of major conflicts akin to the war in the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, this would likely signify the dissipation of Western resources rather than a shift in approaches to war.

In essence, the war in Ukraine will persist until the West realizes that a return to the previous world order is unattainable. Constructing a new world order demands unconventional measures, such as offering genuine security guarantees to nations victimized by aggression or achieving peace, or at least limiting the zone of military operations to the current contact line, without direct agreements with Russia.

So far, such understanding is lacking, and the expectation that Moscow will eventually grasp the futility of its ambitions only emboldens Putin. Consequently, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will endure, potentially spawning new, equally perilous local wars worldwide.

Iran: Problems Within And Without

By Hannah Kaviani

Iran has been dealing with complex domestic and international challenges for years and the same issues are likely to plague it in 2024. But officials in Tehran appear to be taking a “wait-and-see” approach to its lengthy list of multilayered problems.

Iran enters 2024 as Israel's war in Gaza continues and the prospects for a peaceful Middle East are bleak, with the situation exacerbated by militia groups firmly supported by Tehran.

Iran’s prominent role in supporting paramilitary forces in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen has also drawn the ire of the international community and will continue to be a thorn in the side of relations with the West.

Tehran has refused to cooperate with the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency over its nuclear program, resulting in an impasse in talks with the international community. And with the United States entering an election year that could see the return of Donald Trump to the presidency, the likelihood of Tehran and Washington resuming negotiations -- which could lead to a reduction in sanctions -- is considered very low.

But Iran's problems are not limited to outside its borders.

The country’s clerical regime is still reeling from the massive protests that began in 2022 over the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody after her arrest for not obeying hijab rules. The aftershocks of the Women, Life, Freedom movement that emanated from her death were reflected in acts of civil disobedience that are likely to continue in 2024.

At the same time, a brutal crackdown continues as civil rights activists, students, religious minorities, and artists are being beaten, detained, and/or given harsh prison sentences.

With parliamentary elections scheduled for March, the government is likely to face yet another challenge to its legitimacy as it struggles with low voter turnout and general disinterest in another round of controlled elections.

Another critical issue Iranian officials must continue to deal with in 2024 is the devastated economy resulting from the slew of international sanctions because of its controversial nuclear program. After a crushing year of 47 percent inflation in 2023 (a 20-year high, according to the IMF), costs are expected to continue to rise for many foods and commodities, as well as real estate.

Iran’s widening budget deficit due to reduced oil profits continues to cripple the economy, with the IMF reporting that the current government debt is equal to three annual budgets.

With neither the international community nor the hard-line Tehran regime budging, most analysts see scant chances for significant changes in Iran in the coming year.

Belarus: Wider War Role, Integration With Russia Not In The Cards

By Valer Karbalevich

Belarus has been pulled closer into Moscow’s orbit than ever by Russia’s war in Ukraine -- but in 2024, it’s unlikely to be subsumed into the much larger nation to its east, and chances are it won’t step up its so-far limited involvement in the conflict in the country to its south.

The most probable scenario in Belarus, where the authoritarian Alyaksandr Lukashenka will mark 30 years since he came to power in 1994, is more of the same: No letup in pressure on all forms of dissent at home, no move to send troops to Ukraine. And while Russia’s insistent embrace will not loosen, the Kremlin will abstain from using Belarusian territory for any new ground attacks or bombardments of Ukraine.

But the war in Ukraine is a wild card, the linchpin influencing the trajectory of Belarus in the near term and beyond. For the foreseeable future, what happens in Belarus -- or to it -- will depend in large part on what happens in Russia’s assault on Ukraine.

Should the current equilibrium on the front persist and Western support for Ukraine persist, the likelihood is a continuation of the status quo for Belarus. The country will maintain its allegiance to Russia, marked by diplomatic and political support. Bolstered by Russian loans, Belarus's defense industry will further expand its output.

The Belarusian state will continue to militarize the border with Ukraine, posing a perpetual threat to Kyiv and diverting Ukrainian troops from the eastern and southern fronts. At the same time, however, Russia is unlikely to use Belarusian territory as a launching point for fresh assaults on Ukraine, as it did at the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.

If Russia wins or scores substantial victories -- if Ukraine is forced into negotiations on Moscow’s terms, for example, or the current front line comes to be considered the international border -- Lukashenka, consolidating his position within the country, will reap "victory dividends." But relations between Belarus and Russia are unlikely to change dramatically.

Potentially, Moscow could take major steps to absorb Belarus, diminishing its sovereignty and transforming its territory into a staging ground for a fresh assault on Kyiv. This would increase tensions with the West and heighten concerns about the tactical nuclear weapons Moscow and Minsk say Russia has transferred to Belarus. However, this seems unlikely due to the absence of military necessity for Moscow and the problems it could create on the global stage.

The loss of Belarusian sovereignty would pose a major risk for Lukashenka and his regime. An overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose the direct involvement of Belarus in the war against Ukraine. This fundamental distinction sets Belarus apart from Russia, and bringing Belarus into the war could trigger a political crisis in Belarus -- an outcome Moscow would prefer to avoid.

If Russia loses the war or sustains significant defeats that weaken Putin, Lukashenka's regime may suffer economic and political repercussions. This could prompt him to seek alternative global alliances, potentially leading to an attempt to normalize relations with the West.

Russia, Ukraine, And The West: Sliding Toward World War III

By Sergei Medvedev

2024 will be a critical year for the war in Ukraine and for the entire international system, which is quickly unraveling before our eyes. The most crucial of many challenges is a revanchist, resentful, belligerent Russia, bent on destroying and remaking the world order. In his mind, President Vladimir Putin is fighting World War III, and Ukraine is a prelude to a global showdown.

Despite Western sanctions, Russia has consolidated its position militarily, domestically, and internationally in 2023. After setbacks and shocks in 2022, the military has stabilized the front and addressed shortages of arms, supplies, and manpower. Despite latent discontent, the population is not ready to question the war, preferring to stay in the bubble of learned ignorance and the lies of state propaganda.

Here are four scenarios for 2024:

Strategic stalemate in Ukraine, chaos in the international system: The West, relaxed by a 30-year “peace dividend,” lacks the vision and resolve of the 1980s, when its leaders helped bring about the U.S.S.R.’s collapse, let alone the courage of those who stood up to Nazi Germany in World War II. Putin’s challenge to the free world is no less significant than Hitler’s was, but there is no Roosevelt or Churchill in sight. Probability: 70 percent

Widening war, collapse or division of Ukraine: Russia could defend and consolidate its gains in Ukraine, waging trench warfare while continuing to destroy civilian infrastructure, and may consider a side strike in Georgia or Moldova -- or against Lithuania or Poland, testing NATO. A frontal invasion is less likely than a hybrid operation by “unidentified” units striking from Belarus, acts of sabotage, or unrest among Russian-speakers in the Baltic states. Other Kremlin operations could occur anywhere in the world. The collapse of Ukraine’s government or the division of the country could not be ruled out. Probability: 15 percent.

Russia loses in Ukraine: A military defeat for Russia, possibly entailing a partial or complete withdrawal from Ukraine. Consistent Western support and expanded supplies of arms, like F-16s or Abrams tanks, or a big move such as closing the skies over Ukraine, could provide for this outcome. It would not necessarily entail Russia’s collapse -- it could further consolidate the nation around Putin’s regime. Russia would develop a resentful identity grounded in loss and defeat -- and harbor the idea of coming back with a vengeance. Probability: 10 percent

Russia’s Collapse: A military defeat in Ukraine could spark social unrest, elite factional battles, and an anti-Putin coup, leading to his demotion or violent death. Putin’s natural death, too, could set off a succession struggle, causing chaos in a country he has rid of reliable institutions. While breakup into many regions is unlikely, the empire could crumble at the edges -- Kaliningrad, Chechnya, the Far East – like in 1917 and 1991. Russia’s nuclear weapons would be a big question mark, leading to external involvement and possible de-nuclearization. For all its perils, this scenario might provide a framework for future statehood in Northern Eurasia. Probability: 5 percent

EU: 'Fortress Europe' And The Ukraine War

By Rikard Jozwiak

2024 will see a rightward shift in the European Union, but it is unlikely to bring the deluge of populist victories that some are predicting since Euroskeptics won national elections in the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia and polled well in Austria and Germany.

The European Parliament elections in June will be the ultimate test for the bloc in that respect. Polls still suggest the two main political groups, the center-right European People's Party and the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, will finish on top, albeit with a smaller share of the vote. But right-wing populist parties are likely to fail once again to agree on the creation of a single political group, thus eroding their influence in Brussels.

This, in turn, is likely to prod more pro-European groups into combining forces again to divvy up EU top jobs like the presidencies of the European Commission, the bloc's top executive body, and the European Council, which defines the EU's political direction and priorities. Center-right European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is widely tipped to get a second term, even though she might fancy NATO's top job as secretary-general. Charles Michel, on the other hand, will definitely be out as European Council president after serving the maximum five years.

While right-wing populists may not wield major influence in the horse-trading for those top jobs, they will affect policy going forward. They have already contributed to a hardening of attitudes on migration, and you can expect to hear more of the term "fortress Europe" as barriers go up on the EU's outer border.

The biggest question for 2024, however, is about how much support Brussels can provide Ukraine going forward. Could the "cost-of-living crisis" encourage members to side with Budapest to block financial aid or veto the start of de facto accession talks with that war-torn country? The smart money is still on the EU finding a way to green-light both those decisions in 2024, possibly by unfreezing more EU funds for Budapest.

Although it seems like a remote possibility, patience could also finally wear out with Hungary, and the other 26 members could decide to strip it of voting rights in the Council of the European Union, which amends, approves, and vetoes European Commission proposals -- essentially depriving it of influence. In that respect, Austria and Slovakia, Budapest's two biggest allies right now, are the EU countries to watch.

The one surefire guarantee in Europe isn't about the European Union at all but rather about NATO: After somehow failing to join as predicted for each of the past two years, against the backdrop of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Sweden will become the transatlantic military alliance's 32nd member once the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments vote to ratify its accession protocol.

Caucasus: A Peace Agreement Could Be Transformative

By Josh Kucera

Could 2024 be the year that Armenia and Azerbaijan finally formally resolve decades of conflict?

This year, Azerbaijan effectively decided -- by force -- their most contentious issue: the status of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. With its lightning offensive in September, Azerbaijan placed Karabakh firmly under its control. Both sides now say they've reached agreement on most of their fundamental remaining issues, and diplomatic talks, after an interruption, appear set to resume.

A resolution of the conflict could transform the region. If Armenia and Azerbaijan made peace, a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement could soon follow. Borders between the three countries would reopen as a result, ending Armenia's long geographical isolation and priming the South Caucasus to take full advantage of new transportation projects seeking to ship cargo between Europe and Asia while bypassing Russia.

Peace between Armenia and its neighbors also could set the stage for a Russian exit from the region. Russian-Armenian security cooperation has been predicated on potential threats from Azerbaijan and Turkey. With those threats reduced, what's keeping the Russian soldiers, peacekeepers, and border guards there?

A Russian exit would be a messy process -- Moscow still holds many economic levers in Armenia -- but Yerevan could seek help from the United States and Europe to smooth any transition. Washington and Brussels have seemingly been waiting in the wings, nudging Armenia in their direction.

But none of this is likely to happen without a peace agreement. And while there don't seem to be any unresolvable issues remaining, there are mounting indications that Azerbaijan may not see it in its interests to make peace. Baku has gotten what it wanted most of all -- full control of Karabakh -- without an agreement. And maintaining a simmering conflict with Armenia could arguably serve Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev well, as it would allow him to continue to lean on a reliable source of public support: rallying against an Armenian enemy.

But perhaps the most conspicuous indication of a broader strategy is Aliyev's increasing invocation of "Western Azerbaijan" -- a hazily defined concept alluding to ethnic Azerbaijanis who used to live on the territory of what is now Armenia and their presumed right to return to their homes. It suggests that Azerbaijan might keep furthering its demands in hopes that Armenia finally throws in the towel, and each can accuse the other of intransigence.

Hungary: The Return Of Big Brother?

By Pablo Gorondi

Critics might be tempted to believe that Big Brother will be watching over Hungarians in 2024 like at no point since the fall of communism.

A new law on the Defense of National Sovereignty will allow the Office for the Defense of Sovereignty, which the law created, to investigate and request information from almost any group in Hungary that receives foreign funding. This will apply to civic groups, political parties, private businesses, media companies -- in fact, anyone deemed to be conducting activities (including "information manipulation and disinformation") in the interests of a foreign "body, organization, or person."

The law has been criticized by experts from the United Nations and the Council of Europe over its seemingly vague language, lack of judicial oversight, and fears that it could be used by the government "to silence and stigmatize independent voices and opponents."

The head of the Office for the Defense of Sovereignty should be nominated for a six-year term by right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orban and appointed by President Katalin Novak by February 1. This would allow the new authority to carry out investigations and present findings ahead of simultaneous elections to the European Parliament and Hungarian municipal bodies in early June -- possibly influencing their outcomes.

Asked by RFE/RL's Hungarian Service, some experts said fears of the new authority are overblown and that the government is more likely to use it as a threat hanging over opponents than as a direct tool for repression -- at least until it finds it politically necessary or expedient to tighten control.

On the international scene, meanwhile, Hungary will take over the Council of the European Union's six-month rotating presidency in July, a few weeks after voting to determine the composition of a new European Parliament.

MEPs from Orban's Fidesz party exited the center-right European People's Party bloc in 2021 and have not joined another group since then, although some observers expect them to join the more Euroskeptic and nationalist European Conservatives and Reformists.

Orban has for years predicted a breakthrough of more radical right-wing forces in Europe. But while that has happened in Italy, the Netherlands, and Slovakia, experts suggest that's not enough to fuel a significant shift in the European Parliament, where the center-right and center-left should continue to hold a clear majority.

Because of the June elections, the European Parliament's activities will initially be limited -- and its election of a European Commission president could prove complicated. Nevertheless, Orban has said in recent interviews that he wants to "fix the European Union" and that "we need to take over Brussels." So, Hungary's leadership may make progress difficult on issues that Orban opposes, like the start of EU accession talks with Ukraine or a possible reelection bid by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

Stability And The 'Serbian World'

By Gjeraqina Tuhina and Milos Teodorovic

Serbia, once again, will be a key player in the region -- and its moves could significantly shape events in the Balkans over the next 12 months.

For over a decade, the dialogue to normalize relations between Serbia and its former province Kosovo has stymied both countries. Then, in February in Brussels and March in Ohrid, North Macedonia, European mediators announced a path forward and its implementation. There was only one problem: There was no signature on either side. Nine months later, little has changed.

Many eyes are looking toward one aspect in particular -- a renewed obligation for Pristina to allow for an "appropriate level of self-management" for the Serb minority in Kosovo. This also entails creating possibilities for financial support from Serbia to Kosovar Serbs and guarantees for direct communication of the Serb minority with the Kosovar government.

In October, EU mediators tried again, and with German, French, and Italian backing presented both parties with a new draft for an association of Serb-majority municipalities. Both sides accepted the draft. EU envoy to the region Miroslav Lajcak suggested in December that the Ohrid agreement could be implemented by the end of January. If that happened, it would mark a decisive step for both sides in a dialogue that began in 2011.

"The Serbian world" is a phrase launched a few years ago by pro-Russian Serbian politician Aleksandar Vulin, a longtime cabinet minister who until recently headed the Serbian Intelligence Service. It is not officially part of the agenda of either Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic or the government, but it underscores the influence that Serbia seeks to wield from Kosovo and Montenegro to Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But how Vucic chooses to exert the implicit ties to Serb leaders and nationalists in those countries could do much to promote stability -- or its antithesis -- in the Balkans in 2024.

Another major challenge for Vucic revolves around EU officials' request that candidate country Serbia harmonize its foreign policy with the bloc. So far, along with Turkey, Serbia is the only EU candidate that has not introduced sanctions on Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It is unclear how far the Serbian president is willing to push back to foster ongoing good relations with Moscow.

But first, Serbia will have to confront the fallout from snap elections in December dominated by Vucic's Serbian Progressive Party but rejected by the newly united opposition as fraudulent. The results sparked nightly protests in the capital and hunger strikes by a half-dozen lawmakers and other oppositionists. A new parliament is scheduled to hold a session by the end of January 2024, and the margins are seemingly razor-thin for control of the capital, Belgrade.

Central Asia: Don't Write Russia Off Just Yet

By Chris Rickleton

Will the empire strike back? 2023 has been a galling year for Russia in Central Asia as it watched its traditional partners (and former colonies) widen their diplomatic horizons.

With Russia bogged down in a grueling war in Ukraine, Moscow has less to offer the region than ever before. Central Asia’s five countries have made the most of the breathing space, with their leaders holding landmark talks with U.S. and German leaders as French President Emmanuel Macron also waltzed into Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with multibillion-dollar investments.

And China has reinforced its dominant position in the region, while Turkey has also increased its influence.

But don’t write Russia off just yet.

One of Moscow’s biggest wins in the neighborhood this year was an agreement to supply Uzbekistan with nearly 3 billion cubic meters of gas every year, a figure that could increase.

Power deficits in Uzbekistan and energy-rich Kazakhstan are the most obvious short-term sources of leverage for Moscow over those important countries.

The coming year will likely bring more in terms of specifics over both governments’ plans for nuclear power production, with Russia fully expected to be involved.

And Moscow’s confidence in a region that it views as its near abroad will only increase if it feels it is making headway on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan’s hereditary succession has been expected for so long that people have stopped expecting it. Does that mean it is back on the cards for 2024? Probably not.

In 2016, Tajikistan passed a raft of constitutional changes aimed at cementing the ruling Rahmon family’s hold on power. Among them was one lowering the age to run for president from 35 to 30.

That amendment had an obvious beneficiary -- veteran incumbent Emomali Rahmon’s upwardly mobile son, Rustam Emomali. But Emomali is now 36 and, despite occupying a political post that makes him next in line, doesn’t look any closer to becoming numero uno.

Perhaps there hasn’t been a good time to do it.

From the coronavirus pandemic to a bloody crackdown on unrest in the Gorno-Badakhshan region and now the shadows cast by the Ukraine war, there have been plenty of excuses to delay the inevitable.

Turkmenistan

But perhaps Rahmon is considering events in Turkmenistan, where Central Asia’s first father-son power transition last year has ended up nothing of the sort. Rather than growing into the role, new President Serdar Berdymukhammedov is shrinking back into the shadow of his all-powerful father, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov.

And this seems to be exactly how the older Berdymukhammedov wanted it, subsequently fashioning himself a post-retirement post that makes his son and the rest of the government answerable to him.

But Turkmenistan’s bizarre new setup begs a question: If you’re not ready to let it go, why not hold on a little longer?

Kyrgyzstan/Kazakhstan

Writing on X (formerly Twitter) in November, a former IMF economist argued that Kyrgyzstan would be the "perfect test case" for secondary sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Robin Brooks described the country as "small, not remotely systemically important, and very clearly facilitating trade diversion to Russia."

Official statistics show that countries in the Eurasian Economic Union that Moscow leads have become a “backdoor” around the Western-led sanctions targeting Russia. Exports to Kyrgyzstan from several EU countries this year, for example, are up by at least 1,000 percent compared to 2019.

Data for exports to Kazakhstan shows similar patterns -- with larger volumes but gentler spikes -- while investigations by RFE/RL indicate that companies in both Central Asian countries have forwarded “dual-use” products that benefit the Kremlin’s military machine.

Belarus is the only Russian ally to get fully sanctioned for its support of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine -- but will that change in 2024?

Central Asian governments will argue they have resisted Russian pressure to provide political and military support for the war. They might even whisper that their big friend China is much more helpful to Russia.

But the West’s approach of targeting only Central Asian companies actively flouting the regime is failing.

So, while Western diplomats continue to credit the region’s governments for their anti-evasion efforts, their patience may wear out. And if it does, Kyrgyzstan might be first to find out.

Afghanistan: The Vicious Spiral Will Worsen

By Malali Bashir

With little internal threat to Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and the failure of the international community to affect change in the hard-line Islamist regime’s policies, the Taliban mullahs’ control over the country continues to tighten.

And that regime’s continued restrictions on Afghan women -- their rights, freedom, and role in society -- signals a bleak future for them in 2024 and beyond.

Many observers say the move by the Taliban in December to only allow girls to attend religious madrasahs -- after shutting down formal schooling for them following the sixth grade -- is an effort by the Taliban to radicalize Afghan society.

“Madrasahs are not an alternative to formal schooling because they don’t produce doctors, lawyers, journalists, engineers, etc. The idea of [only] having madrasahs is…about brainwashing [people] to create an extremist society,” says Shukria Barakzai, the former Afghan ambassador to Norway.

The crackdown on women’s rights by the Taliban will also continue the reported uptick in domestic violence in the country, activists say.

Since the Taliban shut down Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission and Women Affairs Ministry, women find themselves with nowhere to turn to and find it extremely difficult to seek justice in Taliban courts.

With no justice for victims of abuse on the horizon, women’s rights activists say violence against women will continue with no repercussions for the perpetrators.

Barakzai argues that Taliban officials have already normalized domestic violence and do not consider it a crime.

“According to [a Taliban] decree, you can [confront] women if they are not listening to [your requests]. Especially a male member of the family is allowed to use all means to punish women if they refuse to follow his orders. That is basically a call for domestic violence,” she said.

The vicious spiral for women will only worsen.

Being banned from education, work, and public life, Afghan women say the resulting psychological impact leads to panic, depression, and acute mental health crises.

Although there are no official figures, Afghan mental health professionals and foreign organizations have noted a disturbing surge in female suicides in the two years since the Taliban came to power.

"If we look at the women who were previously working or studying, 90 percent suffer from mental health issues now," said Mujeeb Khpalwak, a psychiatrist in Kabul. "They face tremendous economic uncertainty after losing their work and are very anxious about their future."

Heather Bar, associate director of the women's rights division at Human Rights Watch, says, "It's not surprising that we're hearing reports of Afghan girls committing suicide. Because all their rights, including going to school, university, and recreational places have been taken away from them."

Promising young Afghan women who once aspired to contribute to their communities after pursuing higher education now find themselves with no career prospects.

“I do not see any future. When I see boys continuing their education, I lose all hope and wish that I was not born a girl,” a former medical student in Kabul told RFE/RL's Radio Azadi.

Despite immense global pressure, the Taliban seems adamant about maintaining its severe limits on women and reducing their role in society. This will result in a tragic future for the women of Afghanistan with no relief in sight.

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

• The war in Ukraine will persist until the West realizes that a return to the previous world order is unattainable.
• In Iran, with parliamentary elections scheduled for March, the government is likely to face yet another challenge to its legitimacy.
• In Belarus, setbacks for Russia in Ukraine could prompt the Lukashenka regime to attempt to normalize relations with the West.
• While 2024 will see a rightward shift in the EU, it is unlikely to bring the deluge of populist victories that some are predicting.
• The vicious spiral for women in Afghanistan will only worsen.
• Peace between Armenia and its neighbors could set the stage for a Russian exit from the region.
• Hungary's upcoming leadership of the European Council could prove a stumbling block to the start of EU accession talks with Ukraine.
• Kyrgyzstan is on course to feel the pain of secondary sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine if the West's patience runs out.

Here, then, are our correspondents' predictions for 2024. To find out more about the authors themselves, click on their bylines.

The Ukraine War: A Prolonged Stalemate

By Vitaliy Portnikov

In September 2022, Ukrainian generals Valeriy Zaluzhniy and Mykhaylo Zabrodskiy presciently warned that Russia's aggression against Ukraine would unfold into a protracted conflict. Fast forward 15 months, and the front line is effectively frozen, with neither Ukrainian nor Russian offensives yielding substantial changes.

As 2023 comes to a close, observers find themselves revisiting themes familiar from the previous year: the potential for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive, the extent of Western aid to Kyiv, the possibility of a "frozen conflict,” security assurances for Ukraine, and the prospects for its Euro-Atlantic integration ahead of a NATO summit.

It is conceivable that, by the close of 2024, we will still be grappling with these same issues. A political resolution seems elusive, given the Kremlin's steadfast refusal to entertain discussions on vacating the parts of Ukraine its forces occupy. Conversely, Ukraine’s definition of victory is the full restoration of its territorial integrity.

Even if, in 2024, one side achieves a military victory -- whether through the liberation of part of Ukraine or Russia seizing control of additional regions -- it won't necessarily bring us closer to a political resolution. Acknowledging this impasse is crucial, as Russian President Vladimir Putin's assault on Ukraine is part of a broader agenda: a push to reestablish, if not the Soviet Empire, at least its sphere of influence.

For Ukraine, resistance to Russian aggression is about not just reclaiming occupied territories but also safeguarding statehood, political identity, and national integrity. Western support is crucial for Ukraine's survival and the restoration of its territorial integrity. However, this backing aims to avoid escalation into a direct conflict between Russia and the West on Russia's sovereign territory.

The war's conclusion seems contingent on the depletion of resources on one of the two sides, with Ukraine relying on continued Western support and Russia on oil and gas revenues. Hence, 2024 might echo the patterns of 2023. Even if external factors shift significantly -- such as in the U.S. presidential election in November -- we might not witness tangible changes until 2025.

Another potential variable is the emergence of major conflicts akin to the war in the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, this would likely signify the dissipation of Western resources rather than a shift in approaches to war.

In essence, the war in Ukraine will persist until the West realizes that a return to the previous world order is unattainable. Constructing a new world order demands unconventional measures, such as offering genuine security guarantees to nations victimized by aggression or achieving peace, or at least limiting the zone of military operations to the current contact line, without direct agreements with Russia.

So far, such understanding is lacking, and the expectation that Moscow will eventually grasp the futility of its ambitions only emboldens Putin. Consequently, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will endure, potentially spawning new, equally perilous local wars worldwide.

Iran: Problems Within And Without

By Hannah Kaviani

Iran has been dealing with complex domestic and international challenges for years and the same issues are likely to plague it in 2024. But officials in Tehran appear to be taking a “wait-and-see” approach to its lengthy list of multilayered problems.

Iran enters 2024 as Israel's war in Gaza continues and the prospects for a peaceful Middle East are bleak, with the situation exacerbated by militia groups firmly supported by Tehran.

Iran’s prominent role in supporting paramilitary forces in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen has also drawn the ire of the international community and will continue to be a thorn in the side of relations with the West.

Tehran has refused to cooperate with the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency over its nuclear program, resulting in an impasse in talks with the international community. And with the United States entering an election year that could see the return of Donald Trump to the presidency, the likelihood of Tehran and Washington resuming negotiations -- which could lead to a reduction in sanctions -- is considered very low.

But Iran's problems are not limited to outside its borders.

The country’s clerical regime is still reeling from the massive protests that began in 2022 over the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody after her arrest for not obeying hijab rules. The aftershocks of the Women, Life, Freedom movement that emanated from her death were reflected in acts of civil disobedience that are likely to continue in 2024.

At the same time, a brutal crackdown continues as civil rights activists, students, religious minorities, and artists are being beaten, detained, and/or given harsh prison sentences.

With parliamentary elections scheduled for March, the government is likely to face yet another challenge to its legitimacy as it struggles with low voter turnout and general disinterest in another round of controlled elections.

Another critical issue Iranian officials must continue to deal with in 2024 is the devastated economy resulting from the slew of international sanctions because of its controversial nuclear program. After a crushing year of 47 percent inflation in 2023 (a 20-year high, according to the IMF), costs are expected to continue to rise for many foods and commodities, as well as real estate.

Iran’s widening budget deficit due to reduced oil profits continues to cripple the economy, with the IMF reporting that the current government debt is equal to three annual budgets.

With neither the international community nor the hard-line Tehran regime budging, most analysts see scant chances for significant changes in Iran in the coming year.

Belarus: Wider War Role, Integration With Russia Not In The Cards

By Valer Karbalevich

Belarus has been pulled closer into Moscow’s orbit than ever by Russia’s war in Ukraine -- but in 2024, it’s unlikely to be subsumed into the much larger nation to its east, and chances are it won’t step up its so-far limited involvement in the conflict in the country to its south.

The most probable scenario in Belarus, where the authoritarian Alyaksandr Lukashenka will mark 30 years since he came to power in 1994, is more of the same: No letup in pressure on all forms of dissent at home, no move to send troops to Ukraine. And while Russia’s insistent embrace will not loosen, the Kremlin will abstain from using Belarusian territory for any new ground attacks or bombardments of Ukraine.

But the war in Ukraine is a wild card, the linchpin influencing the trajectory of Belarus in the near term and beyond. For the foreseeable future, what happens in Belarus -- or to it -- will depend in large part on what happens in Russia’s assault on Ukraine.

Should the current equilibrium on the front persist and Western support for Ukraine persist, the likelihood is a continuation of the status quo for Belarus. The country will maintain its allegiance to Russia, marked by diplomatic and political support. Bolstered by Russian loans, Belarus's defense industry will further expand its output.

The Belarusian state will continue to militarize the border with Ukraine, posing a perpetual threat to Kyiv and diverting Ukrainian troops from the eastern and southern fronts. At the same time, however, Russia is unlikely to use Belarusian territory as a launching point for fresh assaults on Ukraine, as it did at the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.

If Russia wins or scores substantial victories -- if Ukraine is forced into negotiations on Moscow’s terms, for example, or the current front line comes to be considered the international border -- Lukashenka, consolidating his position within the country, will reap "victory dividends." But relations between Belarus and Russia are unlikely to change dramatically.

Potentially, Moscow could take major steps to absorb Belarus, diminishing its sovereignty and transforming its territory into a staging ground for a fresh assault on Kyiv. This would increase tensions with the West and heighten concerns about the tactical nuclear weapons Moscow and Minsk say Russia has transferred to Belarus. However, this seems unlikely due to the absence of military necessity for Moscow and the problems it could create on the global stage.

The loss of Belarusian sovereignty would pose a major risk for Lukashenka and his regime. An overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose the direct involvement of Belarus in the war against Ukraine. This fundamental distinction sets Belarus apart from Russia, and bringing Belarus into the war could trigger a political crisis in Belarus -- an outcome Moscow would prefer to avoid.

If Russia loses the war or sustains significant defeats that weaken Putin, Lukashenka's regime may suffer economic and political repercussions. This could prompt him to seek alternative global alliances, potentially leading to an attempt to normalize relations with the West.

Russia, Ukraine, And The West: Sliding Toward World War III

By Sergei Medvedev

2024 will be a critical year for the war in Ukraine and for the entire international system, which is quickly unraveling before our eyes. The most crucial of many challenges is a revanchist, resentful, belligerent Russia, bent on destroying and remaking the world order. In his mind, President Vladimir Putin is fighting World War III, and Ukraine is a prelude to a global showdown.

Despite Western sanctions, Russia has consolidated its position militarily, domestically, and internationally in 2023. After setbacks and shocks in 2022, the military has stabilized the front and addressed shortages of arms, supplies, and manpower. Despite latent discontent, the population is not ready to question the war, preferring to stay in the bubble of learned ignorance and the lies of state propaganda.

Here are four scenarios for 2024:

Strategic stalemate in Ukraine, chaos in the international system: The West, relaxed by a 30-year “peace dividend,” lacks the vision and resolve of the 1980s, when its leaders helped bring about the U.S.S.R.’s collapse, let alone the courage of those who stood up to Nazi Germany in World War II. Putin’s challenge to the free world is no less significant than Hitler’s was, but there is no Roosevelt or Churchill in sight. Probability: 70 percent

Widening war, collapse or division of Ukraine: Russia could defend and consolidate its gains in Ukraine, waging trench warfare while continuing to destroy civilian infrastructure, and may consider a side strike in Georgia or Moldova -- or against Lithuania or Poland, testing NATO. A frontal invasion is less likely than a hybrid operation by “unidentified” units striking from Belarus, acts of sabotage, or unrest among Russian-speakers in the Baltic states. Other Kremlin operations could occur anywhere in the world. The collapse of Ukraine’s government or the division of the country could not be ruled out. Probability: 15 percent.

Russia loses in Ukraine: A military defeat for Russia, possibly entailing a partial or complete withdrawal from Ukraine. Consistent Western support and expanded supplies of arms, like F-16s or Abrams tanks, or a big move such as closing the skies over Ukraine, could provide for this outcome. It would not necessarily entail Russia’s collapse -- it could further consolidate the nation around Putin’s regime. Russia would develop a resentful identity grounded in loss and defeat -- and harbor the idea of coming back with a vengeance. Probability: 10 percent

Russia’s Collapse: A military defeat in Ukraine could spark social unrest, elite factional battles, and an anti-Putin coup, leading to his demotion or violent death. Putin’s natural death, too, could set off a succession struggle, causing chaos in a country he has rid of reliable institutions. While breakup into many regions is unlikely, the empire could crumble at the edges -- Kaliningrad, Chechnya, the Far East – like in 1917 and 1991. Russia’s nuclear weapons would be a big question mark, leading to external involvement and possible de-nuclearization. For all its perils, this scenario might provide a framework for future statehood in Northern Eurasia. Probability: 5 percent

EU: 'Fortress Europe' And The Ukraine War

By Rikard Jozwiak

2024 will see a rightward shift in the European Union, but it is unlikely to bring the deluge of populist victories that some are predicting since Euroskeptics won national elections in the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia and polled well in Austria and Germany.

The European Parliament elections in June will be the ultimate test for the bloc in that respect. Polls still suggest the two main political groups, the center-right European People's Party and the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, will finish on top, albeit with a smaller share of the vote. But right-wing populist parties are likely to fail once again to agree on the creation of a single political group, thus eroding their influence in Brussels.

This, in turn, is likely to prod more pro-European groups into combining forces again to divvy up EU top jobs like the presidencies of the European Commission, the bloc's top executive body, and the European Council, which defines the EU's political direction and priorities. Center-right European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is widely tipped to get a second term, even though she might fancy NATO's top job as secretary-general. Charles Michel, on the other hand, will definitely be out as European Council president after serving the maximum five years.

While right-wing populists may not wield major influence in the horse-trading for those top jobs, they will affect policy going forward. They have already contributed to a hardening of attitudes on migration, and you can expect to hear more of the term "fortress Europe" as barriers go up on the EU's outer border.

The biggest question for 2024, however, is about how much support Brussels can provide Ukraine going forward. Could the "cost-of-living crisis" encourage members to side with Budapest to block financial aid or veto the start of de facto accession talks with that war-torn country? The smart money is still on the EU finding a way to green-light both those decisions in 2024, possibly by unfreezing more EU funds for Budapest.

Although it seems like a remote possibility, patience could also finally wear out with Hungary, and the other 26 members could decide to strip it of voting rights in the Council of the European Union, which amends, approves, and vetoes European Commission proposals -- essentially depriving it of influence. In that respect, Austria and Slovakia, Budapest's two biggest allies right now, are the EU countries to watch.

The one surefire guarantee in Europe isn't about the European Union at all but rather about NATO: After somehow failing to join as predicted for each of the past two years, against the backdrop of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Sweden will become the transatlantic military alliance's 32nd member once the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments vote to ratify its accession protocol.

Caucasus: A Peace Agreement Could Be Transformative

By Josh Kucera

Could 2024 be the year that Armenia and Azerbaijan finally formally resolve decades of conflict?

This year, Azerbaijan effectively decided -- by force -- their most contentious issue: the status of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. With its lightning offensive in September, Azerbaijan placed Karabakh firmly under its control. Both sides now say they've reached agreement on most of their fundamental remaining issues, and diplomatic talks, after an interruption, appear set to resume.

A resolution of the conflict could transform the region. If Armenia and Azerbaijan made peace, a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement could soon follow. Borders between the three countries would reopen as a result, ending Armenia's long geographical isolation and priming the South Caucasus to take full advantage of new transportation projects seeking to ship cargo between Europe and Asia while bypassing Russia.

Peace between Armenia and its neighbors also could set the stage for a Russian exit from the region. Russian-Armenian security cooperation has been predicated on potential threats from Azerbaijan and Turkey. With those threats reduced, what's keeping the Russian soldiers, peacekeepers, and border guards there?

A Russian exit would be a messy process -- Moscow still holds many economic levers in Armenia -- but Yerevan could seek help from the United States and Europe to smooth any transition. Washington and Brussels have seemingly been waiting in the wings, nudging Armenia in their direction.

But none of this is likely to happen without a peace agreement. And while there don't seem to be any unresolvable issues remaining, there are mounting indications that Azerbaijan may not see it in its interests to make peace. Baku has gotten what it wanted most of all -- full control of Karabakh -- without an agreement. And maintaining a simmering conflict with Armenia could arguably serve Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev well, as it would allow him to continue to lean on a reliable source of public support: rallying against an Armenian enemy.

But perhaps the most conspicuous indication of a broader strategy is Aliyev's increasing invocation of "Western Azerbaijan" -- a hazily defined concept alluding to ethnic Azerbaijanis who used to live on the territory of what is now Armenia and their presumed right to return to their homes. It suggests that Azerbaijan might keep furthering its demands in hopes that Armenia finally throws in the towel, and each can accuse the other of intransigence.

Hungary: The Return Of Big Brother?

By Pablo Gorondi

Critics might be tempted to believe that Big Brother will be watching over Hungarians in 2024 like at no point since the fall of communism.

A new law on the Defense of National Sovereignty will allow the Office for the Defense of Sovereignty, which the law created, to investigate and request information from almost any group in Hungary that receives foreign funding. This will apply to civic groups, political parties, private businesses, media companies -- in fact, anyone deemed to be conducting activities (including "information manipulation and disinformation") in the interests of a foreign "body, organization, or person."

The law has been criticized by experts from the United Nations and the Council of Europe over its seemingly vague language, lack of judicial oversight, and fears that it could be used by the government "to silence and stigmatize independent voices and opponents."

The head of the Office for the Defense of Sovereignty should be nominated for a six-year term by right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orban and appointed by President Katalin Novak by February 1. This would allow the new authority to carry out investigations and present findings ahead of simultaneous elections to the European Parliament and Hungarian municipal bodies in early June -- possibly influencing their outcomes.

Asked by RFE/RL's Hungarian Service, some experts said fears of the new authority are overblown and that the government is more likely to use it as a threat hanging over opponents than as a direct tool for repression -- at least until it finds it politically necessary or expedient to tighten control.

On the international scene, meanwhile, Hungary will take over the Council of the European Union's six-month rotating presidency in July, a few weeks after voting to determine the composition of a new European Parliament.

MEPs from Orban's Fidesz party exited the center-right European People's Party bloc in 2021 and have not joined another group since then, although some observers expect them to join the more Euroskeptic and nationalist European Conservatives and Reformists.

Orban has for years predicted a breakthrough of more radical right-wing forces in Europe. But while that has happened in Italy, the Netherlands, and Slovakia, experts suggest that's not enough to fuel a significant shift in the European Parliament, where the center-right and center-left should continue to hold a clear majority.

Because of the June elections, the European Parliament's activities will initially be limited -- and its election of a European Commission president could prove complicated. Nevertheless, Orban has said in recent interviews that he wants to "fix the European Union" and that "we need to take over Brussels." So, Hungary's leadership may make progress difficult on issues that Orban opposes, like the start of EU accession talks with Ukraine or a possible reelection bid by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

Stability And The 'Serbian World'

By Gjeraqina Tuhina and Milos Teodorovic

Serbia, once again, will be a key player in the region -- and its moves could significantly shape events in the Balkans over the next 12 months.

For over a decade, the dialogue to normalize relations between Serbia and its former province Kosovo has stymied both countries. Then, in February in Brussels and March in Ohrid, North Macedonia, European mediators announced a path forward and its implementation. There was only one problem: There was no signature on either side. Nine months later, little has changed.

Many eyes are looking toward one aspect in particular -- a renewed obligation for Pristina to allow for an "appropriate level of self-management" for the Serb minority in Kosovo. This also entails creating possibilities for financial support from Serbia to Kosovar Serbs and guarantees for direct communication of the Serb minority with the Kosovar government.

In October, EU mediators tried again, and with German, French, and Italian backing presented both parties with a new draft for an association of Serb-majority municipalities. Both sides accepted the draft. EU envoy to the region Miroslav Lajcak suggested in December that the Ohrid agreement could be implemented by the end of January. If that happened, it would mark a decisive step for both sides in a dialogue that began in 2011.

"The Serbian world" is a phrase launched a few years ago by pro-Russian Serbian politician Aleksandar Vulin, a longtime cabinet minister who until recently headed the Serbian Intelligence Service. It is not officially part of the agenda of either Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic or the government, but it underscores the influence that Serbia seeks to wield from Kosovo and Montenegro to Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But how Vucic chooses to exert the implicit ties to Serb leaders and nationalists in those countries could do much to promote stability -- or its antithesis -- in the Balkans in 2024.

Another major challenge for Vucic revolves around EU officials' request that candidate country Serbia harmonize its foreign policy with the bloc. So far, along with Turkey, Serbia is the only EU candidate that has not introduced sanctions on Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It is unclear how far the Serbian president is willing to push back to foster ongoing good relations with Moscow.

But first, Serbia will have to confront the fallout from snap elections in December dominated by Vucic's Serbian Progressive Party but rejected by the newly united opposition as fraudulent. The results sparked nightly protests in the capital and hunger strikes by a half-dozen lawmakers and other oppositionists. A new parliament is scheduled to hold a session by the end of January 2024, and the margins are seemingly razor-thin for control of the capital, Belgrade.

Central Asia: Don't Write Russia Off Just Yet

By Chris Rickleton

Will the empire strike back? 2023 has been a galling year for Russia in Central Asia as it watched its traditional partners (and former colonies) widen their diplomatic horizons.

With Russia bogged down in a grueling war in Ukraine, Moscow has less to offer the region than ever before. Central Asia’s five countries have made the most of the breathing space, with their leaders holding landmark talks with U.S. and German leaders as French President Emmanuel Macron also waltzed into Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with multibillion-dollar investments.

And China has reinforced its dominant position in the region, while Turkey has also increased its influence.

But don’t write Russia off just yet.

One of Moscow’s biggest wins in the neighborhood this year was an agreement to supply Uzbekistan with nearly 3 billion cubic meters of gas every year, a figure that could increase.

Power deficits in Uzbekistan and energy-rich Kazakhstan are the most obvious short-term sources of leverage for Moscow over those important countries.

The coming year will likely bring more in terms of specifics over both governments’ plans for nuclear power production, with Russia fully expected to be involved.

And Moscow’s confidence in a region that it views as its near abroad will only increase if it feels it is making headway on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan’s hereditary succession has been expected for so long that people have stopped expecting it. Does that mean it is back on the cards for 2024? Probably not.

In 2016, Tajikistan passed a raft of constitutional changes aimed at cementing the ruling Rahmon family’s hold on power. Among them was one lowering the age to run for president from 35 to 30.

That amendment had an obvious beneficiary -- veteran incumbent Emomali Rahmon’s upwardly mobile son, Rustam Emomali. But Emomali is now 36 and, despite occupying a political post that makes him next in line, doesn’t look any closer to becoming numero uno.

Perhaps there hasn’t been a good time to do it.

From the coronavirus pandemic to a bloody crackdown on unrest in the Gorno-Badakhshan region and now the shadows cast by the Ukraine war, there have been plenty of excuses to delay the inevitable.

Turkmenistan

But perhaps Rahmon is considering events in Turkmenistan, where Central Asia’s first father-son power transition last year has ended up nothing of the sort. Rather than growing into the role, new President Serdar Berdymukhammedov is shrinking back into the shadow of his all-powerful father, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov.

And this seems to be exactly how the older Berdymukhammedov wanted it, subsequently fashioning himself a post-retirement post that makes his son and the rest of the government answerable to him.

But Turkmenistan’s bizarre new setup begs a question: If you’re not ready to let it go, why not hold on a little longer?

Kyrgyzstan/Kazakhstan

Writing on X (formerly Twitter) in November, a former IMF economist argued that Kyrgyzstan would be the "perfect test case" for secondary sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Robin Brooks described the country as "small, not remotely systemically important, and very clearly facilitating trade diversion to Russia."

Official statistics show that countries in the Eurasian Economic Union that Moscow leads have become a “backdoor” around the Western-led sanctions targeting Russia. Exports to Kyrgyzstan from several EU countries this year, for example, are up by at least 1,000 percent compared to 2019.

Data for exports to Kazakhstan shows similar patterns -- with larger volumes but gentler spikes -- while investigations by RFE/RL indicate that companies in both Central Asian countries have forwarded “dual-use” products that benefit the Kremlin’s military machine.

Belarus is the only Russian ally to get fully sanctioned for its support of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine -- but will that change in 2024?

Central Asian governments will argue they have resisted Russian pressure to provide political and military support for the war. They might even whisper that their big friend China is much more helpful to Russia.

But the West’s approach of targeting only Central Asian companies actively flouting the regime is failing.

So, while Western diplomats continue to credit the region’s governments for their anti-evasion efforts, their patience may wear out. And if it does, Kyrgyzstan might be first to find out.

Afghanistan: The Vicious Spiral Will Worsen

By Malali Bashir

With little internal threat to Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and the failure of the international community to affect change in the hard-line Islamist regime’s policies, the Taliban mullahs’ control over the country continues to tighten.

And that regime’s continued restrictions on Afghan women -- their rights, freedom, and role in society -- signals a bleak future for them in 2024 and beyond.

Many observers say the move by the Taliban in December to only allow girls to attend religious madrasahs -- after shutting down formal schooling for them following the sixth grade -- is an effort by the Taliban to radicalize Afghan society.

“Madrasahs are not an alternative to formal schooling because they don’t produce doctors, lawyers, journalists, engineers, etc. The idea of [only] having madrasahs is…about brainwashing [people] to create an extremist society,” says Shukria Barakzai, the former Afghan ambassador to Norway.

The crackdown on women’s rights by the Taliban will also continue the reported uptick in domestic violence in the country, activists say.

Since the Taliban shut down Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission and Women Affairs Ministry, women find themselves with nowhere to turn to and find it extremely difficult to seek justice in Taliban courts.

With no justice for victims of abuse on the horizon, women’s rights activists say violence against women will continue with no repercussions for the perpetrators.

Barakzai argues that Taliban officials have already normalized domestic violence and do not consider it a crime.

“According to [a Taliban] decree, you can [confront] women if they are not listening to [your requests]. Especially a male member of the family is allowed to use all means to punish women if they refuse to follow his orders. That is basically a call for domestic violence,” she said.

The vicious spiral for women will only worsen.

Being banned from education, work, and public life, Afghan women say the resulting psychological impact leads to panic, depression, and acute mental health crises.

Although there are no official figures, Afghan mental health professionals and foreign organizations have noted a disturbing surge in female suicides in the two years since the Taliban came to power.

"If we look at the women who were previously working or studying, 90 percent suffer from mental health issues now," said Mujeeb Khpalwak, a psychiatrist in Kabul. "They face tremendous economic uncertainty after losing their work and are very anxious about their future."

Heather Bar, associate director of the women's rights division at Human Rights Watch, says, "It's not surprising that we're hearing reports of Afghan girls committing suicide. Because all their rights, including going to school, university, and recreational places have been taken away from them."

Promising young Afghan women who once aspired to contribute to their communities after pursuing higher education now find themselves with no career prospects.

“I do not see any future. When I see boys continuing their education, I lose all hope and wish that I was not born a girl,” a former medical student in Kabul told RFE/RL's Radio Azadi.

Despite immense global pressure, the Taliban seems adamant about maintaining its severe limits on women and reducing their role in society. This will result in a tragic future for the women of Afghanistan with no relief in sight.

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

Kremlin critic Aleksei Navalny says he was immediately placed in a punitive solitary confinement cell after finishing a quarantine term at the so-called Polar Wolf prison in Russia's Arctic region where he was transferred last month.

In a series of messages on X, formerly Twitter, Navalny said on January 9 a prison guard ruled that "convict Navalny refused to introduce himself according to format, did not respond to the educational work, and did not draw appropriate conclusions for himself" and therefore must spend seven days in solitary confinement.

Navalny added that unlike in a regular cell, where inmates are allowed to have a walk outside of the cell in the afternoon when it is a bit warmer outside, in the punitive cell, such walks are at 6:30 a.m. in a part of the world where temperatures can fall to minus 45 degrees Celsius or colder.

"I have already promised myself that I will try to go for a walk no matter what the weather is," Navalny said in an irony-laced series of eight posts, adding that the cell-like sites for walks are "11 steps from the wall and 3 steps to the wall" with an open sky covered with metal bars above.

"It's never been colder here than -32 degrees Celsius (-25 degrees Fahrenheit). Even at that temperature you can walk for more than half an hour, but only if you have time to grow a new nose, ears, and fingers," Navalny joked, comparing himself with the character played by Leonardo DiCaprio in the Revenant film, who saved himself from freezing in the cold by crawling inside the carcass of a dead horse.

"Here you need an elephant. A hot or even roasted elephant. If you cut open the belly of a freshly roasted elephant and crawl inside, you can keep warm for a while. But where am I going to get a hot, roasted elephant [here], especially at 6:30 in the morning? So, I will continue to freeze," Navalny concludes in his sarcastic string of messages.

Navalny was transported in December to the notorious and remote prison, formally known as IK-3, but widely referred to as Polar Wolf.

Some 2,000 kilometers northeast of Moscow, the prison holds about 1,050 of Russia's most incorrigible prisoners.

Human rights activists say the prison holds serial killers, rapists, pedophiles, repeat offenders, and others convicted of the most serious crimes and serving sentences of 20 years or more.

In some cases, like Navalny's, the government sends convicts who are widely considered to be political prisoners there as well. Platon Lebedev, a former business partner of Mikhail Khodorkovsky who was convicted of tax evasion and other charges during the dismantling of the Yukos oil giant, spent about two years at IK-3 in the mid-2000s.

The prison was founded in 1961 at a former camp of dictator Josef Stalin's Gulag network. The settlement of Kharp, with about 5,000 people, mostly provides housing and services for prison workers and administrators.

Navalny was sentenced to 19 years in prison in August 2023 on extremism charges, on top of previous sentences for fraud. He says the charges are politically motivated, and human rights organizations recognized him as a political prisoner.

He has posed one of the most-serious threats to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who recently announced he is running for reelection in March. Putin is expected to easily win the election amid the continued sidelining of opponents and a clampdown on opposition and civil society that intensified after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

Navalny survived a poisoning with Novichok-type nerve agent in 2020 that he says was ordered by Putin. The Kremlin has denied any role in Navalny's poisoning.

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

"Japan is determined to support Ukraine so that peace can return to Ukraine," Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa said during a surprise visit to Kyiv, becoming the first official foreign visitor for 2024.

"I can feel how tense the situation in Ukraine is now," she told a news conference -- held in a shelter due to an air-raid alert in the capital at the time -- alongside her Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba.

"I once again strongly condemn Russia's missile and drone attacks, particularly on New Year's Day," she added, while also saying Japan would provide an additional $37 million to a NATO trust fund to help purchase drone-detection systems.

The Japanese diplomat also visited Bucha, the Kyiv suburb where Russian forces are blamed for a civilian massacre in 2022, stating she was "shocked" by what occurred there.

In a Telegram post, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal thanked "Japan for its comprehensive support, as well as significant humanitarian and financial assistance."

In particular, he cited Tokyo's "decision to allocate $1 billion for humanitarian projects and reconstruction with its readiness to increase this amount to $4.5 billion through the mechanisms of international institutions."

Live Briefing: Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine

RFE/RL's Live Briefing gives you all of the latest developments on Russia's full-scale invasion, Kyiv's counteroffensive, Western military aid, global reaction, and the plight of civilians. For all of RFE/RL's coverage of the war in Ukraine, click here.

Meanwhile, Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom told a Stockholm defense conference that the main goal of the country’s foreign policy efforts in the coming years will be to support Kyiv.

“Sweden’s military, political, and economic support for Ukraine remains the Swedish government’s main foreign policy task in the coming years,” he posted on social media during the event.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, speaking via video link, told the conference that the battlefield in his country was currently stable but that he remained confident Russia could be defeated.

"Even Russia can be brought back within the framework of international law. Its aggression can be defeated," he said.

Ukraine’s much-anticipated counteroffensive last summer largely failed to shift the front line, giving confidence to the Kremlin’s forces, especially as further Western aid is in question.

Ukraine has pleaded with its Western allies to keep supplying it with air defense weapons, along with other weapons necessary to defeat the invasion that began in February 2022.

U.S. President Joe Biden has proposed a national-security spending bill that includes $61 billion in aid for Ukraine, but it has been blocked by Republican lawmakers who insist Biden and his fellow Democrats in Congress address border security.

Zelenskiy also urged fellow European nations to join Ukraine in developing joint weapons-production capabilities so that the continent is able to "preserve itself" in the face of any future crises.

"Two years of this war have proven that Europe needs its own sufficient arsenal for the defense of freedom, its own capabilities to ensure defense," he said.

Overnight, Ukrainian officials said Russia launched 28 drones and three cruise missiles, and 12 people were wounded by a drone attack in the central city of Dnipro.

Though smaller in scale than other recent assaults, the January 7 aerial attack was the latest indication that Russia has no intention of stopping its targeting of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, often far from the front lines.

In a post to Telegram, Ukraine’s air force claimed that air defenses destroyed 21 of the 28 drones, which mainly targeted locations in the south and east of Ukraine.

"The enemy is shifting the focus of attack to the frontline territories: the Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk regions were attacked by drones," air force spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat told Ukrainian TV.

Russia made no immediate comment on the attack.

In the southern city of Kherson, meanwhile, Russian shelling from across the Dnieper River left at least two people dead, officials said.

In the past few months, Ukrainian forces have moved across the Dnieper, setting up a small bridgehead in villages on the river's eastern banks, upriver from Kherson. The effort to establish a larger foothold there, however, has faltered, with Russian troops pinning the Ukrainians down, and keeping them from moving heavier equipment over.

Over the past two weeks, Russia has fired nearly 300 missiles and more than 200 drones at targets in Ukraine, as part of an effort to terrorize the civilian population and undermine morale. On December 29, more than 120 Russian missiles were launched at cities across Ukraine, killing at least 44 people, including 30 in Kyiv alone.

Ukraine’s air defenses have improved markedly since the months following Russia’s mass invasion in February 2022. At least five Western-supplied Patriot missile batteries, along with smaller systems like German-made Gepard and the French-manufactured SAMP/T, have also improved Ukraine’s ability to repel Russian drones and missiles.

Last week, U.S. officials said that Russia had begun using North Korean-supplied ballistic missiles as part of its aerial attacks on Ukrainian sites.

Inside Russia, authorities in Belgorod said dozens of residents have been evacuated to areas farther from the Ukrainian border.

“On behalf of regional Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov, we met the first Belgorod residents who decided to move to a safer place. More than 100 people were placed in our temporary accommodation centers,” Andrei Chesnokov, head of the Stary Oskol district, about 115 kilometers from Belgorod, wrote in Telegram post.

With reporting by RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, Reuters, and AP

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

"Japan is determined to support Ukraine so that peace can return to Ukraine," Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa said during a surprise visit to Kyiv, becoming the first official foreign visitor for 2024.

"I can feel how tense the situation in Ukraine is now," she told a news conference -- held in a shelter due to an air-raid alert in the capital at the time -- alongside her Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba.

"I once again strongly condemn Russia's missile and drone attacks, particularly on New Year's Day," she added, while also saying Japan would provide an additional $37 million to a NATO trust fund to help purchase drone-detection systems.

The Japanese diplomat also visited Bucha, the Kyiv suburb where Russian forces are blamed for a civilian massacre in 2022, stating she was "shocked" by what occurred there.

In a Telegram post, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal thanked "Japan for its comprehensive support, as well as significant humanitarian and financial assistance."

In particular, he cited Tokyo's "decision to allocate $1 billion for humanitarian projects and reconstruction with its readiness to increase this amount to $4.5 billion through the mechanisms of international institutions."

Live Briefing: Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine

RFE/RL's Live Briefing gives you all of the latest developments on Russia's full-scale invasion, Kyiv's counteroffensive, Western military aid, global reaction, and the plight of civilians. For all of RFE/RL's coverage of the war in Ukraine, click here.

Meanwhile, Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom told a Stockholm defense conference that the main goal of the country’s foreign policy efforts in the coming years will be to support Kyiv.

“Sweden’s military, political, and economic support for Ukraine remains the Swedish government’s main foreign policy task in the coming years,” he posted on social media during the event.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, speaking via video link, told the conference that the battlefield in his country was currently stable but that he remained confident Russia could be defeated.

"Even Russia can be brought back within the framework of international law. Its aggression can be defeated," he said.

Ukraine’s much-anticipated counteroffensive last summer largely failed to shift the front line, giving confidence to the Kremlin’s forces, especially as further Western aid is in question.

Ukraine has pleaded with its Western allies to keep supplying it with air defense weapons, along with other weapons necessary to defeat the invasion that began in February 2022.

U.S. President Joe Biden has proposed a national-security spending bill that includes $61 billion in aid for Ukraine, but it has been blocked by Republican lawmakers who insist Biden and his fellow Democrats in Congress address border security.

Zelenskiy also urged fellow European nations to join Ukraine in developing joint weapons-production capabilities so that the continent is able to "preserve itself" in the face of any future crises.

"Two years of this war have proven that Europe needs its own sufficient arsenal for the defense of freedom, its own capabilities to ensure defense," he said.

Overnight, Ukrainian officials said Russia launched 28 drones and three cruise missiles, and 12 people were wounded by a drone attack in the central city of Dnipro.

Though smaller in scale than other recent assaults, the January 7 aerial attack was the latest indication that Russia has no intention of stopping its targeting of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, often far from the front lines.

In a post to Telegram, Ukraine’s air force claimed that air defenses destroyed 21 of the 28 drones, which mainly targeted locations in the south and east of Ukraine.

"The enemy is shifting the focus of attack to the frontline territories: the Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk regions were attacked by drones," air force spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat told Ukrainian TV.

Russia made no immediate comment on the attack.

In the southern city of Kherson, meanwhile, Russian shelling from across the Dnieper River left at least two people dead, officials said.

In the past few months, Ukrainian forces have moved across the Dnieper, setting up a small bridgehead in villages on the river's eastern banks, upriver from Kherson. The effort to establish a larger foothold there, however, has faltered, with Russian troops pinning the Ukrainians down, and keeping them from moving heavier equipment over.

Over the past two weeks, Russia has fired nearly 300 missiles and more than 200 drones at targets in Ukraine, as part of an effort to terrorize the civilian population and undermine morale. On December 29, more than 120 Russian missiles were launched at cities across Ukraine, killing at least 44 people, including 30 in Kyiv alone.

Ukraine’s air defenses have improved markedly since the months following Russia’s mass invasion in February 2022. At least five Western-supplied Patriot missile batteries, along with smaller systems like German-made Gepard and the French-manufactured SAMP/T, have also improved Ukraine’s ability to repel Russian drones and missiles.

Last week, U.S. officials said that Russia had begun using North Korean-supplied ballistic missiles as part of its aerial attacks on Ukrainian sites.

Inside Russia, authorities in Belgorod said dozens of residents have been evacuated to areas farther from the Ukrainian border.

“On behalf of regional Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov, we met the first Belgorod residents who decided to move to a safer place. More than 100 people were placed in our temporary accommodation centers,” Andrei Chesnokov, head of the Stary Oskol district, about 115 kilometers from Belgorod, wrote in Telegram post.

With reporting by RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, Reuters, and AP

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev has given a lengthy interview in which he discusses what he sees as the origins of the "Bloody January" protests of 2022 as well as the threat of dual power systems.

Speaking to the state-run Egemen Qazaqstan newspaper, which published the interview on January 3, Toqaev said the protests that began in the southwestern town Zhanaozen on January 2, 2022, following a sharp rise in fuel prices and which quickly spread to other cities, including Almaty, were instigated by an unidentified "rogue group."

Toqaev's shoot-to-kill order to quell the unrest led to the deaths of more than 230 protesters, and the Kazakh president has been criticized for not living up to his promise to the public to answer questions about the incident.

The Kazakh authorities have prosecuted several high-ranking officials on charges that they attempted to seize power during the protests, with some removed from office or sentenced to prison, and others acquitted.

Many were seen to be allies of Toqaev's predecessor, long-serving Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbaev.

When asked what caused the unrest, Toqaev initially cited "socio-economic problems accumulated over the years," which had led to stagnation and undermined faith in the government.

However, Toqaev then suggested that "some influential people" did not like the changes to the country's political scene after he was appointed as acting president by Nazarbaev in 2019 and later that year elected as president.

Toqaev said the unknown people perceived the change "as a threat" to the power structure after decades of rule by Nazarbaev, and then "decided to turn back the face of reform and destroy everything in order to return to the old situation that was convenient for them."

"This group of high-ranking officials had a huge influence on the power structures and the criminal world," Toqaev alleged. "That's why they decided to seize power by force."

Toqaev, citing investigations by the Prosecutor-General's Office, said the unidentified group began "preparations" about six months before the nationwide demonstrations in January 2022, when the government made what he called "an ill-conceived, illegal decision to sharply increase the price of liquefied gas."

From there, Toqaev alleged, "extremists, criminal groups, and religious extremists" worked together to stage a coup. When the protests broke out in January 2022, Toqaev claimed that 20,000 "terrorists" had entered the country.

Experts have widely dismissed suggestions of foreign involvement in the mass protests.

Aside from about 10 members of the fundamentalist Islamic group Yakyn Inkar -- which is considered a banned extremist group in Kazakhstan -- who were arrested in connection with the protests, no religious groups have been singled out for alleged involvement in the protests.

The goal of the alleged coup plotters, Toqaev said, was to set up a dual power structure that would compete with the government.

"I openly told Nazarbaev that the political arrogance of his close associates almost destroyed the country," Toqaev said, without expounding on who the associates might be.

Toqaev had not previously mentioned speaking with Nazarbaev about the mass protests.

Toqaev also suggested that Kazakhstan, which has come under criticism for its imprisonment of journalists and civil and political activists, does not have any political prisoners.

When asked about political prisoners, Toqaev said only that "our legislation does not contain a single decree, a single law, a single regulatory document that provides a basis for prosecuting citizens for their political views."

For there to be political persecution, according to Toqaev, there would need to be "censorship, special laws, and punitive bodies" in place.

Toqaev also appeared to subtly criticize Nazarbaev, who became head of Soviet Kazakhstan in 1990 and became Kazakhstan's first president after the country became independent in 1991.

Nazarbaev served as president until he resigned in 2019, although he held the title of "Leader of the Nation" from 2010 to 2020 and also served as chairman of the Security Council from 1991 to 2022. Nazarbaev has since been stripped of those roles and titles.

While discussing Nazarbaev, Toqaev said that "everyone knows his contribution to the formation of an independent state of Kazakhstan. He is a person who deserves a fair historical evaluation."

But the current Kazakh president also said that "there should be no senior or junior president in the country."

"Go away, don't beg!" Toqaev said. "Citizens who will be in charge of the country in the future should learn from this situation and stay away from such things and think only about the interests of the state and the prosperity of society."

This content originally appeared on News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

On Sunday, December 10, a Taliban court in the city of Nili, in central Daikundi Province, sentenced Jawadi, director of the independent Radio Nasim, to one year in prison, according to local media support group the Afghanistan Journalists Center and two journalists familiar with his case, who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, due to fear of Taliban retaliation. He was convicted of spreading anti-regime propaganda, committing espionage for foreign organizations, and cooperating with foreign media, the two journalists told CPJ.  

The ruling was issued in the presence of Jawadi and his wife, with the local Taliban’s intelligence agency presenting the charge sheet just before the start of the closed-door proceeding. Jawadi was taken back to prison after the verdict, according to those sources.

Jawadi was detained alongside two other journalists from the radio station, Saifullah Rezaei, and Mojtaba Qasemi, on October 7. The two other journalists have since been released.

“Taliban authorities must immediately and unconditionally release Radio Nasim director Sultan Ali Jawadi and stop detaining Afghan journalists and media workers,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “This is a grave injustice. Jawadi’s conviction on vague charges during shoddy legal proceedings shows how the Taliban’s sweeping measures against journalists are impeding even basic newsgathering.”

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not immediately respond to CPJ’s request for comment.

Since the Taliban retook control of the country on August 15, 2021, the Taliban’s repression of the Afghan media has worsened. On the second anniversary of the group’s return to power, CPJ called on the Taliban to stop its relentless campaign of intimidation and abide by its promise to protect journalists in Afghanistan.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

On December 4, Mohammadi, a reporter for the independent broadcaster Tamadon TV, responded to a summons by Taliban provincial intelligence officers in the southern city of Kandahar and has not been heard from since, according to local media support group the Afghanistan Journalists’ Center and an Afghan journalist familiar with his case who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, due to fear of Taliban retaliation.

As of Tuesday, CPJ could not determine why the journalist was summoned, the reason for his detention, or his whereabouts.

“The Taliban must immediately release Afghan journalist Abdul Rahim Mohammadi and end the intimidation and detention of journalists in Afghanistan,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “After more than two years in power, the Taliban and its intelligence agency continues to crack down on Afghan journalists on a daily basis, hampering reporting and the free flow of information.”

Mohammadi, who has been working as a journalist for 10 years, reports on local current affairs in Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second-largest city. In February, armed Taliban members raided the headquarters of Tamadon TV in the capital, Kabul, beat several staff members, and held them for a half hour.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid told CPJ that he was not aware of the detention and declined to elaborate.

Since the Taliban retook control of the country on August 15, 2021, the Taliban’s repression of the Afghan media has worsened. On the second anniversary of the group’s return to power, CPJ called on the Taliban to stop its relentless campaign of intimidation and abide by its promise to protect journalists in Afghanistan.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

The warming relations come, experts say, as Beijing seeks access to Afghanistan’s vast mineral deposits, including its copper mines.

China last week became the first country to accept the credentials of an ambassador from the Taliban, which retook control of Afghanistan in August 2021 after the withdrawal of U.S. forces but is not yet formally recognized as the government of the country by any state.

Assadullah Bilal Karimi, a former Taliban spokesperson believed to be in his early 30s, handed credentials to Hong Lei, the director-general of the protocol department of China’s foreign ministry, on Friday.

On Tuesday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said that as “a long-standing friendly neighbor of Afghanistan,” China wanted to help the Taliban emerge from isolation. But he said the regime had to pursue reform to receive full diplomatic recognition.

To that end, Wang called on the Taliban to adopt “moderate and prudent domestic and foreign policies” and an “open and inclusive political structure,” as well as to combat “all forms of terrorist forces.”

“China believes that Afghanistan should not be excluded from the international community,” Wang said. “We believe that diplomatic recognition of the Afghan government will come naturally as the concerns of various parties are effectively addressed.”

Afghanistan is the only country that bans women from being educated, which many countries cite in boycotting ties with the Taliban.

China’s approximately 12 million Muslim Uyghurs, meanwhile, have been subject to harsh government campaigns that China says are necessary to fight extremism and Islamic terrorism, including a mass incarceration program that has affected as many as 1.8 million people.

China also regularly conducts “strike hard” campaigns in Xinjiang, including police raids on Uyghur households, restrictions on Islamic practices, and curbs on the culture and the Uyghur language.

The Taliban previously had a charge d'affaires at Afghanistan’s embassy in Beijing, a position that does not require formal recognition of the host country, according to a report from Reuters.

A friend in need

In receiving an ambassador from Afghanistan’s new government, Beijing has also beaten out the Taliban’s erstwhile benefactors – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the only countries to recognize the Taliban regime before its 2001 ouster. 

That has raised questions about China’s urgency.

Part of the draw for China, according to Ja-Ian Chong, an expert in Chinese foreign policy at the National University of Singapore and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is more stable relations with a country on its land border.

Working with the Taliban could also help China to “develop support in the Islamic world against criticism of its human rights abuses in Xinjiang” against the Uyghur Muslim minority, Chong told Radio Free Asia, “while allowing access to mineral resources in Afghanistan.” 

For other experts, though, it’s mostly the latter, with China motivated by more than just good ties with neighbors and its regional reputation.

Anders Corr, principal of New York-based Corr Analytics, said an “extra vote at the United Nations” and a new ally would be nice upshots of wider diplomatic recognition for the Taliban. But he said that was not why China was so “quick to jump on this side of these terrorists.”

“China has financial and business interests in Afghanistan,” Corr said.

“They want to extract oil from the country. There’s not as much as in other countries, but there is some,” he said. “There's a lot of copper – probably trillions of dollars worth of mineral resources in Afghanistan that China has, for years, been involved in trying to extract.”

Mineral wealth

China has a long-held interest in the Mes Aynak mine, which lies about 40 kilometers (25 miles) southeast of Afghanistan’s capital and reportedly has about $50 billion worth of copper deposits that have yet to be extracted. 

A Chinese government official recently visited the mine, according to a Voice of America report, which quoted the Taliban’s minister of mining, Shahabuddin Delawar, as saying the extraction of copper from the mine was “one of the top priorities” of the government in Kabul.

And then there’s Afghanistan’s strategic location. 

Afghanistan was a central part of the Silk Road, which China’s Belt and Road Initiative seeks to emulate. The Taliban said it in October it wants to formally join the project, which would lead to hundreds of millions of dollars pouring into the country for infrastructure projects. 

“China needs Afghanistan, and Afghanistan also needs China,” China’s charge d'affaires in Kabul, Zhao Haihan, said in September, lauding “Afghanistan's geographical and resource advantages” while calling it the “center of Silk Road trade” and “crossroad of Eurasia.”

This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alex Willemyns and Adile Ablet for RFA.

A very dramatic example of roughing up and violence is taking place against Afghans in Pakistan, a country that, despite having a lengthy association with hosting refugees, has yet to ratify the primary Convention.  Yet in March 2023, the UNHCR noted that Pakistan hosted 1.35 million registered refugees.  The organisation praised Pakistan for its “long and commendable tradition of providing protection to refugees and asylum-seekers”, noting that the current number comprised “mainly Afghan refugees holding Proof of Registration (PoR), as well as a small number of non-Afghan refugees and asylum seekers from other countries such as Myanmar, Yemen, Somalia and Syria.”

Such a rosy assessment detracts from the complex nature of the status of Afghans in that country, characterised by, in some cases, the absence of visas and passports, the expiration of visas and the long wait for renewals.  Then comes the tense, heavy mix of domestic politics.

On September 15, the federal government ordered all individual Afghans residing in the country illegally to leave the country by November 1 or face deportation.  The order affects some 1.7 million Afghans residing in the country, though the figures on the undocumented vary with dizzy fluctuations.

It is proving disastrous for those vulnerable individuals who fled a country where the Taliban has returned to power.  To date, 400,000 are said to have left Pakistan via border crossings in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, with one estimate from the International Rescue Committee suggesting that 10,000 are being returned to Afghanistan each day.  These include the whole spectrum of vulnerable persons: women, girls, human rights activists, journalists and those formerly in the employ of the previous Western-backed government.

The picture is an ugly one indeed, complicated by Pakistan’s own domestic ills and complex relationship with Kabul.  During the course of the vacuously named Global War on Terror, Afghanistan came to be seen as a problem for Pakistani security, its refugee camps accused as being incubators for fractious Afghan militants.  Kabul, at that point yet to return to Taliban control, accused Islamabad of destabilising its own security by providing sanctuary for those very same militants.  In the aftermath of the killing of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani in September 2011, the victim of a daring suicide attack on his residency, Pakistan’s then Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, proved roundly dismissive: “We are not responsible if Afghan refugees crossed the border and entered Kabul, stayed in a guest house and attacked Professor Rabbani.”

The latest chapter of demonisation comes on the coattails of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.  Brutal night raids by police, featuring beatings, ominous threats and detention, have become the hallmarks of the expulsion campaign.  The police forces, themselves spoiled by corruption and opportunism, are prone to pilfering property, including jewellery and livestock.

In October, Mir Ahmad Rauf, who heads the Afghan Refugees’ Council in Pakistan reported “widespread destruction of Afghan homes in Islamabad’s B-17, Karachi, and other parts of Pakistan.”  Last month, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom issued a statement expressing concern at “reports of increased detainment, violence, and intimidation against the Ahmadiyya and Afghan refugee communities” in the country.

To add to this failure of protection is the status of many who, despite being Afghan, were born in Pakistan and never set foot in Afghanistan.  In 2018, Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Imran Khan announced that his government would be amenable to granting citizenship to Afghans born in the country.  The promise (amenability is always contingent) was never enacted into law, and Khan is now persona non grata with Pakistan’s usurpers.

The protective, humanitarian burden for processing claims by Afghans in other countries has also been reluctantly shared.  To return to Afghanistan spells potential repression and persecution; but to find a country in the European Union, or to seek sanctuary in the United States, Australia and others, has been nigh impossible for most.

When asylum has been considered, it has often been done with an emphasis on prioritising the contributions of men who had performed military and security roles in the previous Western-backed Kabul administration.  There is a delicious irony to this, given the evangelical promises of US President George W. Bush to liberate the country’s women from the clutches of obscurantist fundamentalism.

On December 1, a three-member bench of the Pakistani Supreme Court sought responses from the various arms of the government, including the apex committee led by the Prime Minister, foreign office, and army chief on their decision to expel Afghan nationals.  Given the caretaker status of the current government, which has all but outsourced foreign policy to the military, including the “Afghan issue”, legal questions can be asked.

One of the petitioners to the court, Senator Farhatullah Babar, states that current government members are technically unelected to represent the country.  “So, the court would need to decide whether a caretaker government with such a restrictive mandate can take such a major policy decision, and in my view, this is beyond the power of the caretaker government.”  Those Afghans remaining in Pakistan can only wait.

This content originally appeared on Dissident Voice and was authored by Binoy Kampmark.

On Saturday, three Taliban intelligence operatives took the independent Radio Nasim’s director, Jawadi, and two of its journalists, Rezaei and Qasemi, from Jawadi’s home in the city of Nili in central Daikundi Province and detained them in an unknown location, according to the non-profit Afghanistan Journalist Center and a reporter familiar with the case, who spoke to CPJ on condition of anonymity, citing fear of retaliation.

It was the second time in 10 days that the Taliban detained the three journalists. On September 27, the Islamist militant group’s intelligence operatives raided and sealed Radio Nasim’s office, stopped it broadcasting, and took Jawadi, Rezaei, and Qasemi to the provincial intelligence headquarters, the reporter said. The Taliban freed the Radio Nasim journalists after five hours but retained their mobile phones, the reporter added.

“The detention of Radio Nasim’s director and two journalists in Daikundi Province is another example of the Taliban’s far-reaching—and intensifying— crackdown on the media in recent months in Afghanistan,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “Taliban authorities must immediately and unconditionally release Sultan Ali Jawadi, Saifullah Rezaei and Mojtaba Qasemi and end this practice of detaining journalists and closing media outlets.”

CPJ could not immediately determine the reason for the journalists’ detention. Radio Nasim reports on current affairs and rebroadcasts content from an international radio network.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not respond to CPJ’s request for comment via messaging app.

Since the fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021, the Taliban’s repression of the Afghan media has worsened. On the second anniversary of the group’s return to power, CPJ called on the Taliban to stop its relentless campaign of intimidation and abide by its promise to protect journalists in Afghanistan.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Arlene Getz/CPJ Editorial Director.

On August 19, Taliban authorities detained Velayati, a photographer for Iran’s semi-official Tasnim News Agency, at Kabul International Airport before he boarded a flight to Iran, according to his employer and a reporter in Kabul familiar with the case who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of retaliation by the Taliban.

Velayati had travelled to Afghanistan for a 10-day personal visit, according to those sources. Authorities have not disclosed any reason for Velayati’s detention or where he was being held as of Tuesday.

“The detention of Iranian photojournalist Mohammad Hossein Velayati is the latest blow to press freedom in Afghanistan, as the Taliban has ramped up its efforts to crack down on the media in recent weeks,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator, in Kuala Lumpur. “Taliban authorities must immediately and unconditionally release Velayati, explain why they detained him in the first place, and end these arbitrary arrests once and for all.”

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not respond to a CPJ’s request for comment sent via messaging app.

The Taliban has detained at least five other journalists this month on claims they worked for media outlets operating from exile. Authorities also banned women’s voices from broadcasts in Helmand province.

Since the fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021, the Taliban’s repression of the Afghan media has worsened. On the second anniversary of the group’s return to power, CPJ called on the Taliban to stop its relentless campaign of intimidation and abide by its promise to protect journalists in Afghanistan.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.

On Sunday, August 13, Taliban intelligence agents summoned Omar, a journalist at the independent broadcaster TOLO News, to the intelligence service’s provincial headquarters in Kandahar and detained him, according to his employer, the local Afghanistan Journalists’ Center nonprofit, and a local journalist familiar with the situation who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of retaliation by the Taliban. Authorities accused him of working with media outlets operating from exile.

CPJ could not immediately determine Omar’s whereabouts as of Tuesday evening.

Also on Sunday, intelligence agents detained freelance journalist Wahidurahman Afghanmal outside the Kandahar Press Club, and questioned him about his work and whether he had worked for exiled media groups, according to the journalists’ center and another local journalist who spoke with CPJ on the condition of anonymity, fearing Taliban reprisal. Authorities released Afghanmal on bail Monday evening.

Separately, the Taliban Directorate of Information and Culture in Helmand province recently announced that it had banned women’s voices from being featured in commercials or any other programs aired by the province’s media outlets, according to a journalist in Helmand who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisal, and the U.S. Congress-funded outlet Radio Azadi. The ban went into effect on July 21, according to those sources.

Officials have threatened to revoke outlets’ licenses and shut down their operations if they air women’s voices, the journalist said.

“The detention of Afghan journalists Ataullah Omar and Wahidurahman Afghanmal, as well as the latest discriminatory policy against women being featured in broadcasts in Helmand province, show there is no let-up in the Taliban’s repression after two years in power,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator, in Kuala Lumpur. “Authorities must immediately and unconditionally release all detained journalists and allow the media to report freely.”

Last week, authorities detained three other journalists over their alleged links to media outlets operating from exile.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid told CPJ via messaging app that journalists have not been targeted for their work but had been detained “to be given guidance on certain issues and will be released afterwards.” He did not specify the reason for Omar’s detention.

Since the fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021, the Taliban’s repression of the Afghan media has worsened. On the second anniversary of the group’s return to power, CPJ called on the Taliban to stop its relentless campaign of intimidation and abide by its promise to protect journalists in Afghanistan.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.

“We are committed to the media within our cultural frameworks. Private media can continue to be free and independent. They can continue their activities,” Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said at the first news conference two days after the fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021.

Two years later, the Taliban not only has reneged on that pledge, but intensified its crackdown on what was once a vibrant media landscape in Afghanistan.

Here is a look of what happened to Afghan media and journalists since the 2021 takeover:

What is the state of media freedom in Afghanistan?

Since the fall of Kabul, the Taliban have escalated a crackdown on the media in Afghanistan. CPJ has extensively documented cases of censorship, assaults, arbitrary arrests, home searches, and restrictions on female journalists in a bid to muzzle independent reporting.

Despite their public pledge to allow journalists to work freely, Taliban operatives and officials from the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) – the Taliban’s intelligence agency – have assaulted, arbitrarily arrested and detained journalists, while shutting down local news outlets and banning broadcasts of a number of international media from inside the country. Foreign correspondents face visa restrictions to return to Afghanistan to report.

Journalists continue to be arrested for their job. Since August 2021, at least 64 journalists have been detained in Afghanistan in retaliation for their work, according to CPJ’s research. They include Mortaza Behboudi, a co-founder of the independent news site Guiti News, who has been held since January.

Afghan journalists have fled in huge numbers, mostly to neighboring countries like Pakistan and Iran. Many who left are now stuck in legal limbo without clear prospects of resettlement to a third country, and their visas are running out, prompting fears they could be arrested and deported back to Afghanistan.

What trends have emerged in the last two years?

The Taliban have not ceased their efforts to stifle independent reporting, with the GDI emerging as the main driving force behind the crackdown. The few glimmers of hope that CPJ noted in its 2022 special report on Afghanistan’s media crisis are dimming as independent organizations like Ariana News and TOLO News face both political and economic pressures and Taliban intelligence operatives detained at least three journalists they claimed were reporting for Afghan media in exile.

The Taliban are also broadening their target to take aim at social media platforms, enforcing new regulations targeting YouTube channels this year while officials mull a ban on Facebook.

A clampdown on social media would further tighten the space for millions of Afghans to freely access information. The rapid deterioration of the media landscape has led to some Afghan YouTubers taking on the role of citizen journalists, covering issues from politics to everyday lives on their channels.

Meanwhile, the Taliban are seeking to end their international isolation. In recent weeks, they have sent a delegation to Indonesia and held talks with officials from the United States as the group tried to shore up the country’s ailing economy and struggle with one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises. with more than half of its 41 million population relying on aid to survive.

A worsening media repression, however, is pushing Afghanistan deeper into isolation from the world, hurting its economy and people’s livelihoods, as CPJ’s Beh Lih Yi writes in an op-ed for Nikkei Asia.

What is CPJ hearing from Afghan journalists?

Even two years after the fall of Kabul, we hear from Afghan journalists on a near-daily basis – both from those who remain inside the country and those who are in exile – on the hostile environment they are facing.

Afghanistan remains one of the top countries for CPJ’s exile support and assistance to journalists. Since 2021, Afghan journalists have become among the largest share of exiled journalists getting support each year from CPJ, and contributed to a jump of 227 percent in CPJ’s overall exile support for journalists during a three-year period from 2020-2022. The support they received included immigration support letters and grants for necessities like rent and food.

We also increasingly received reports from exiled Afghan journalists who were being targeted in immigration-related cases. Afghan journalists who have sought refuge in Pakistan told us they have been arrested and extorted for overstaying their visas, and many are living in hiding and in fear.

What does CPJ recommend to end the Taliban’s media crackdown and help Afghan journalists forced into exile?

There are several actions we can take. Top of the list is to continue urging the international community to pressure the Taliban to respect the rights of the Afghan people and allow the country to return to a democratic path, including by allowing a free press.

The global community and international organizations should use political and diplomatic influence – including travel bans and targeted sanctions – to pressure the Taliban to end their media repression and allow journalists to freely report without fear of reprisal.

Foreign governments should streamline visa and broader resettlement processes, and support exiled journalists in continuing their work, while collaborating with appropriate agencies to extend humanitarian and technical assistance to journalists who remain in Afghanistan.

CPJ is also working with other rights groups to advocate for the implementation of recommendations that include those in its 2022 special report on Afghanistan’s media crisis. (Read CPJ’s complete list of 2022 recommendations here.)  

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Beh Lih Yi.

Despite an initial promise to allow press freedom after taking power on August 15, 2021, the Taliban have shut down dozens of local media outlets, banned some international broadcasters, and denied visas to foreign correspondents.

CPJ published a special report about the media crisis in Afghanistan in August 2022, and it has continued to document multiple cases of censorship, beatings, and arbitrary arrests of journalists, as well as restrictions on female reporters. The Taliban’s intelligence agency, the General Directorate of Intelligence, has been the driving force behind the crackdown.

In the last two years, hundreds of Afghan journalists have fled to neighboring countries like Pakistan and Iran, and many are now stuck in legal limbo without clear prospects of resettlement to a third country. Since 2021, Afghans have become among the largest share of exiled journalists receiving emergency support from CPJ each year.

When CPJ conducted its most recent annual worldwide census of imprisoned journalists on December 1, 2022, Afghanistan appeared for the first time in 12 years, with three reporters in jail.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Arlene Getz/CPJ Editorial Director.

On Thursday, August 10, officials from the General Directorate of Intelligence, the Taliban’s intelligence agency, stormed the office of the independent Killid radio station in Jalalabad city, in eastern Nangarhar province, and detained its manager Faqirzai and reporter Saleh, according to the non-profit Afghanistan Journalists Center (AFJC)and a journalist with knowledge of the situation who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of retaliation by the Taliban.

Separately, also on Thursday, Taliban intelligence operatives entered offices of the independent Uranus TV network in Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan and detained Hasib Hassas, a journalist at the independent radio Salam Watandar, according to the AFJC and another journalist who spoke with CPJ anonymously due to fear of Taliban reprisal.

CPJ’s journalist sources said that Faqirzai, Saleh, and Hassas were detained on accusations that they reported for exiled media. 

“The detention of journalists Faqir Mohammad Faqirzai, Jan Agha Saleh, and Hasib Hassas just before the second anniversary of the fall of Kabul shows the Taliban is determined to continue their brutal crackdown on the media,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “Taliban authorities must immediately and unconditionally release the three journalists and stop muzzling reporting, whether it is conducted for local media or the exiled press.”

The journalist sources said that the three were transferred to an undisclosed location; CPJ was unable to determine their whereabouts. 

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not respond to a CPJ’s request for comment sent via messaging app.

Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, the country’s media have been in crisis, with journalists facing arrests, raids on offices, and beatings. The Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence has emerged as a key threat to journalists in the country. Some journalists who fled the country have established media outlets to continue reporting on Afghanistan in exile. 

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

On Thursday, August 10, officials from the General Directorate of Intelligence, the Taliban’s intelligence agency, stormed the office of the independent Killid radio station in Jalalabad city, in eastern Nangarhar province, and detained its manager Faqirzai and reporter Saleh, according to the non-profit Afghanistan Journalists Center (AFJC)and a journalist with knowledge of the situation who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of retaliation by the Taliban.

Separately, also on Thursday, Taliban intelligence operatives entered offices of the independent Uranus TV network in Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan and detained Hasib Hassas, a journalist at the independent radio Salam Watandar, according to the AFJC and another journalist who spoke with CPJ anonymously due to fear of Taliban reprisal.

CPJ’s journalist sources said that Faqirzai, Saleh, and Hassas were detained on accusations that they reported for exiled media. 

“The detention of journalists Faqir Mohammad Faqirzai, Jan Agha Saleh, and Hasib Hassas just before the second anniversary of the fall of Kabul shows the Taliban is determined to continue their brutal crackdown on the media,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “Taliban authorities must immediately and unconditionally release the three journalists and stop muzzling reporting, whether it is conducted for local media or the exiled press.”

The journalist sources said that the three were transferred to an undisclosed location; CPJ was unable to determine their whereabouts. 

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not respond to a CPJ’s request for comment sent via messaging app.

Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, the country’s media have been in crisis, with journalists facing arrests, raids on offices, and beatings. The Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence has emerged as a key threat to journalists in the country. Some journalists who fled the country have established media outlets to continue reporting on Afghanistan in exile. 

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

When he took over as attorney general in 2016, Mohammad Farid Hamidi vowed to crack down on the corruption that had plagued Afghanistan’s political elites, including within his new office. For months, he spent his Mondays meeting with any resident seeking legal counsel, earning a reputation as the “people’s prosecutor.” And he increased the number of women on his staff of 6,000 prosecutors from under three percent to 23 percent, before resigning amid political pressure in early 2021.

But his greatest challenge came six months later, when the Taliban seized back control of Afghanistan, two years ago this month. Since then, the Taliban have shut down the attorney general’s office and freed thousands of people who had been locked up, sending many former prosecutors into hiding. Targeted by the people they helped convict, some 29 prosecutors have been killed in the last two years, including three in the last two weeks.

“They were released,” said Hamidi, referring to scores of individuals his office had prosecuted, including many Taliban members, “and they are looking to find the prosecutors who tried them.”

All along, Hamidi has been trying to help his former colleagues; last month, with the U.S. Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, or APA-US, he helped launch the “Prosecutors for Prosecutors” campaign, which aims to get 1,500 Afghan prosecutors and their families to safety. APA-US and its Afghan counterpart, now operating in exile, have partnered with a number of organizations to raise $15 million to fund nongovernmental organizations that can relocate them to safe countries. Their partners include Jewish Humanitarian Response, the International Association of Prosecutors, and No One Left Behind, as well as a number of local district attorneys across the U.S.

“They stood for law and justice in Afghanistan for the past 20 years, shoulder to shoulder with the international community, with the people of Afghanistan, with the government of Afghanistan,” Hamidi told The Intercept. “Withdrawal from Afghanistan shouldn’t be a withdrawal from all promises, all ethical obligations, human rights obligations.”

More than 1.6 million Afghans fled the country in the last two years, with more than 100,000 resettling in the U.S. In the chaotic weeks following the dramatic collapse of the former Afghan government, foreign states and international organizations helped evacuate Afghans they had worked with, prioritizing those they deemed at the highest risk, including women activists, human rights defenders, and members of the former government and military.

No such priority group was carved out for Afghan prosecutors, who also did not qualify for the State Department’s Special Immigrant Visa program, reserved for Afghans who had been employed by the U.S. government. While some prosecutors were able to flee through personal connections, thousands were left behind.

There was “no plan” by U.S. officials to get prosecutors to safety, Hamidi said, even as they had been targets of attacks for years. “They knew many people like prosecutors would be in danger. And there was no plan or program to provide them any opportunity to be included in any of these categories, SIV, P-1, P-2,” he said, referring to priority refugee status for certain categories of vulnerable Afghans.

That makes no sense to David LaBahn, president of APA-US, which had helped train Afghan prosecutors. “Here are the prosecutors who put terrorists and drug smugglers in prison — who have now been released from prison — and because they didn’t have a government contracting card, they are at the bottom of the list,” LaBahn told The Intercept. “It defies all logic.

“They’re being hunted right now,” he added. “People who are begging for their lives and who feel completely deserted.”

Afghan Attorney General Mohammad Farid Hamidi takes part in a petitioners’ meeting at the attorney general’s office in Kabul, Afghanistan, on Oct. 2, 2017.

Photo: Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images

An Ongoing Emergency

Hamidi was in the U.S. when Kabul fell. He immediately knew that years of his work would be wiped out, that he wouldn’t be able to return home, and that the lives of thousands of his colleagues were at risk. As soon as the Taliban seized the capital, he started writing to all the international agencies that had worked alongside his office over the years, including the United Nations and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

USAID and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul had funded his office’s initiative to train 250 female prosecutors, but now that those women were in hiding, he heard nothing from them. “They financed this program, and we implemented it. I sent letters to USAID and mentioned this, but no response,” he said. “The U.S. government, U.S. entities, the U.S. people — they have a responsibility to support the people of Afghanistan and those people who are at risk and in danger because of their work, because of their dedication to law and justice.”

The U.S. government, he stressed, did “nothing” for them.

That’s despite the fact that Afghan prosecutors had been responsible for jailing thousands of Taliban members, as well as narcotraffickers and members of other extremist groups and organized crime networks who helped fund the Taliban insurgency. Hamidi said that some 50,000 Taliban and Islamic State members were imprisoned between 2001 and 2021. “The fight against terrorism was in two main areas: One was in the battlefield, and the other was when the Taliban were arrested and handed over to the attorney general’s office for investigation,” he said. “Many ministers, commanders, governors who are now holding positions of power in the country were in jail at a time or another.”

Asked about Hamidi’s outreach to the U.S. government, a spokesperson for the State Department wrote in an email to The Intercept that “the Biden-Harris Administration continues to demonstrate its commitment to the brave Afghans who stood side-by-side with the United States over the past two decades.” The spokesperson added that the agency “does not comment on who is in the refugee processing pipeline due to privacy and protection reasons” but that the resettlement of eligible Afghans is one of its “top priorities.” USAID did not respond to a request for comment.

Over the last two years, the plight of Afghans in the country and outside has largely fallen off the news cycle as fatigue and new conflicts have replaced global shock at the country’s unraveling. That indifference stands in stark contrast with the sense of emergency that still dominates countless Afghans’ lives. APA-US continues to field desperate requests for help from dozens of former prosecutors still in Afghanistan. Through its Afghan counterpart, the group compiled a verified list of 3,850 former prosecutors and other staff and shared it with U.S. officials. But because there’s no visa path available to them in the U.S., the groups are looking to fund private efforts to relocate the prosecutors and help them secure employment. Already, some U.S.-based prosecutors have answered the call, promising help with relocation efforts and jobs for Afghan prosecutors arriving in the U.S.

“People are being killed, and there appears to be no action, or limited action, by those who should be acting.”

For the time being, LaBahn stresses, the need is urgent and short-term.

“People are being killed, and there appears to be no action, or limited action, by those who should be acting,” he said. “What we’re trying to do right now is just get people to safety, get them food, and get them housing, and then we can worry about the process of what country will ultimately protect them.”

The scene after gunmen fatally shot two Afghan women judges working for the Supreme Court, in Kabul, Afghanistan, on Jan. 17, 2021.

Photo: Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images

One Prosecutor’s Escape

Najia Mahmodi was one of the women Hamidi hired into the attorney general’s office. She was born before the U.S. toppled the Taliban in 2001 and remembers seeing them beat women in the street when she was a child. But she was part of a generation of Afghan women who grew up during a time of opportunity. She received a law degree from the American University of Afghanistan. While a student, she survived a Taliban attack that killed 16 of her classmates. Later, she became chief prosecutor for crimes against women and survived other attacks near the prosecutor’s office. Her role involved investigating crimes such as rape, battery, forced marriage, and prohibiting a woman or girl from going to school or work. Many of those offenses were criminalized under the U.S.-backed former Afghan government, and the Taliban rescinded the laws when it returned to power.

As the Taliban seized province after province two summers ago, Mahmodi’s 3-year-old son would greet her when she came home from work with updates on which part of the country had fallen. Her friends and family urged her to leave Afghanistan, knowing she would be an immediate target. She delivered her second child, a daughter, just as the Taliban advanced on Kabul, choosing to have an early C-section because she wasn’t sure she would be able to access a hospital when the time came. Thousands of the men her office had helped convict were being freed, and she began to have nightmares about them.

On August 15, she went into hiding. For 10 days, she tried to make sure her toddler wouldn’t be too loud because she feared being discovered and handed to the Taliban. Meanwhile, she reached out to all her foreign contacts for help. Eventually, she got a call back and was told to head to the airport immediately, instructed to wave her phone at U.S. Special Forces so they would recognize her. Her contact told her that the soldiers would shoot toward the crowd to disperse those around her but that she should not run and keep walking toward them.

Hours later, she was in Qatar with her children; she eventually resettled in the U.S., where she is enrolled to start a master’s in law program in the fall.

After leaving, she was able to rile up international support to get some of her colleagues from the elimination of violence against women division of the attorney general’s office moved to Pakistan through a private sponsorship. But only women benefited from that initiative, and many more remain in Afghanistan. They are struggling to survive without jobs in a country where more than 15 million people are currently facing food insecurity. Passports are hard to obtain, particularly for those who are trying to hide their identity.

“They are in constant fear for their lives,” Mahmodi said. “They are a target.”

This content originally appeared on The Intercept and was authored by Alice Speri.

On Sunday, July 30, about 20 members of the Taliban provincial police raided the office of Hamisha Bahar Radio and TV in Jalalabad city, in eastern Nangarhar province, after receiving information about a journalism training workshop attended by both male and female journalists from the broadcaster, according to news reports and a journalist familiar with the situation, who spoke to CPJ via messaging app on condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisal. On Tuesday, armed members of the Taliban provincial police then shuttered the broadcaster’s operations and sealed its office, according to those sources.

“The Taliban must allow the broadcaster Hamisha Bahar Radio and TV to resume operations promptly and ensure its employees, including female journalists, are allowed unfettered access to professional training,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “It is appalling that the Taliban cracked down on a media outlet because of women’s participation at a journalism training session. Denying women of their rights has become the hallmark of the Taliban regime.”

Hamisha Bahar Radio and TV has 35 employees, including nine women, according to the journalist who spoke with CPJ. Under the Taliban, women face severe restrictions on education and employment, which the United Nations says have increased in recent months.

CPJ contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app but received no response.

In August 2022, CPJ published a special report about the media crisis in Afghanistan showing a rapid deterioration in press freedom characterized by censorship, arrests, assaults, and restrictions on women journalists since the Taliban retook control of the country in 2021.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Arlene Getz/CPJ Editorial Director.

On July 12, officers with the Taliban General Directorate of Intelligence stopped Baidar near the Eidgah Mosque in the eastern city of Jalalabad, covered his head with a sack, and forced him into a vehicle, according to news reports and an Afghan journalist familiar with his case who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity due to fear of retaliation.

As of Friday, July 21, CPJ could not determine where Baidar, a reporter for the broadcaster Radio Safa who reported on current affairs and cultural issues, was being held or whether any charges had been filed against him.

“The Taliban must immediately and unconditionally release Afghan journalist Irfanullah Baidar,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “Nearly two years since the Taliban seized power, Afghan journalists continue to face a relentless campaign of intimidation on a daily basis simply for doing their job.”

Radio Safa director Ismail Hazrati was quoted in those news reports saying that Baidar had worked with the station since 2009. Hazrati said that he had contacted Taliban authorities after the journalist’s disappearance but had not received any information about his whereabouts.

CPJ contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app but did not receive any response.

In August 2022, CPJ published a special report about the media crisis in Afghanistan, showing a rapid deterioration in press freedom since the Taliban retook control of the country one year earlier, marked by censorship, arrests, assaults, and restrictions on Afghan journalists. Since the takeover, the General Directorate of Intelligence has emerged as a key threat to journalists in the country.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.

In a fit of wounded pride, the United States has, in turn, sought to strangulate and asphyxiate the Taliban regime, citing human rights and security concerns.  The Taliban’s Interim Foreign Minister, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, makes the not unreasonable point that “the ongoing crisis is the imposition of sanctions and banking restrictions by the United States.”

In May this year, Idaho Republican Senator Jim Risch, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, led 18 of his righteous colleagues in introducing the Taliban Sanctions Act, promising more chastising.  Ostensibly, the Act seeks to impose “sanctions with respect to terrorism, human rights abuses, and narcotics trafficking committed by the Taliban and others in Afghanistan.”

The brief for prosecuting an even more aggressive stance against the Taliban never ceases to bulk, be it to arrest the mistreatment of women and their inexorable marginalisation, or the claim that the country is now essentially a bandit state which is both a danger to itself and its neighbours.  “Over a year into Taliban rule, breakdown of the state, bankruptcy of financial institutions, economic collapse and diplomatic isolation have pushed Afghan society to the brink of humanitarian catastrophe,” writes a former senior advisor to Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister, Arian Sharifi, currently an academic at Princeton University’s School of International Affairs.

Sharifi goes on to analyse the Taliban in what resembles a portrait of the ramshackle government he served.  “The Taliban today is deeply divided, making it unable to pursue a unified course of action.”  They also ruled a country with “more than 20 terrorist groups with a long-standing presence in Afghanistan.”

In typical good taste, Sharifi delicately ignores his role in having advised a corrupt government whose strings were firstly pulled, then abandoned, by Washington and its allies.  His poisonous pen fails to acknowledge the attempt by his own past sponsors to systematically contribute to that very failure, bankruptcy and ruin.  He can, however, take some hope in recent reports suggesting that Afghanistan will again become a playground for what British imperialists dubbed in the 19^th century the Great Game, the Anglo-Russian competition for influence over Central Asia.

In recent months, Afghanistan has again piqued the interest of eager strategists drawing their salaries from the US government and assorted think tanks.  Such interest has nothing at all to do with the good citizenry of the Taliban-controlled state, be it the welfare of women or purported links to terrorist groups.  They concern the presence of lithium reserves in the Chapa Dara district of Kunar province and, almost inevitably, a fear that the People’s Republic of China might muscle in.

In 2010, a US Department of Defense memorandum valued the extent of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth as between $1 trillion and $3 trillion.  And that was before the skyrocketing value of specific minerals that are becoming critical in the global energy transition.

As the Washington Post reports, the eightfold rise in the mineral’s market price around the time of the Taliban takeover in August 2021 enticed “hundreds of Chinese mining entrepreneurs to Afghanistan.”  The paper describes in tones of awe and alarm Chinese traders filing Kabul’s hotels, then making their way to the hinterlands to seek lithium reminiscent “of a 19^th-century gold rush.”

Foreign Policy columnist Lynne O’Donnell also points an accusing finger at China for yet again “mucking about in Afghanistan’s mineral-rich playground.”  Doing so is evidently the prerogative of Western states.  She mocks the suggestion that this move in the energy transition stakes might “mean that billions of dollars will be pouring into securing a prosperous future for one of the world’s poorest countries.  It probably won’t.”  Remarkably, China is reproached for treating the country as a political, rather than economic matter.

The interest in such minerals is bound to only grow; the International Energy Agency, predicts that the growth in demand for lithium by 2040 will be by a factor 40 times, with graphite, cobalt and nickel in the order of 20-25 times.

The Post also seems troubled by another fact: that the Taliban have woken up to the value of lithium, and its vital role in the manufacture of Electric Vehicles (EVs) and battery storage.  (How dare they?)  “The tremendous promise of lithium […] could frustrate Western efforts to squeeze the Taliban into changing its extremist ways.”  The absence of the United States also meant that Chinese companies could “aggressively” position themselves to exploit the resource, thereby tightening Beijing’s “grasp of much of the global supply chain for EV minerals.”

In April, the Taliban’s Ministry of Mine and Petroleum announced the interest of a Chinese company, Gochin, in investing $10 billion in the country’s lithium deposits.  According to the Ministry, some 120,000 direct jobs would arise from the investment, with a million indirect jobs being created.

Whatever the merits of such extravagant announcements (China’s 2007 copper mining project valued at $3 billion failed to provide predicted returns), it was the sort of thing bound to make the Washington establishment livid.  The object of the Biden administration has been to corner the rare minerals market and prize out China, best seen in efforts to classify Australia as a “domestic source” for US defence interests.  Doing so would give unqualified access to the island continent’s own impressive lithium reserves.  (53% of the world’s lithium supply is mined in Australia.)

A traditional, potentially violent rivalry over the resources of yet another country, is in the offing.  Only this time, the narrative will be slightly different: the competitors, notably the United States, habitually prone to cant and hustling, will argue that the mission to secure such minerals will be less a case of manifest destiny than environmental duty.  The cry will be: Save the Planet; Invade Afghanistan.

This content originally appeared on Dissident Voice and was authored by Binoy Kampmark.

Background

Jake Sullivan was born in November 1976.  He describes his formative years like this:

I was raised in Minnesota in the 1980s, a child of the later Cold War – of Rocky IV, the Miracle on Ice, and ‘Tear down this wall’. The 90s were my high school and college years. The Soviet Union collapsed. The Iron Curtain disappeared. Germany was reunified. An American-led alliance ended a genocide in Bosnia and prevented one in Kosovo. I went to graduate school in England and gave fiery speeches on the floor of the Oxford Union about how the United States was a force for good in the world.

Sullivan’s education includes Yale (BA), Oxford (MA) and Yale again (JD). He went quickly from academic studies and legal work to political campaigning and government.

Sullivan made important contacts during his college years at elite institutions. For example, he worked with former Deputy Secretary of State and future Brookings Institution president, Strobe Talbott. After a few years clerking for judges, Sullivan transitioned to a law firm in his hometown of Minneapolis. He soon became chief counsel to Senator Amy Klobuchar who connected him to the rising Senator Hillary Clinton.

Mentored by Hillary

Sullivan became a key adviser to Hillary Clinton in her campaign to be Democratic party nominee in 2008. At age 32, Jake Sullivan became deputy chief of staff and director of policy planning when she became secretary of state. He was her constant companion, travelling with her to 112 countries.

The Clinton/Sullivan foreign policy was soon evident. In Honduras, Clinton clashed with progressive Honduras President Manuel Zelaya over whether to re-admit Cuba to the OAS. Seven weeks later, on June 28, Honduran soldiers invaded the president’s home and kidnapped him out of the country, stopping en route at the US Air Base. The coup was so outrageous that even the US ambassador to Honduras denounced it. This was quickly over-ruled as the Clinton/Sullivan team played semantics games to say it was a coup but not a “military coup.” Thus the Honduran coup regime continued to receive US support. They quickly held a dubious election to make the restoration of President Zelaya “moot”. Clinton is proud of this success in her book “Hard Choices.”

Two years later the target was Libya. With Victoria Nuland as State Department spokesperson, the Clinton/Sullivan team promoted sensational claims of a pending massacre and urged intervention in Libya under the “responsibility to protect.”  When the UN Security Council passed a resolution authorizing a no-fly zone to protect civilians, the US, Qatar and other NATO members distorted that and started air attacks on Libyan government forces. Today, 12 years later, Libya is still in chaos and war. The sensational claims of 2011 were later found  to be false.

When the Libyan government was overthrown in Fall 2011, the Clinton/Sullivan State Department and CIA plotted to seize the Libyan weapons arsenal. Weapons were transferred to the Syrian opposition. US Ambassador Stevens and other Americans were killed in an internecine conflict over control of the weapons cache.

Undeterred, Clinton and Sullivan stepped up their attempts to overthrow the Syrian government. They formed a club of western nations and allies called the “Friends of Syria.” The “Friends” divided tasks who would do what in the campaign to topple the sovereign state.  Former policy planner at the Clinton/Sullivan State Department, Ann Marie Slaughter, called for “foreign military intervention.”  Sullivan knew they were arming violent sectarian fanatics to overthrow the Syrian government. In an email to Hillary released by Wikileaks, Sullivan noted “AQ is on our side in Syria.”

Biden’s adviser during the 2014 Ukraine Coup

After being Clinton’s policy planner, Sullivan  became President Obama’s director of policy planning (Feb 2011 to Feb 2013) then national security adviser to Vice President Biden (Feb 2013 to August 2014).

In his position with Biden, Sullivan had a close-up view of the February 2014 Ukraine coup. He was a key contact between Victoria Nuland, overseeing the coup, and Biden. In the secretly recorded conversation where Nuland and the US Ambassador to Ukraine discuss how to manage the coup, Nuland remarks that Jake Sullivan told her “you need Biden.” Biden gave the “attaboy” and the coup was “midwifed” following a massacre of  police AND protesters on the Maidan plaza.

Sullivan must have observed Biden’s use of the vice president’s position for personal family gain. He would have been aware of  Hunter Biden’s appointment to the board of the Burisima Ukrainian energy company, and the reason Joe Biden demanded that the Ukrainian special prosecutor who was investigating Burisima to be fired. Biden later bragged and joked about this.

In December 2013, at a conference hosted by Chevron Corporation, Victoria Nuland said the US has spent five BILLION dollars to bring “democracy” to Ukraine.

Sullivan helped create Russiagate

 Jake Sullivan was a leading member of the 2016 Hillary Clinton team which  promoted Russiagate.  The false claim that Trump was secretly contacting Russia was promoted initially to distract from negative news about Hillary Clinton and to smear Trump as a puppet of  Putin.  Both the Mueller and Durham investigations officially discredited the main claims of Russiagate. There was no collusion. The accusations were untrue, and the FBI gave them unjustified credence for political reasons.

Sullivan played a major role in the deception as shown by his “Statement from Jake Sullivan on New Report Exposing Trump’s Secret Line of Communication to Russia.”

 Sullivan’s misinformation

 Jake Sullivan is a good speaker, persuasive and with a dry sense of humor. At the same time, he can be disingenuous. Some of his statements are false. For example, in June 2017 Jake Sullivan was interviewed by Frontline television program about US foreign policy and especially US-Russia relations. Regarding NATO’s overthrow of the Libyan government, Sullivan says, “Putin came to believe that the United States had taken Russia for a ride in the UN Security Council that authorized the use of force in Libya…. He thought he was authorizing a purely defensive mission…. Now on the actual language of the resolution, it’s plain as day that Putin was wrong about that.”  Contrary to what Sullivan claims, the UN Security Council resolution clearly authorizes a no-fly zone for the protection of civilians, no more. It’s plain as day there was NOT authorization for NATO’s offensive attacks and “regime change.”

Planning the Nord Stream Pipeline destruction

The bombing of the Nord Stream pipelines, filled with 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas, was a monstrous environmental disaster. The destruction also caused huge economic damage to Germany and other European countries. It has been a boon for US liquefied natural gas exports which have surged to fill the gap, but at a high price. Many European factories dependent on cheap gas have closed down.  Tens of thousands of workers lost their jobs.

Seymour Hersh reported details of  How America Took Out the Nord Stream Pipeline. He says, “Biden authorized Jake Sullivan to bring together an interagency group to come up with a plan.” A sabotage plan was prepared and officials in Norway and Denmark included in the plot. The day after the sabotage, Jake Sullivan tweeted

I spoke to my counterpart Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe of Denmark about the apparent sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines. The U.S. is supporting efforts to investigate and we will continue our work to safeguard Europe’s energy security.

Ellerman-Kingombe may have been one of the Danes informed in advance of the bombing. He is close to the US military and NATO command.

Since then, the Swedish investigation of Nord Stream bombing has made little progress. Contrary to Sullivan’s promise in the tweet, the US has not supported other efforts to investigate. When Russia proposed an independent international investigation of the Nord Stream sabotage at the UN Security Council, the resolution failed due to lack of support from the US and US allies. Hungary’s foreign minister recently asked,

How on earth is it possible that someone blows up critical infrastructure on the territory of Europe and no one has a say, no one condemns, no one carries out an investigation?

 Economic Plans devoid of reality

 Ten weeks ago Jake Sullivan delivered a major speech on “Renewing American Economic Leadership” at the Brookings Institution. He explains how the Biden administration is pursuing a “modern industrial and innovation strategy.” They are trying to implement a “foreign policy for the middle class” which better integrates domestic and foreign policies. The substance of their plan is to increase investments in semiconductors, clean energy minerals and manufacturing. However the new strategy is very unlikely to achieve the stated goal to “lift up all of America’s people, communities, and industries.”  Sullivan’s speech completely ignores the elephant in the room: the costly US Empire including wars and 800 foreign military bases which consume about 60% of the total discretionary budget. Under Biden and Sullivan’s foreign policy, there is no intention to rein in the extremely costly military industrial complex. It is not even mentioned.

US exceptionalism 2.0

In December 2018 Jake Sullivan wrote an essay titled “American Exceptionalism, Reclaimed.” It shows his foundational beliefs and philosophy. He separates himself from the “arrogant brand of exceptionalism” demonstrated by Dick Cheney.  He also criticizes the “American first” policies of Donald Trump.  Sullivan advocates for “a new American exceptionalism” and “American leadership in the 21^st Century.”

Sullivan has a shallow Hollywood understanding of history: “The United States stopped Hitler’s Germany, saved Western Europe from economic ruin, stood firm against the Soviet Union, and supported the spread of democracy worldwide.”  He believes “The fact that the major powers have not returned to war with one another since 1945 is a remarkable achievement of American statecraft.”

Jake Sullivan is young in age but his ideas are old. The United States is no longer dominant economically or politically. It is certainly not “indispensable.” More and more countries are objecting to US bullying and defying Washington’s demands. Even key allies such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are ignoring US requests.  The trend  toward a multipolar world is escalating. Jake Sullivan is trying to reverse the trend but reality and history are working against him.  Over the past four or five decades, the US has gone from being an investment, engineering and manufacturing powerhouse to a deficit spending consumer economy waging perpetual war with a bloated military industrial complex.

Instead of reforming and rebuilding the US, the national security state expends much of its energy and resources trying to destabilize countries deemed to be “adversaries”.

Conclusion

Previous national security advisers Henry Kissinger and Zbignew Brzezinski were very  influential.

Kissinger is famous for wooing China and dividing the communist bloc.  Jake Sullivan is now wooing India in hopes of dividing that country from China and the BRICS alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).

Brzezinski is famous for plotting the Afghanistan trap. By destabilizing Afghanistan with foreign terrorists beginning 1978, the US induced the Soviet Union to send troops to Afghanistan at the Afghan government’s request. The result was the collapse of the progressive Afghan government, the rise of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and 40 years of war and chaos.

On 28 February 2022, just four days after Russian troops entered Ukraine, Jake Sullivan’s mentor, Hillary Clinton, was explicit: “Afghanistan is the model.” It appears the US intentionally escalated the provocations in Ukraine to induce Russia to intervene. The goal is to “weaken Russia.” This explains why the US has spent over $100 billion sending weapons and other support to Ukraine. This explains why the US and UK undermined negotiations which could have ended the conflict early on.

The Americans who oversaw the 2014 coup in Kiev, are the same ones running US foreign policy today:  Joe Biden, Victoria Nuland and Jake Sullivan.  Prospects for ending the Ukraine war are very poor as long as they are in power.

The Democratic Party constantly emphasizes “democracy” yet there is no debate or discussion over US foreign policy. What kind of “democracy” is this where crucial matters of life and death are not discussed?

Robert F Kennedy Jr is now running in the Democratic Party primary. He has a well informed and critical perspective on US foreign policy including the never ending wars, the intelligence agencies and the conflict in Ukraine.

Jake Sullivan is a skilled debater. Why doesn’t he debate Democratic Party candidate Robert F Kennedy Jr over US foreign policy and national security?

This content originally appeared on Dissident Voice and was authored by Rick Sterling.

The post The Taliban and the Islamic State Continue to Fight for Control of Afghanistan’s Future appeared first on CounterPunch.org.

This content originally appeared on CounterPunch.org and was authored by John P. Ruehl.

On Monday, May 8, the provincial directorate of the Taliban-controlled Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in the eastern province of Khost detained four journalists after summoning them for questioning, according to the exile-based media support group Afghanistan Journalists Center and the London-based broadcaster Afghanistan International.

Authorities accused the journalists of violating the Taliban’s media policies, according to the AFJC report, which cited an anonymous source that did not specify which policies they allegedly violated. CPJ could not immediately determine where the journalists are being held.

“The Taliban must immediately release four journalists recently detained in Khost province and stop the harassment and intimidation of the press in Afghanistan,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “The Taliban must abide by its own promise to protect press freedom. The Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice should be held accountable for its crackdown on journalists.”

Those sources identified the journalists as Sakhi Sarwar Miakhel, editor-in-chief of the privately owned Gharghast Radio and TV; Mohammad ud Din Shah Khiali, editor-in-chief of the privately owned Wolas Ghag Radio; Pamir Andish Mohaidi, editor-in-chief of the privately owned Chinar Radio; and Abdul Rahman Ashna, a reporter with the privately owned broadcaster Nan FM.

Shabir Ahmad Osmani, the Taliban’s director of information and public affairs in Khost, said the journalists had been summoned so authorities could share “some important issues” with them, and denied that they had been detained, according to AFJC.

CPJ contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app but did not receive any response.

Afghanistan’s independent media have come under increasing pressure since the Taliban took back control of the country in 2021. On March 31, Taliban authorities shut down the women-run broadcaster Radio Sada e Banowan for allegedly playing music, which the Taliban banned after its return to power.  

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned this week that Afghanistan continues to face the largest humanitarian crisis in the world today, with a two-day summit in Doha ending without formal recognition of the Taliban government that has ruled the country since August 2021. Since their return to power, the Taliban have cracked down on women’s rights, including restricting access to education and banning women from working with international aid groups. Poverty has skyrocketed in Afghanistan as years of conflict, corruption and international sanctions have battered the economy. We speak with Farzana Elham Kochai, a women’s rights activist who was elected to the Afghan Parliament in 2019 before fleeing the country for safety, and Jumana Abo Oxa, who works with the Greek refugee project Elpida Home helping Afghan women lawmakers find refuge in other countries.

This content originally appeared on Democracy Now! and was authored by Democracy Now!.

In a statement on Thursday, April 20, Washington Post Executive Editor Sally Buzbee said that George, the paper’s Islamabad-based Afghanistan and Pakistan bureau chief, was informed by the Taliban that she was barred from reporting from Afghanistan. The statement said her last reporting trip to Afghanistan was in November 2021.

“The Taliban must immediately allow Washington Post journalist Susannah George to return to Afghanistan and continue her vital reporting,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “It is absurd to ban journalists for simply reporting the news. The Taliban must stop cracking down on journalism and finally allow members of the media to work freely.”

A journalist familiar with the situation who spoke with CPJ on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of retaliation, said that Taliban authorities refused to renew George’s visa and accreditation after her visa expired several months ago.

Buzbee’s statement said that the newspaper had raised objections for several months “but Afghan authorities have indicated that the action is final.” Authorities have allowed several other journalists from the newspaper to report from the country since George’s last reporting trip, that statement said.

CPJ contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app but did not receive any response.

In July 2022, Taliban intelligence officers forced Australian journalist Lynne O’Donnell to tweet apologies for her previous coverage on Afghan women and girls and threatened her with jail time.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.

Jahesh is one of many exiled Afghan journalists still in limbo more than 18 months after the Taliban seized power, forcing hundreds of thousands of Afghans to flee. Those who left included hundreds of journalists seeking refuge as the Taliban cracked down on the country’s previously vibrant independent media landscape.

While some journalists found shelter in Europe or the U.S., those unable to move beyond neighboring Pakistan are in increasingly dire straits. Unable to find jobs without work authorization, their visas are running out as they struggle with the snail-paced process of resettlement to a third country. Pakistan, which last year announced it would expedite 30-day transit visas for Afghans going to other countries, is now taking harsher steps against those in the country without valid documents. In March, the government announced new restrictions limiting their movements. At least 1,100 Afghans have been deported in recent months, according to a Guardian report citing Pakistani human rights lawyer Moniza Kakar.

Pakistan is not a signatory to the U.N. refugee convention stating that refugees should not be forced to return to a country where they face threats to their life or freedom, and Afghan journalists told CPJ they fear the Taliban’s hardline stance on the media would put them at particular risk if they were sent back.

Some journalists told CPJ they have to pay exorbitant fees to renew a visa and applications can take months to be processed. Those without valid visas live in hiding for fear of detention or extortion. Even those with the proper documentation said they have been harassed by local authorities. The uncertainty, they say, has put a strain on their mental health.  

“People are worried about being identified and arrested if they go out to try to renew their visas. The risk of deportation is putting everyone under pressure,” said Jahesh, who suspended his plan to sell his kidney following a donation after tweeting his desperate offer in February.

The situation is “dire,” said Ahmad Quraishi, executive director of the advocacy group Afghanistan Journalists Center, which estimates there are at least 150 Afghan journalists in Pakistan. He called on embassies to prioritize resettlement applications of at-risk journalists. 

CPJ spoke with five other exiled Afghan journalists in Pakistan who are facing visa issues. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity.

Ahmad Ferooz Esar, a former journalist with Arezo TV and Mitra TV, fled to Pakistan in December 2021 with his wife, also a journalist. He was briefly detained in early February and is in hiding after speaking out about his detention.

On the night of February 3, the police entered our house and arrested me and a number of other Afghans living there. I asked the police why I was being arrested, they didn’t say anything. They asked me about my job and what I did in Afghanistan, I was very afraid. They did not even check our passport or visa status.

We were taken to the police station. They asked for money. Before my mobile phone was taken away, I shared my arrest with some media colleagues in Islamabad. With their help, I got out later and I gave media interviews in which I talked about police corruption. I stated the facts, but the police came looking for me later. We had to leave the house.

We are living in fear. Every moment we fear they may find out our current address and come here to arrest me. Please help me and my wife escape from this horror and destruction. There is no way for us to go back to Afghanistan.

Khatera Ahmadi, a former news presenter with Afghan broadcaster TOLONews, fled to Pakistan in July 2022. A photo of her covering her face on-air following an order by the Taliban was one of the most widely shared images illustrating the restrictions on female journalists in the country.  

I had to flee Afghanistan after the Taliban came to power and after the threats that were made against me. I got the visa and came to Pakistan with my husband, who is also a journalist. It’s been eight months now, we’re in a bad situation. We can’t travel freely in Pakistan. We have to go to the Torkham border [a border crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan that some Afghans are required visit every two months] to renew our visas, but the Taliban might arrest me there.

I cannot go anywhere, my family cannot transfer me money, I cannot make the [rental] contract for the house. We can’t do anything here.

Medina Kohistani, a former journalist with TOLONews, fled to Pakistan a year ago. She said there has been heightened anxiety among exiled Afghan journalists in Pakistan.

The police always patrol the streets and markets and check the visas and passports of Afghans. In some cases, they enter buildings and check the visas and residence permits of Afghan refugees.

In one case, several people, including journalists, had been arrested over visa issues, and were later released after paying a bribe. My friend, who is a journalist, did not have money to pay the fines after his visa expired, he is living in constant fear.

Ahmad, who asked to be identified only by his first name, has been living in Islamabad for about 10 months. He was forced to flee Afghanistan after he was detained by the Taliban over his reporting.

I have seen that most Afghan journalists have had to buy their [Pakistan] visas for US$1,200 to be able to flee Afghanistan and now, their visas have expired. Even though they tried to apply for an extension, they didn’t get an answer. The only way to get a visa is by paying a bribe, which is impossible, given the financial situations of many Afghan journalists.

I personally witnessed one of the journalists whose visa has expired…pay a bribe to the police. I cannot provide more details as I may face more risks to discuss that.

An Afghan journalist in Pakistan, who is also a father of three children aged 5 to 14. He fled to Pakistan over a year ago and asked not to be named for the security of his family.

Pakistan does not provide education for our children, public and private schools do not enroll our children. This is a really big issue. What will be the future of these children while there is no hope for a third country resettlement?

When we fled Afghanistan, we had a small amount of cash savings that we kept with us. We had just enough to get by with those savings in the beginning, now we have to sell our belongings like my wife’s jewelries for cash and for food.

There are no other options, we can’t go back to Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior did not respond to a request seeking comment for this article, including the allegations of bribery.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Beh Lih Yi.

On Thursday, March 30, authorities in the city of Faizabad, in Badakhshan province, shuttered the broadcaster’s operations and sealed its office, according to news reports and an employee of the radio station who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisal.

The officers at the scene, from the Taliban’s Directorate of Information and Culture and Directorate of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, accused the outlet of illegally airing music during the holy month of Ramadan. The Taliban banned playing and listening to music when it retook power in August 2021.

The radio station employee who spoke to CPJ said she was not aware that any music had been aired, and believed that the decision was retaliation for the station’s programs focusing on women’s education and job opportunities in Badakhshan.

“The Taliban should immediately reverse its decision shuttering the Radio Sada e Banowan broadcaster and allow the outlet to reopen and work freely,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The Taliban have deprived Afghan women of everything from jobs to education. Shutting down a women-run radio station shows there is no reprieve for the Afghan media even during the holy month of Ramadan. The Taliban must correct its course and stop cracking down on journalism.”

Radio Sada e Banowan was established in 2014 and owned by Afghan female journalist Najla Shirzad. Local Taliban officials allowed the radio station to restart operations not long after the group retook power. It has six employees, according to the person who spoke to CPJ.

CPJ contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app but did not receive any response.

In August 2022, CPJ published a special report about the media crisis in Afghanistan, showing a rapid deterioration in press freedom since the Taliban retook control of the country one year earlier, marked by censorship, arrests, assaults, and restrictions on women journalists.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.

“Targeting journalists during an event to honor reporters is a despicable and cowardly act,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia Program Coordinator. “Brave Afghan journalists are already reporting in extremely challenging circumstances. The Taliban must investigate quickly, bring the perpetrators to justice, and end impunity for those who target journalists.”

The explosion took place at a cultural center in Mazar-e-Sharif, the capital of northern Balkh province, on Saturday as journalists gathered for an event marking the National Journalists Day, according to those reports. A security guard was killed and several journalists were injured.

Police put the number of journalists injured at five, while the Afghanistan Journalists Center, a local media group, said at least 16 were wounded. CPJ could not immediately independently verify the number of casualties.

No one has claimed responsibility for Saturday’s attack so far. The incident came two days after a suicide bombing in Mazar-e-Sharif killed the provincial governor and two other people at his office in an attack claimed by the militant group Islamic State.

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid did not immediately respond to a request for comment sent via messaging app.

Afghanistan was ranked fourth on CPJ’s 2022 Global Impunity Index, which spotlights countries with the worst records for prosecuting murderers of journalists.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Jennifer Dunham.

A coalition of Afghan-American community organizations on Wednesday welcomed a U.S. federal judge's ruling rejecting a bid by relatives of 9/11 victims to seize billions of dollars in assets belonging to the people of Afghanistan.

In a 30-page opinion issued Tuesday, Judge George B. Daniels of the Southern District of New York denied an effort by family members of people killed during the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States to gain access to $3.5 billion in frozen funds from Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), the country's central bank.

"The judgment creditors are entitled to collect on their default judgments and be made whole for the worst terrorist attack in our nation's history, but they cannot do so with the funds of the central bank of Afghanistan," Daniels wrote. "The Taliban—not the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or the Afghan people—must pay for the Taliban's liability in the 9/11 attacks."

"We support the 9/11 families' quest for just compensation, but believe justice will not be achieved by 'raiding the coffers'... of a people already suffering."

The frozen assets are currently being held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the wake of the Taliban's reconquest of the nation that, under the militant group's previous rule, hosted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and other figures involved in planning and executing the terrorist attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people. The 9/11 attacks resulted in a U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Afghanistan that lasted nearly two decades, the longest war in American history.

"We are pleased to see that Judge Daniels shares the same assessment we laid out in our amicus brief to the court: That this money belongs to the Afghan people, and no one else," the coalition—Afghans for a Better Tomorrow (AFBT)—said in a statement.

In February 2022, the Biden administration said it would split $7 billion in frozen DAB funds between the people of Afghanistan and victims of the 9/11 attacks who sued the Taliban—a move that one critic warned would amount to a "death sentence for untold numbers of civilians" in a war-ravaged country reeling from multiple humanitarian crises including widespread starvation.

Last August, U.S. Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn said that 9/11 families should not be allowed to use billions of frozen DAB funds to pay off legal judgments against the Taliban.

"Just like the families of the September 11th attack victims, the Afghan people are no stranger to the Taliban's brutality and rule," AFBT co-director Arash Azizzada said. "We support the 9/11 families' quest for just compensation, but believe justice will not be achieved by 'raiding the coffers,' as Judge Daniels put [it], of a people already suffering."

Homaira Hosseini, a board member of coalition member Afghan-American Community Organization (AACO), asserted that "an appeal of this decision, which the 9/11 families have stated they will pursue, will only cause further harm to both Afghans and the families involved."

"We continue to encourage these families to seek legal retribution elsewhere," Hosseini added, "and to not further harm Afghans in the process."

This content originally appeared on Common Dreams and was authored by Brett Wilkins.

On Tuesday, February 21, Taliban officials, in a meeting with journalists in the southern province of Helmand, announced a ban on all media outlets—including Taliban-run Radio Television of Helmand and Bakhtar News Agency —preparing and distributing photos and videos, according to the media watchdog Nai and a journalist inside Afghanistan, who spoke to CPJ by messaging app on the condition of anonymity due to fear of reprisal. Taliban authorities have not clarified whether text-based media activities are still allowed; however, Bakhtar News Agency has stopped operations in Helmand, because the ban on recording video and taking pictures has prevented them from producing any content.

Separately, on Monday, February 20, Taliban officials in northern Parwan province ordered the media to change their coverage to fall in line with what is reported by the Taliban-run Bakhtar News Agency, stifling all independent reporting, according to a local news report and another journalist inside Afghanistan, who spoke to CPJ by messaging app on the condition of anonymity due to fear of reprisal.

“The Taliban’s severe restrictions imposed on the media in Helmand and Parwan provinces reflect an alarming escalation of local information control,” said Carlos Martinez de la Serna, CPJ’s program director, in New York. “The Taliban must immediately reverse these devastating orders and allow journalists to report without fear of retaliation. Access to information inside Afghanistan depends on it.”

Abdul Ahad Talib, the Taliban governor of Helmand, said during the February 21 meeting that recording videos and taking photos are forbidden in Islam, which is why the ban includes Taliban-run outlets, the journalist told CPJ. Taliban officials also warned the journalists attending the meeting not to discuss the order publicly.

CPJ contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app but received no response. CPJ was unable to locate contact information for the Taliban governor of Helmand.

In August 2022, CPJ published a special report about the media crisis in Afghanistan, showing a rapid deterioration in press freedom since the Taliban retook control of the country one year earlier, marked by censorship, arrests, assaults, and restrictions on women journalists.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

On Tuesday, February 14, about 10 armed Taliban members raided the headquarters of the privately owned broadcaster in Kabul, beat several staff members, and held them for 30 minutes, according to news reports and a journalist familiar with the case who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity due to fear of reprisal.

That journalist said they did not know what led to the raid. Tamadon TV is predominantly owned and operated by members of the Hazara ethnic minority, and covers political and current affairs as well as Shiite religious programming. Hazara people have faced persecution and escalated violence since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021.

“The Taliban’s raid of Tamadon TV and attacks on its employees show the group’s failure to abide by its professed commitment to freedom of expression in Afghanistan,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “Access to information in Afghanistan is critical. The Taliban must stop harassing journalists and stifling the work of the free press.”

While entering the broadcaster’s premises, Taliban members beat a security guard, two journalists, and two media workers, the journalist who spoke to CPJ said.

The Taliban members then pointed guns the station’s staff members, confiscated their mobile phones, and transferred them to a meeting room, where they were held for 30 minutes while Taliban members verbally harassed them, referring to one as an “infidel Hazara journalist,” according to that journalist.

Taliban members roamed around the headquarters, but it was not clear if they conducted any additional searches, and then confiscated two of the broadcaster’s vehicles when they left the scene.

CPJ contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app but did not receive any response.

In August 2022, CPJ published a special report about the media crisis in Afghanistan, showing a rapid deterioration in press freedom since the Taliban retook control of the country, marked by censorship, arrests, assaults, and restrictions on women journalists.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.

The websites of both outlets are inaccessible on three of Afghanistan’s privately owned telecommunications providers—Afghan Wireless, Roshan, and Etisalat Afghanistan—but remain accessible to users of the state-owned telecom company Salam, according to a report by VOA, a statement by RFE/RL, and two journalists inside the country who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisal.

That VOA report, published February 9, said users in different Afghan provinces had experienced issues accessing the websites for at least two weeks. The Taliban’s Ministry of Information and Culture previously banned VOA and RFE/RL’s radio transmissions on December 1, 2022.

“The restrictions on access to VOA and RFE/RL’s websites inside Afghanistan reflect an escalated attack on press freedom and the Afghan people’s right to information,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “The Taliban must lift all restrictions on access to online news media inside Afghanistan and cease their relentless campaign of media censorship.”

The broadcasters’ websites remain accessible to those using virtual private networking software, according to the journalists who spoke with CPJ.

That VOA article cited a source at one of the telecommunication providers saying that the company had received a direct order from the Taliban.  

The Taliban-controlled Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority directed telecommunication providers to block access to the website of Radio Azadi, the Afghan branch of RFE/RL, on orders by Taliban officials, Radio Azadi head Qadir Habib told Amu TV, citing sources within the regulator.

CPJ emailed the regulator and contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app, but did not receive any replies.

In August, CPJ published a special report about the media crisis in Afghanistan, showing a rapid deterioration in press freedom since the Taliban took control of the country in August 2021, marked by censorship, arrests, assaults, and restrictions on women journalists.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.

On January 7, members of the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence detained Behboudi, a reporter and cofounder of the independent news website Guiti News, in the capital city of Kabul, according to the U.S. Congress-funded broadcaster Voice of America and three people familiar with the matter who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisal from the Taliban.

The sources told CPJ that Behboudi, who has dual Afghan and French citizenship, is detained in the GDI’s headquarters in Kabul. On February 6, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed to Voice of America that Behboudi was detained by the GDI, saying that details of his case could not be made public “but he is fine and he was treated well.”

“The Taliban must release French Afghan journalist Mortaza Behboudi immediately and stop the growing trend of detaining foreign journalists in Afghanistan,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The Taliban’s intelligence agency has been the driving force behind the recent crackdown on press freedom in the country. The General Directorate of Intelligence must stop this attack on the media at once.”

At about 10:30 a.m. on January 7, Behboudi called several human rights activists and arranged to meet with them at 11; half an hour later, he did not arrive at the planned meeting place and his cellphone was turned off, one of those people familiar with his case told CPJ.

Behboudi is an award-winning journalist and photographer who focuses on migration and refugee issues; he was named one of Forbes magazine’s “30 under 30” in 2019.

CPJ messaged the GDI for comment but did not receive any reply.

CPJ has documented the GDI’s expanded role in persecuting and abusing journalists in Afghanistan since the Taliban took back control in August 2021.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.

On January 9, agents with the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence detained Parhar, a reporter and chair of the Nangarhar Sports Journalists Association in Kabul, the capital, according to the independent broadcaster Afghanistan International and a source familiar with the matter who spoke to CPJ on the condition of anonymity, citing fear of reprisal.

CPJ was unable to determine Parhar’s whereabouts or the reason for his arrest.

“The Taliban must immediately release Afghan journalist Khairullah Parhar and stop their continued arbitrary detention of journalists and media workers in the country,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The Taliban’s intelligence agency has been the main force behind the worsening crackdown on independent and critical reporting in Afghanistan, and must be held to account.”

The person who spoke to CPJ said that GDI officers confiscated Parhar’s mobile phone at a cricket stadium in the eastern province of Nangarhar on December 14, after checking the device’s contents. CPJ could not determine whether Parhar, a freelance reporter and the head of the local sports journalists’ group, was reporting at the stadium at the time.

A few days later, authorities summoned Parhar to Kabul to collect his phone; he left for the city on January 9 and was detained after he arrived, that person said.

CPJ has documented the GDI’s expanded role in persecuting and abusing journalists in Afghanistan since the Taliban took back control of Afghanistan in August 2021.

CPJ contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app but did not receive any response.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.

We go to Kabul to speak with Jan Egeland of the Norwegian Refugee Council about the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, where at least five people died Wednesday in a suicide bombing near the Foreign Ministry. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack. Meanwhile, pressure is growing on the ruling Taliban to reverse bans on women attending university or working with nongovernmental organizations. In recent weeks a number of major international aid agencies, including the Norwegian Refugee Council, have suspended operations in Afghanistan due to the ban, potentially worsening the humanitarian crisis in the country, where the United Nations estimates more than 28 million Afghans, or over 70% of the population, require humanitarian assistance. “We need to help the same 28 million people in need that the NATO countries left behind,” says Egeland, who recently met with Taliban leaders to urge them to lift restrictions on women’s rights.

This content originally appeared on Democracy Now! and was authored by Democracy Now!.

International aid groups are suspending their relief programs in Afghanistan after the Taliban government announced on Saturday that humanitarian organizations are barred from employing women. The edict is the latest blow to women’s rights in the country as the Taliban reimpose draconian rules they employed in the 1990s, when they were previously in power. Last week, the government also barred women from attending universities. We speak with Jan Egeland, head of the Norwegian Refugee Council, which is one of several NGOs to suspend operations in the country, as well as Afghan educator and women’s rights activist Jamila Afghani, who leads the Afghanistan section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and was evacuated from Kabul last August.

This content originally appeared on Democracy Now! and was authored by Democracy Now!.

Former New Zealand prime minister Helen Clark is supporting aid agencies’ decision to halt operations in Afghanistan, and a UN official has urged the Taliban to reverse its ban on women humanitarian workers.

The country’s Taliban administration on Saturday ordered all local and foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs) not to let female staff work until further notice.

It said the move, which was condemned globally, was justified because some women had not adhered to the Taliban’s interpretation of Islamic dress code for women.

• READ MORE: UN to Taliban: ‘Vital’ to reverse ban on women in NGOs

The news led to the beginning of a withdrawal by organisations such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, and Unicef.

Clark, who also used to head the UN Development Programme, said the aid agencies were forced to suspend their services or yield to an oppressive policy.

She condemned Afghanistan’s banning of female humanitarian workers.

“It’s a huge violation of human rights of women. Where do you draw the line? If the organisations simply capitulated to this edict from the Taliban, they would be seen to be going along with a huge violation of women’s rights,” she said.

“So it is important that big organisations are speaking out now as they have, and are saying they will suspend their operations while this policy holds.

“The problem is the Taliban and these horrible hostile decisions that they’re taking towards women.”

Clark said the Taliban had tried to present itself as more legitimate than the last time it ruled Afghanistan, but a leopard did not change its spots.

She expected the Taliban leadership would face strong ongoing pressure from the UN and other entities, and they would see the consequences of foreign aid groups withdrawing.

UN calls for Taliban to reverse the decision
A senior UN official has urged Afghanistan’s Taliban administration to reverse the ban on female humanitarian workers, and charities fear it will worsen winter hardships.

“Millions of Afghans need humanitarian assistance and removing barriers is vital,” UNAMA said in the statement, adding that its acting head and humanitarian coordinator Ramiz Alakbarov had met with Economy Minister Mohammad Hanif.

The directives barring women from working at NGOs came from Hanif’s ministry.

The orders did not apply directly to the United Nations, but many of its programmes were carried out by NGOs subject to the order.

Four major global NGOs, whose humanitarian efforts had reached millions of Afghans, announced they were suspending operations on Sunday. Other smaller NGOs had also announced suspensions, including UK-based Islamic Relief Worldwide.

The NGOs said they were unable to run their programmes without female staff.

More than half of Afghanistan’s population relied on humanitarian aid, according to aid agencies. Basic aid was more critical during the mountainous nation’s harsh winter.

Two spokesmen for the Taliban administration did not respond to queries on the suspension of humanitarian programmes.

NGOs were also a critical source of employment for tens of thousands of Afghans, particularly women, as the local economy had collapsed following the withdrawal of US-led foreign forces and the Taliban takeover last year.

One such employee, a 27-year-old female aid worker in western Afghanistan who asked for her identity to be concealed because she feared retribution, said that her NGO had shut its office on Saturday and she could not go to work.

The NGO, funded by a Western country, worked with women in the agriculture sector, helping them set up sustainable incomes.

She said she was worried that losing her job would have a huge impact on her family because she was a single woman and the sole breadwinner.

Her father was dead and her mother was a housewife, she said, adding that she supported four sisters, three of whom were university students who could not complete their degrees since the Taliban administration barred women from attending university last week.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ. 

This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

On December 9, around 50 armed officers surrounded and entered the home of Noori, a reporter with independent Takharistan Radio, in Taloqan city in northeastern Takhar Province, according to Rohullah Noori, the journalist’s cousin and director of the station, and the exile-based watchdog group Afghanistan Journalist Center.  

The men beat Noori and some of his family and searched his home for hours before detaining the journalist and transferring him to the provincial headquarters of the Taliban General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). Rohullah Noori told CPJ by phone that the journalist was interrogated for 48 hours about the station’s programming, which his interrogators said had not been approved by the Taliban without giving further details.  

Officials beat the journalist with an iron rod, administered electric shocks, and suffocated him with a plastic bag, according to Rohullah Noori.

“The Taliban must investigate the detention and brutal assault of Afghan journalist Zabihullah Noori and hold its intelligence agency accountable for these unconscionable actions against a reporter,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi in Frankfurt, Germany. “Violence against journalists must not go unpunished. The Taliban’s promise that independent media can continue to operate freely under its rule is worthless until it ensures that its forces do not attack and harass journalists.

Upon the intervention of local tribal elders, Noori was released after 48 hours, Rohullah Noori said, adding that he was required to sign a letter saying that he would no longer report against the Taliban directives. The journalist has since left the country, said Rohullah Noori, who directs the radio station from overseas since fleeing Afghanistan in 2021 amid Taliban threats.

CPJ reviewed images and video of Noori after the beating that showed bruising on his thighs, and Rohullah Noori said he was experiencing short-term memory loss.

CPJ has documented the GDI’s expanded role in persecuting and abusing journalists in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover of August 2021.

CPJ contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app but did not receive any response.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Madeline Earp.

“The release of journalist Ivor Shearer is a small relief after four months of unjust and arbitrary detention, and we call on the Taliban to immediately release all other journalists who are being held,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi. “The continued detention of Afghan journalists underscores the dire situation of press freedom in Afghanistan, which has gone from bad to worse with an intensifying crackdown on the media in the past year.”

Shearer arrived in Doha, Qatar, on Tuesday after he was freed and appeared to be healthy, a source familiar with the matter told CPJ, asking not to be named for safety reasons.  

Afghan producer Faizullah Faizbakhsh, who was arrested along with Shearer on August 17 while they were filming in the Afghan capital Kabul, has not been released and his whereabouts remain unknown, the source added.

The Taliban authorities and U.S. State Department have not identified the two Americans who were released on Tuesday. Citing anonymous sources, CNN and The Washington Post reported that one of the two Americans was Shearer.

Taliban intelligence agents detained Shearer and Faizbakhsh while they were filming in Kabul, where a U.S. drone strike killed Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri earlier in August. 

Shearer was one of at least three journalists imprisoned in Afghanistan as of December 1, 2022, according to CPJ’s annual prison census. Afghanistan appeared on the list for the first time in 12 years after the Taliban took back control of the country in August 2021.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Jennifer Dunham.

The Taliban’s Ministry of Information and Culture issued the ban, which went into effect on Thursday, removing the two stations from AM and FM transmission networks in Afghanistan, according to statements by both broadcasters. The statements said the Taliban received unspecified complaints about the outlets’ programming content.

In its statement, RFE/RL said it would continue working outside the country and would expand options to reach its audience through other platforms.

“The Taliban must immediately lift their ban on radio broadcasts by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America in Afghanistan,” said CPJ Asia Program Coordinator Beh Lih Yi, in Frankfurt, Germany. “The information aired by those outlets is critical and can save lives. This latest crackdown on media clearly shows the Taliban is going back on their word about guaranteeing press freedom in Afghanistan.”

RFE/RL’s Afghan service, known locally as Azadi, is among the most popular media outlets in Afghanistan, covering issues from public health to school lessons for girls, in the Dari and Pashto languages, the outlet wrote in its statement. VOA wrote that the station’s Afghan service broadcasts 12 hours a day on 15 FM channels and two medium wave channels, with programming split between the Pashto and Dari languages.

CPJ contacted Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid for comment via messaging app but did not receive any response.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.