Departing from a policy from trying to speak with a unique voice and not being derivative, I prefer to publish a view that is similar to my own but has been already published, is highly informative, and is eloquently expressed.

The secret sauce of Chinese industrial success
Smart state planning plus ferocious market competition
Hua Bin, May 23

The planning function is carried out by the China State Planning and Development Commission, which assembles the best minds in the government, academia, think tanks, and industries and goes through multi-year research, studies, and survey to understand and predict key technological trends and future market demand. Then they iterate and socialize the plans until there is broad buy-in.

Once top-line state planning priorities are set, central government empowers local governments to implement the policies. At the implementation level, fierce market competition becomes the norm.

Local governments compete with each other. Each local government is powerfully incentivized to create local tech and industrial champions as career advancements are typically tied in with achievements of national priorities.

Local governments unleash suites of policy support measures to attract and help businesses succeed, including

• Preferential tax
• Land use priority
• Preferential bank loans, even venture capital financing from government agencies (e.g. Shanghai and Shenzhen each has multi-billion dollar semiconductor funds)

Other policy support even extends to

• Establishing educational programs at universities to train and develop scientific and technical talents specifically for identified industries and technologies (e.g. AI, robotics, hypersonics, rare earth mining and refining, rail, ship building, etc.)
• Rolling out talent acquisition programs to provide housing, allowances, and compensation equalization schemes to attract talents to move to their cities. Some governments even provide WeWork type of office facilities to startups for free.
• investing in infrastructure upgrades including 5G coverage, EV charging stations, high speed rail, ports, bridges, etc. to enable smooth operation of large industrial enterprises.
• Investing in local parts and components supply chains that can be plugged into specific manufacturing sectors.
• Promoting successful technical leaders and executives in critical industries into senior government positions (e.g. the head of AVIC, the leading aeronautic business in China, was promoted to become a provincial governor)

The central government went so far as to crack down on monopolistic consumer tech companies such as Alibaba and Tencent in 2019 as these companies were consuming too much financial and talent resources and preventing startups from emerging. The main goal of the crackdown was to redirect resources (funding, talent) to more productive directions such as AI and hard tech.

As a result, in the key technological and industrial hubs across China, from Shanghai, Shenzhen, Wuhan, Chengdu to Hefei and Changsa, you will find hundreds of EV companies, solar energy companies, AI and robotics startups, ship builders, and drone companies that are developing innovative technologies, building production capacity, and engage in intense competition for consumers.

In the competition, there are private businesses, state owned enterprises, and foreign companies as well. All have to compete for customers on price and quality and operate with razor thin margin. Innovation and cost efficiency are prized in the never-ending loop of hyper competition.

The Chinese industrial and technological ecosystem is often described by insiders as “arena for gladiators”. In a survival of the fittest environment, the winners of such competitions emerge as world class champions.

The same model is replicated in industry after industry from EV, smart phones, solar energy, robotics, ship building, AI large language models, drones, chip making, and biopharmaceuticals.

Many people mistakenly assume the Chinese state planning model means the government picks the winners and losers. That cannot be further from the truth. State planners pick the priority industries, define the swim lane, provide policy incentives, and then market takes over to decide the winner.

In contrast, the US industrial policy is more guilty of government picking winners – just witness how both Biden and Trump surround themselves with senior executives of incumbent tech giants when they announce policies such as the Chips Act, Inflation Reduction Act, or the Stargate program. Almost by definition, the main beneficiaries of these industrial policies will be the companies in the room. Market competition doesn’t seem to play the same decisive rule as in China.

As China accelerates the third mixed-economy phase of its industrial development, we can expect to see more Chinese companies will innovate faster, scale in the largest single market in the world, and become world-class competitors in their industries. Profit margins will be kept low as competition will never rest. However, more consumer surplus will accrue to customers, leading to improvement of living standards for all.

Hua Bin details the advances in China’s economy and describes why those advances will continue and cannot stall ─ the government apparatus plans ahead, outlines alternative directions to roadblocks, and facilitates shifts in production, enabling government industry to step in when private initiative falters. No matter how the U.S. contends China, the PRC will find a way to deter the contention and, in the end, the U.S. will lose, and lose until, as a last resort….

This content originally appeared on Dissident Voice and was authored by Dan Lieberman.

But the claim is false. The photo in fact shows Hua and a Chinese journalist, Serena Dong, and it was taken in Beijing. AFCL found no reliable reports that Hua and Dong are related. 

The photo of Hua posing with a woman in a blue hooded jacket was shared on X, formerly known as Twitter, on Sep. 27, 2024.

“The older woman in this pic is China’s deputy foreign minister @SpokespersonCHN [Hua’s X handle], the other is her daughter. The location is somewhere in the US,” the claim reads in part. 

“She is a hardcore anti-US CCP official, yet she sent her young daughter to poor, dangerous and evil America anyway,” it reads further. 

Hua is a prominent diplomat, known for her sharp rhetoric and staunch defense of China’s policies. She has become a key figure in shaping China’s international image, playing a significant role in addressing global concerns related to China, especially on issues such as the U.S.-China relations, human rights and regional disputes.

But the claim about the photo of Hua is false. 

Original photo

A reverse image search on Google found the same photo published on May 28 by Serena Dong, a journalist for the English-language news channel of state-run China Global Television Network, or CGTN. 

The photo was published alongside a congratulatory text a day after the government announced Hua’s promotion to vice foreign minister.

Dong later removed the post from X.

Location

AFCL found the photo was taken in China’s capital, Beijing, not in the U.S.

A closer look at the photo shows the Beijing Winter Olympics logo and unclear Chinese text on the building behind Hua and Dong. 

A comparison with photos published by The Beijing News shows that the roof shape of the building seen in Dong’s photo is identical to that of the Olympic village in Yanqing, Beijing. 

Relationship between Dong and Hua

AFCL does not know the exact relationship between Hua and Dong but found no credible reports that they are related.

Public information about Hua’s family is scarce.

Hua is married and has a daughter, though the  identity of her husband has been the subject of debate, although the pro-Beijing Chinese-language Sing Tao Daily said that Hua’s husband was also a Chinese diplomat.

Dong has not responded to inquiries as of the time of publication. 

Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Taejun Kang.

Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.

This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Rita Cheng for Asia Fact Check Lab.

On April 19, police arrested Lü in the city of Huanggang, in central Hubei province, according to reports in late July and mid-August by the Chinese-language human rights news website Weiquanwang and state-owned provincial newspaper Hubei Daily.

The Hubei Daily said that Lü and another suspect were arrested for allegedly extorting advertisers, their equipment was seized, and their bank accounts frozen. It said their case went to court on May 26 with the approval of the Huanggang City Procuratorate, or public prosecutor. The trial had not started as of Tuesday, August 22.

“Authorities in China’s Hubei province should ensure that publisher Lü Hua and all other members of the press can cover topics of public interest without fear that they will be arrested and face years in prison,” said Iris Hsu, CPJ’s China representative. “Arresting a journalist for reporting on alleged government wrongdoing is shameful, and Lü should be released at once.”

Hubei Xinshidianwang regularly reports on social issues. In early April, the outlet published an investigation, which was covered by other domestic media outlets, about a local official in eastern Hubei who allegedly used public money to build herself a luxurious bedroom in a government office building. The story has since been removed from the outlet’s website, which has not been updated since Lü’s arrest.

If convicted of extortion, Lü could face up to three years in prison; if the court rules that the journalist committed a “more serious” form of extortion, he could face up to 10 years, according to China’s Criminal Law.

CPJ’s calls to Hubei Xinshidianwang and messages to the Huanggang Public Security Bureau, the local police force, did not receive any replies.

At least 43 journalists were imprisoned in China at the time of CPJ’s December 1, 2022, prison census.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Erik Crouch.